
The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld Hannah Lafferty’s conviction for dangerous driving causing death, rejecting her appeal in a case about whether fear of a confrontation justified accelerating and swerving a truck to shake another woman off it.
In R. v. Lafferty, 2026 SCC 38, five judges unanimously dismissed the appeal on November 10. Chief Justice Richard Wagner delivered a brief oral judgment adopting substantially the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal for the Northwest Territories.
That majority had upheld two separate reasons for rejecting self-defence: the trial judge found Lafferty’s belief that she would be hurt was not reasonably grounded, and her driving was not a proportionate response to the perceived threat. A dissenting appeal judge would have ordered a new trial, questioning both conclusions.
A confrontation beside a parked truck
The case arose from an April 21, 2022 incident in Yellowknife. Lafferty drove a man she was dating to his former partner’s apartment building and waited in the truck with its engine running. The two women knew of each other but had not previously spoken.
After the man gestured for Lafferty to leave, his former partner approached and opened the driver’s door. She stood on the running board and held an interior handle as Lafferty accelerated and swerved, intending to throw her off the truck.
Germaine Mantla was standing farther up the road. Lafferty braked, but the open door struck him. He died from his injuries four months later.
There was little dispute that the driving endangered the public. The appeal majority, Justices Jolaine Antonio and Jane Fagnan, explained that deliberately creating a danger can establish the fault required for dangerous driving. Lafferty’s decision to accelerate and swerve to dislodge the woman was sufficient; the case did not depend solely on comparing her driving with that of a reasonably careful driver.
Why the majority rejected self-defence
The trial judge accepted that Lafferty believed the other woman wanted to hurt her. Accepting that belief did not settle whether it rested on reasonable grounds, as the Criminal Code requires.
The majority found no reversible error in the judge’s assessment of the history between the women, the absence of a weapon and the circumstances of the approach to the truck. It said the judge properly examined the threat Lafferty actually perceived — that she would be hurt — rather than substituting a different belief about the other woman trying to control the vehicle.
The majority also upheld the finding that the driving itself was disproportionate. Lafferty argued that the judge had focused improperly on Mantla’s death instead of the risk her driving created. The majority disagreed: the judge had assessed the manner of driving, and the reference to an innocent bystander’s death was not essential to that reasoning.
A further dispute concerned Lafferty’s recent shoulder injury. The majority said the injury had been argued at trial and there was no basis to conclude the judge had overlooked it merely because the written reasons did not expressly discuss it. It rejected an approach that reduced the circumstances to a choice between fighting and fleeing.
The dissent would have required another trial
Justice Mark Mossey agreed that deliberately trying to throw the woman off the truck established the fault required for dangerous driving. He nevertheless considered the self-defence analysis flawed.
He emphasized evidence that the other woman reached for the ignition key to compel a confrontation. In his view, the trial judge had interpreted force too narrowly by concentrating on anticipated harm rather than the attempted compulsion. He considered Lafferty’s perception of a threat reasonably grounded.
Mossey also found that the judge had failed to assess adequately how Lafferty’s shoulder injury affected her physical capabilities and possible responses. He would have ordered a new trial on that independent basis as well. The majority found neither ground justified interfering with the conviction.
The majority separately rejected Lafferty’s argument that the judge mishandled the burden of proof by failing to recite the standard framework for assessing an accused’s testimony. Much of her evidence had been accepted, and the reasons expressly recognized the Crown’s burden. The majority saw no indication that she had been convicted simply because the judge disbelieved her.
The Supreme Court’s dismissal leaves the conviction in place. Its short judgment supplies no separate analysis beyond its substantial adoption of the territorial appeal majority’s reasons.
Sources: Supreme Court judgment; incorporated appeal reasons, including dissent.



