
When a litigant has little money, an order to set aside funds for the other side’s appeal costs can put an appeal out of reach. In Anderson v Double M Construction Ltd., the B.C. Court of Appeal upheld a $5,000 security order against a woman challenging a ruling in a campground dispute. The panel rejected her argument that a judge could require security from someone in her financial position only if the appeal was certain to fail.
Cheryl Anderson leased a site at a private campground operated by Double M Construction. Litigation followed over the lease and damage to personal property she kept there, including a vehicle. A trial judge dismissed Anderson’s claim, found she had repudiated her contracts and ordered her to give the operator vacant possession. Anderson appealed on a narrow ground. She said the judge had failed to address, or adequately explain the dismissal of, her claim about responsibility for property entrusted to another’s care.
Anderson obtained a waiver of court fees. The respondents nevertheless faced their own expense in defending the appeal. They asked for $9,750 in security. In June, a judge ordered Anderson to post $5,000 within 30 days and put the appeal on hold pending that deposit. The order allowed the respondents to apply for dismissal if she failed to post the money.
Anderson asked three appeal judges to change the order. Justice Iyer, writing for the panel, acknowledged the problem on both sides. Someone with more money could pursue an equally weak appeal, while a litigant without the funds might never get a hearing. Yet the respondents had won in the court below and might never recover the costs of defending that result.
A judge deciding whether to require security makes only a preliminary assessment of the appeal. Requiring a conclusion that the appeal is hopeless would turn that assessment into a condition that had to be met before the judge could consider anything else. Iyer said the judge must weigh the appeal’s strength alongside the parties’ circumstances, including the appellant’s means, the timing of the request and the likelihood that the respondents could recover their costs.
Here, the judge had read the pleadings, the trial reasons and both sides’ written arguments. Anderson’s argument on appeal placed responsibility for goods in another’s care at the centre of a case that had focused below on intentional or negligent acts. The judge explained why that shift weakened the appeal and set security well below the amount requested. The panel found no error and dismissed the application to change the security order. Its ruling left the merits of Anderson’s appeal undecided.



