The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia has refused to certify a proposed automobile-insurance class action after finding that a replacement representative plaintiff could not fairly and adequately represent the people the lawsuit sought to cover.

In Barnard v. The Portage Mutual Insurance Company, 2026 NSSC 337, decided October 30, 2026, Justice Gail L. Gatchalian dismissed both the motion to add Sandra Clark as a plaintiff and appoint her as class representative, and the motion to certify the proceeding. The ruling did not determine whether the insurers had improperly deducted benefits.

A narrower class needed a different representative

The proposed lawsuit concerned deductions from weekly income-loss payments under the mandatory accident-benefits section of Nova Scotia’s standard automobile policy.

In an earlier certification decision issued February 20, 2026, the judge had been prepared to allow part of the case to proceed, but for the absence of an adequate representative. The proposed class covered people insured by a defendant in Nova Scotia whose weekly payments, received since April 2007, had been reduced below $250 because of deductions for Employment Insurance disability benefits.

The contemplated common questions concerned whether the policy permitted those deductions and, if not, whether they breached the contract and whether a uniform deduction practice breached the duty of good faith. People whose payments were reduced because of long-term disability or Canada Pension Plan disability benefits were excluded from the proposed class.

The original proposed representative, Dougalenes Bowman, had experienced a long-term disability deduction, not an EI disability deduction. Clark fell within the narrower definition because Intact had deducted EI disability benefits from her payments.

The court had power to consider a replacement

The insurers argued that section 8(1) of the Class Proceedings Act did not expressly authorize adding or substituting parties. They contrasted it with section 12, which expressly permits changes to parties after certification has been refused.

The judge rejected that reading. Section 8(1) allows a certification hearing to be adjourned so pleadings can be amended or further evidence introduced. Read alongside the Act’s purposes and the Civil Procedure Rules, it allowed the court to consider a new representative. Requiring a fresh lawsuit to correct an otherwise remediable deficiency would waste time, money and judicial resources.

The insurers did not assert serious prejudice from adding Clark. Nor had the earlier ruling required Bowman to be removed as a named plaintiff before someone else could represent the class.

Knowledge and reliable evidence were decisive

The plaintiffs still had to provide some factual basis for concluding that Clark would adequately represent the class. A representative need not be the best possible candidate or master every legal and factual detail, but must have a basic understanding of the case and the role.

The court rejected objections based on Clark’s inability to fund an adverse costs award. Her lawyers’ firm had agreed to indemnify her. Although evidence of that agreement was filed late, the judge admitted it because it was relevant, excluding it would leave a false premise before the court, and the insurers did not allege prejudice. The litigation plan had already been found sufficient with modifications.

The decisive problems were different. Clark’s affidavit said she had reviewed the pleadings, certification decision and litigation plan. On cross-examination, she said she had not reviewed the plan and gave inconsistent or uncertain answers about other documents. The judge found false and unreliable evidence on matters central to her suitability.

Clark also lacked basic knowledge of the claims and the earlier decision, and was unaware of counsel’s stated intention to appeal it. The judge distinguished assessing a representative’s suitability from deciding the merits of the proposed lawsuit.

Without an adequate representative, certification failed. Costs remained unresolved: if the parties could not agree, the insurers could make written submissions within two weeks and the plaintiffs within four weeks of the decision. The ruling shows that replacing a proposed representative is procedurally possible, but does not dispense with evidence that the replacement can perform the role.