A Toronto taxpayer has lost her claim to the principal residence exemption after the Tax Court found that inconsistent testimony and documents did not establish that she ordinarily inhabited the property before selling it.

In Abbasi v. The King, Justice Jenna Clark dismissed appeals concerning Huda Abbasi’s 2014 and 2015 taxation years. The October 23 decision also rejected additional expenses claimed against gains on two property sales and upheld late-filing penalties.

Short occupation can qualify, but must be proven

The Minister had assessed capital gains of $67,261 on the first property and $177,651 on the second. Both sales were initially treated as business income, but the Minister changed that treatment to capital gains after objections. The trial therefore was not a decision that the taxpayer was carrying on a house-flipping business.

Abbasi argued that the second property was her principal residence. She testified that she intended to renovate it, move in and sell her existing home, and that she gradually spent more time there while renovations proceeded.

The judge emphasized that the statutory test requires ordinary inhabitation in the year, not throughout the year. A short period can suffice, and retaining another residence does not automatically defeat the exemption. The question was whether this property was occupied as part of Abbasi’s customary way of life rather than casually or occasionally.

The evidence failed that test. Neither Abbasi nor the other witnesses could provide a sufficiently clear account of when she began living there. Their testimony conflicted on important details, including the renovation timeline. Utility and renovation records largely connected the property to her brother, who lived there, rather than to her. She continued to receive her mail at her existing home.

The court did not find the residence testimony credible and concluded that ordinary inhabitation had not been established on a balance of probabilities. The ruling turned on the evidence, not on a minimum number of days that every homeowner must satisfy.

Additional costs lacked the necessary support

Abbasi also sought to reduce the gains by financing-related charges, tax adjustments and other amounts. The court found insufficient evidence that the disputed amounts were incurred for the purpose of disposing of the properties or were otherwise properly included in their cost.

A separate claim that a $15,000 purchaser’s deposit represented additional real estate commission also failed. The purchase agreement credited that deposit toward the price, and the evidence did not establish that the realtor retained it as a further commission.

Penalty challenge required facts, not just a pleading objection

For the late-filing penalties, Abbasi argued that the Crown had not established lateness through documentary evidence or a formal pleaded assumption. The court distinguished these penalties under subsection 162(1) from penalties for which the Income Tax Act expressly places a proof burden on the Minister.

The Crown’s reply identified a May 20, 2017 filing date. Abbasi did not dispute that date, plead a different one, challenge the calculation through material facts or introduce evidence establishing timely filing. Her asserted belief that the second sale did not need to be reported did not establish due diligence in avoiding late filing.

The judge also rejected procedural objections concerning an imperfectly worded assumption and alleged unfairness in addressing contradictory witness testimony. The contradictions arose in the taxpayer’s own evidence and were also put to witnesses in cross-examination.

Costs were awarded to the Crown, with the amount left for agreement or written submissions. The reasons do not fix a dollar amount.

Read the official judgment and reasons. This is an unofficial report.