The Federal Court of Appeal has refused to lift Paul Abi-Mansour’s vexatious-litigant designation, explaining that removing such an order requires persuasive evidence of a lasting change, not another attempt to contest the original decision.

In Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Abi-Mansour, 2026 FCA 168, Justice David Stratas dismissed the motion on October 5 and awarded costs to the union. The reasons do not fix a dollar amount.

The court had declared Abi-Mansour a vexatious litigant in 2025. His new motion invoked subsection 40(3) of the Federal Courts Act, which permits the court to rescind that order. The provision does not expressly list the conditions for doing so, making its relationship with the rest of the legislation central to the decision.

Ending an order is different from permitting one proceeding

Justice Stratas distinguished complete removal of a vexatious-litigant order from permission to pursue a particular case while the order remains in force. The latter route is addressed by subsection 40(4).

A narrow arrangement might support permission for an individual proceeding. As an example, the judge suggested that a reputable lawyer responsible for managing a case could provide a safeguard. But that was an illustration, not a finding that hiring counsel automatically secures permission or a ruling granting such permission here.

Rescinding the order altogether requires more than a temporary solution. The litigant must demonstrate through compelling evidence a fundamental, meaningful and lasting change in circumstances, personal condition or attitude toward using the courts, showing that the conduct which prompted the order will not recur.

The court connected that demanding standard to the purpose of section 40: protecting other parties and the court system from repeated abuse and wasted resources. Complete rescission is justified only when the protective order is no longer needed.

A rescission motion is not another appeal

The judgment also distinguishes rescission from challenging whether the original order was correct. The Act provides an appeal route from a Federal Court decision declaring someone vexatious. Subsection 40(3) cannot be used as an additional or substitute appeal after a matter has been finally determined.

Abi-Mansour argued that the court which made the designation had misinterpreted section 40 and used an improper procedure. Justice Stratas characterized those submissions as an effort to relitigate a final order more than a year after it was made, rather than evidence supporting its removal.

The judge also relied on Abi-Mansour’s continuing failure to pay outstanding costs awards as evidence that his attitude toward using the courts had not changed.

Filing restriction remains

The Registry was directed not to file further motions, proceedings or other documents from Abi-Mansour without leave of the court under Rule 72 of the Federal Courts Rules. The Attorney General did not seek costs; the union did, but did not request an increased award.

The decision leaves a statutory route for a litigant who can establish genuine, lasting change. It does not make a designation impossible to remove, but confirms that disagreement with the earlier ruling is not enough.