The Supreme Court of Canada rejected a fixed five-month ceiling for sentencing delay while upholding a reduced conditional sentence for an offender whose sentencing proceedings took unreasonably long.

In R. v. R.B.-C., 2026 SCC 30, the Court unanimously dismissed the offender’s appeal on September 11, 2026. It confirmed that the delay breached the Charter but left in place the Ontario Court of Appeal’s reduction of his conditional sentence from two years less a day to 20 months.

Justice Sheilah Martin’s reasons established a contextual test: whether sentencing took “markedly longer than it reasonably should have” in all the circumstances. A sentence reduction will ordinarily be the appropriate remedy, rather than an automatic stay of proceedings.

More than a year to impose sentence

R.B.-C. was convicted of sexual assault in October 2021. Sentencing began immediately, but a series of adjournments, incomplete submissions, technical difficulties and periods of judicial unavailability extended the process. Questions about the collateral consequences of possible sentences generated further submissions over several appearances.

In October 2022, before sentence had been imposed, the defence sought a stay for breach of section 11(b), the Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time. The offender waived further delay needed for the Crown to respond. The judge dismissed the application and imposed sentence in December 2022, more than 14 months after conviction.

Applying the five-month presumptive ceiling from the Ontario Court of Appeal’s Charley decision, the trial judge had deducted periods attributed to the defence, exceptional events and complexity. Her resulting calculation fell below that ceiling.

The Court of Appeal rejected some deductions, found unconstitutional delay and reduced the conditional sentence to 20 months. It declined to grant the more extensive relief the offender sought. At the Supreme Court, he urged adoption of the five-month ceiling and argued that a stay, or functionally similar relief, was required once a breach was established.

Why Jordan’s approach did not carry over

The Supreme Court confirmed that section 11(b) protects the period through sentencing. But the presumptive ceilings established in Jordan govern delay leading to the end of trial evidence and argument, not every later stage of criminal proceedings.

The Court rejected Charley’s sentencing ceiling for two principal reasons. Sentencing is an individualized process, and the evidentiary foundation that justified Jordan’s fixed limits was absent here.

A sentencing judge may need pre-sentence, psychological, Gladue or other background reports, victim-impact material, findings on disputed facts, or submissions on available sanctions and collateral consequences. The process ends only when all components of the sanction, including ancillary orders, have been fixed. The Criminal Code requires sentencing “as soon as practicable,” while allowing the information needed for a fit and proportionate sentence to be gathered.

Variability alone would not defeat a ceiling: trials also differ in complexity. The decisive additional point was that Jordan responded to a proven systemic culture of complacency about bringing accused people to trial. No comparable record established such a sentencing-delay problem. A lack of reported sentencing-delay decisions did not prove one.

Rejecting a ceiling did not excuse poor management. Judges should identify the parties’ positions and disputed issues early, set deadlines for materials and argument, and require both sides to help avoid unnecessary delay.

A contextual test, not acceptance of chronic delay

The “markedly longer” standard already appeared in the Court’s delay jurisprudence, including cases about time spent deliberating on a verdict. Applying it throughout sentencing avoids artificially separating judicial deliberation from report preparation, submissions and other parts of the process.

The assessment compares the actual elapsed time with what the particular sentencing process reasonably required. Relevant considerations include its overall length, complexity, explanations for particular delays, the parties’ positions and conduct, and comparable cases in the relevant local setting. Waiver, defence-caused delay and exceptional circumstances can inform that assessment without turning it into a mechanical calculation.

An extraordinarily long delay could exceptionally establish a breach by its sheer duration, but that will be extremely unlikely. Ordinarily, elapsed time must be assessed in context.

The benchmark is a justice system functioning as it ought to, not whatever delays an underfunded system has come to tolerate. Local realities, such as the logistics of a remote court, can matter. Chronic resource shortages, institutional inertia or delayed access to necessary reports cannot become their own constitutional justification. Usual appellate deference to underlying factual findings remains.

Relief must address the breach

The Court rejected an automatic stay for unconstitutional sentencing delay. Before conviction, the accused remains presumed innocent and delay can taint the process of deciding guilt. After a valid conviction, liberty, security and fairness interests remain protected, but the balance changes: society has a heightened interest in a fit sentence for an offence already proved.

Section 24(1) of the Charter requires a remedy appropriate and just in the circumstances. Reducing a sentence ordinarily responds to the uncertainty, extended restrictions and postponed sanction caused by unreasonable sentencing delay.

The Court emphasized that such a reduction is a constitutional remedy, not merely an “enhanced” mitigating factor. Ordinary delay may sometimes mitigate a sentence without a Charter breach; a reduction for unconstitutional delay rests on a different legal basis.

A stay remains possible in exceptional, clear cases after consideration of alternatives and the competing interests. It is not presumed necessary simply because a breach occurred. Crucially, a stay at this stage would end the remaining sentencing process prospectively, without undoing a lawful conviction unaffected by the delay. The Court also left room for other tailored remedies rather than prescribing a binding formula.

The delay still breached the Charter

Although the Ontario Court of Appeal had used the wrong five-month framework, the Supreme Court agreed with its finding of unconstitutional delay.

Understanding the sentence’s collateral consequences was legitimate, but the issue was neither novel nor unusually complex. It had been raised early. Instead of being resolved through focused questions and a timetable, it developed incrementally over repeated appearances and additional opinions.

Other adjournments, technical problems and availability difficulties were not remarkable individually. Together, however, they did not satisfactorily explain the total delay in a case of modest complexity. Sentencing had taken markedly longer than reasonably necessary.

The Court accepted the reduction to 20 months as a proper and proportionate remedy reflecting approximately four months of unconstitutional delay. It did not disturb the conviction or award the stay sought. The ruling establishes the legal remedy; it does not establish when the offender completed the sentence or any present release or compliance status.

Source: R. v. R.B.-C., 2026 SCC 30.