
The Northwest Territories Supreme Court has required a plaintiff to deposit $22,050 as security for litigation costs, but limited the calculation to the discovery stage rather than demanding protection for an uncertain future trial.
In Raymond v Gillis, 2026 NWTSC 56, Justice S.M. MacPherson balanced the defendants’ ability to recover costs against the risk that a large upfront deposit could prevent the plaintiff from having her case heard. The August 27 ruling also adjusted an outdated costs tariff to account for inflation and the additional work of representing multiple defendants.
Barbara Raymond did not dispute that she had to provide security. The disagreement concerned how much. The court did not decide her underlying claims concerning tenancy and occupancy rights.
Competing estimates and an unresolved consolidation
Raymond’s action arose from accommodation arrangements after she moved to the territory for work. She sued Robin Gillis, the Paulatuk Housing Association and Lorna Neal following the end of those arrangements. A separate action against the Beaufort-Delta Divisional Education Council remained outstanding.
The defendants relied on Raymond’s residence outside the jurisdiction to seek security under the court’s rules. Because entitlement was conceded, the judge did not need to decide that threshold issue.
Raymond proposed security through discovery, broadly in the range of $14,000 to $15,000 plus disbursements already incurred. She argued that Gillis should count as one defence unit and the jointly represented housing association and Neal as another. The defendants sought $37,474.50, based on estimated party-and-party costs for all three defendants through trial.
The possibility of consolidating the two actions complicated the calculation. Raymond wanted any trial-stage security deferred until it became clearer whether a trial would occur and what it would involve. The defendants raised uncertainty about her ability to pay and the cost and delay of another security application.
Why security stopped at discovery
The rules permit security in different amounts at different stages. The judge treated the amount as a balancing exercise: it should provide meaningful protection without becoming oppressive.
Three considerations supported a staged order. First, Raymond’s counsel acknowledged that she was highly unlikely to reverse her position on the obligation to provide security if a later application became necessary. The judge gave that pragmatic concession considerable weight because it reduced the defendants’ concern about having to argue entitlement again.
Second, estimating trial costs before the consolidation question was resolved would be speculative. Combining the actions would almost certainly change the complexity and cost of a trial. A figure fixed immediately risked becoming an unsupported estimate rather than a reasoned assessment of likely costs.
Third, a large deposit covering an entire trial could create a practical barrier to access to justice. Limiting security to discovery was less oppressive, while preserving the defendants’ ability to obtain further protection later. Fairness still had to extend to the defendants, whose potential costs recovery could not be ignored.
More realistic discovery time
The court did not simply adopt Raymond’s proposed calculation. Her draft bill allowed half a day for each discovery witness. Uncontradicted evidence showed that cross-examinations already conducted on the security application had taken most of a day per witness, even though those examinations were narrower than full discovery.
The judge therefore allowed a full day per witness and fixed the discovery-stage tariff assessment at $7,175 plus GST. Existing transcript disbursements were $1,233, but future examinations would also generate transcripts. The court allowed $3,000 for past and future transcript costs.
Shared representation and inflation
The defendants sought a threefold tariff calculation, while Raymond favoured doubling it. The court adopted neither position exactly.
Representing the housing association and Neal involved two distinct clients, even if their objectives substantially overlapped. That created additional work beyond a single retainer and justified more than straight doubling.
But Neal was also the housing association’s designated representative, so only one witness would be required for those defendants. Those efficiencies meant a full third increment was not justified.
Inflation supplied another reason for an adjustment. The tariff had not been revised since 2012 and no longer reasonably approximated litigation costs of this kind. The judge declined both to adopt the defendants’ full multiplier and to postpone inflation entirely until final costs were assessed.
Balancing the added complexity of the shared retainer with inflation, the court fixed the tariff component at $18,000—approximately two-and-a-half times the base amount. Adding $3,000 in disbursements and GST produced the $22,050 deposit.
Raymond was ordered to provide cash or a bond within 90 days. The proceedings were stayed until security was furnished, with dismissal and costs to follow without a further application if she failed to meet the deadline. The defendants could revisit security after examinations for discovery. Those were the order’s conditions; the reasons do not establish whether the deposit was subsequently made.
Source: Raymond v Gillis, 2026 NWTSC 56.



