
The Federal Court of Appeal has upheld the denial of a foreign-exchange trading loss after finding no error in the Tax Court’s conclusion that the transactions pursued a targeted tax loss rather than profit.
In Chad v. Canada, 2026 FCA 84, Justice Siobhan Monaghan, writing for a unanimous panel, rejected an attempt to revisit the court’s source-of-income jurisprudence. The appeal was dismissed with costs on May 1.
The ruling did not find the transactions fictitious. The Tax Court had concluded that they were legally effective and not a sham. The decisive problem was different: an activity undertaken to generate a loss, rather than to pursue profit, did not provide a source of income from which the claimed loss could be deducted.
More than $22 million in losses, followed by offsetting gains
Robert Chad began a foreign-exchange forward-contract straddle strategy in late 2011. It generated a loss exceeding $22 million that year and a nearly equal aggregate gain in 2012. He deducted approximately $9.6 million in calculating 2011 income and approximately $4.9 million of the remaining loss in 2013 and 2014.
Only the 2011 reassessment was before the Tax Court. The minister had advanced sham, legal-effectiveness and source-of-income arguments. Although the first two failed, the Tax Court upheld the reassessment because it found that Chad had pursued loss rather than profit.
On appeal, Chad argued that the absence of any personal or hobby element should have ended the inquiry in his favour. He said the Federal Court of Appeal’s Paletta Estate decision conflicted with the Supreme Court’s Stewart and Walls decisions and should not have been followed.
Pursuing profit is not the same as reasonably expecting it
The panel rejected that argument. Paletta Estate had expressly considered the Supreme Court authorities and treated pursuit of profit as an essential characteristic of a source of income. Chad identified no overlooked statute or binding case that would justify departing from that appellate precedent.
The court also distinguished an intention to pursue profit from a reasonable expectation of earning it. The latter is not a prerequisite to a source of income. A venture may qualify even when it has no reasonable expectation of profit. But the taxpayer must still be pursuing profit rather than exclusively seeking a tax loss.
The panel declined to reformulate the test merely because commentators and litigants had debated its application. A commercial appearance and absence of a hobby element do not settle matters when the evidence shows that the activity was not actually conducted with a view to profit.
At the same time, the reasons do not require every taxpayer to prove a separate profit intention for every transaction. In ordinary commercial situations, the circumstances may make that purpose obvious and further inquiry unnecessary. The court declined to prescribe a fixed list of factors for cases in which the evidence points instead to a deliberate loss.
The evidence had been considered as a whole
Chad alternatively argued that the Tax Court had misapplied the test. He relied on the transactions’ legal effectiveness, said the judge had focused too narrowly on two trades and challenged the treatment of a $240,000 broker fee.
The appeal court found those objections unpersuasive. The Tax Court had examined the trading history, admitted facts and contemporaneous correspondence rather than relying solely on statements of intention. Its reasons considered expert evidence about the possibility of profit, Chad’s knowledge and subsequent learning, and the arrangements under which the trades were carried out.
The broker fee was one relevant feature of the overall assessment, not a decisive rule. The panel also rejected the suggestion that the lower court had ignored the broader course of conduct.
The conclusion that Chad intended to generate a loss was factual. Without a palpable and overriding error, the appeal court could not reweigh the evidence and substitute its own view. No such error was established.
Chad has applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Its public docket for file 42426 records a June 29 application, an August response and a September reply. No leave decision appeared in the docket checked for this report; permission to appeal has not been established.



