The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the cancellation of a Quebec declaration of death after an insurer produced evidence that a missing man was alive in Iran, ruling that he did not have to return physically to Quebec for the law to recognize his survival.

In Riddle v. ivari, 2026 SCC 9, a unanimous court rejected Deborah Carol Riddle’s challenge to the annulment of the judgment declaring her husband, Hooshang Imanpoorsaid, dead. The dispute arose after his disappearance and concerned a life insurance policy with an insured sum of $550,000.

Chief Justice Richard Wagner’s April 10, 2026 reasons addressed two distinct questions: what evidence can undo a declaration of death, and whether the insurer’s failure to notify the missing man of its application invalidated the proceedings. The insurer succeeded on both, although the court criticized its failure to attempt service.

A declaration based on prolonged absence

Imanpoorsaid, an insurance and mutual fund representative living in Brossard, left home in February 2008 after telling his family he was travelling to Toronto for business. A police investigation found he had never gone there. His family did not see him again.

After eight years without his return, Riddle applied for a declaration of death. Ivari opposed the application, arguing that the circumstances suggested he had fled creditors rather than died. The Supreme Court’s reasons recount substantial debts and financial misconduct before his disappearance.

The Superior Court nevertheless declared him dead, assigning a presumed death date in 2015. Once the statutory conditions for a declaration after seven years of absence were met, the suspicious circumstances did not themselves prevent that result.

Ivari subsequently obtained new evidence and sought to annul the declaration under article 98 of the Civil Code of Québec. A different Superior Court judge found it more likely than not that Imanpoorsaid was alive. The Quebec Court of Appeal substantially upheld that decision, while changing the allocation of expert fees.

Riddle argued in the Supreme Court that the declaration could not be undone without certain or unquestionable proof of life. She also maintained that ivari’s failure to serve Imanpoorsaid required dismissal of its application and invalidated the resulting decisions.

Proof of life can come from abroad

The Supreme Court explained that Quebec’s absence regime allows families and others to escape indefinite uncertainty. A person who meets the legal definition of an absentee is generally presumed alive for seven years. A subsequent declaration of death has major legal effects, including opening a succession and dissolving matrimonial ties.

But it presumes death; it does not establish death as a fact. The code expressly anticipates that the missing person may reappear and provides a way to undo the declaration.

In that setting, “return” is not confined to coming back to one’s former home. Evidence that the person is alive elsewhere can suffice. Requiring a physical return to Quebec would leave someone known to be alive abroad legally dead, undermine the reliability of civil-status records, and potentially allow people to evade obligations by remaining outside the province.

The court identified an important time limit, however. At least some evidence of life must concern the period after the declaration of death was pronounced. An old sighting during the initial seven-year period cannot, by itself, undo the judgment: it merely confirms that the person was alive during a period when the law already presumed life.

Earlier records can strengthen newer evidence, and evidence need not coincide exactly with the filing of the annulment application. The judge must assess whether the combined evidence is sufficiently current. A single distant sign of life will generally be inadequate; a body of corroborating records may be persuasive.

The court also distinguished the separate rules for ending a tutorship established to protect an absent person’s property before a declaration of death. In that context, simply learning that the person is alive does not necessarily justify ending the protection. Physical return, or at least a concrete ability to resume administering the property, matters. The same word therefore serves different purposes in the two parts of the code.

No heightened standard of certainty

Riddle’s appeal also failed on the standard of proof. Quebec civil law ordinarily requires proof on a balance of probabilities, and the code creates no special exception for establishing a missing person’s return.

The evidence must be clear and convincing enough to make survival probable, rather than merely possible. That does not create an intermediate standard between ordinary civil proof and certainty. The seriousness or apparent improbability of the facts does not change the legal threshold.

The trial judge had considered Iranian identity and passport documents, photographs, travel records, civil-status information and a welfare registration. The evidence included travel after the declaration of death and registration for welfare in December 2018. She was satisfied that the person identified in those records was Riddle’s husband.

Riddle had not alleged a palpable and overriding error in that factual assessment. Having rejected her legal arguments, the Supreme Court would not weigh the evidence afresh.

Failure to notify was serious but not fatal

On the separate procedural issue, the court rejected ivari’s position that service was unnecessary. The right to learn of proceedings affecting one’s rights and to be heard is fundamental. Difficulty locating someone abroad does not erase the obligation; courts can authorize appropriate alternative methods of notification.

Ivari should have attempted service, particularly because it had retained lawyers in Iran and said it had obtained Imanpoorsaid’s telephone number. The court rejected the suggestion that insisting on notification was merely technical nitpicking.

The consequence of defective service nevertheless depends on context, including prejudice to the people concerned and the integrity of the judicial process. Here, the normally non-contentious annulment procedure turned on proof that Imanpoorsaid was alive. His attendance would have reinforced that proof, and the court concluded that no argument from him could have changed the result. The failure therefore did not justify invalidating the judgments.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. The ruling left the annulment in place; it did not order payment of the $550,000 insured sum or decide all subsequent questions about Imanpoorsaid’s property and obligations. The court also explained that proof of life abroad does not automatically place a person back into legal absence merely because they remain away from Quebec.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2026 SCC 9.