
Police lawfully approached a running truck in a residential driveway to investigate an impaired-driving complaint, but violated the driver’s Charter rights when they opened its door, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled. A five-judge majority nevertheless held that the resulting evidence could be used in court.
The March 20 decision in R. v. Singer, 2026 SCC 8, set aside a Saskatchewan appeal judgment that had acquitted Wayne Singer of refusing to provide a breath sample. It did not finally resolve the prosecution: the Supreme Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan to decide a separate, outstanding trial-fairness argument.
Four judges would have dismissed the Crown’s appeal and kept the evidence out. Their disagreement extended beyond the door-opening search to whether the officers had any right to enter the driveway for the investigation in the first place.
An investigation reached a private driveway
The case began with a complaint around 11 p.m. on March 20, 2019, that Singer was speeding and driving while intoxicated on Big Island Lake Cree Nation in Saskatchewan. About an hour later, two RCMP officers found a truck matching the caller’s description parked in a residential driveway with its engine running and headlights on.
The officers could not see an occupant from the road. They walked onto the driveway and saw Singer asleep or passed out in the driver’s seat. After knocking on the window without getting a response, one officer opened the driver’s door and smelled alcohol. The second opened the passenger door and shook him awake.
Singer provided a roadside breath sample that registered a fail. He was arrested and taken to the police station, where he refused a further breath sample after speaking with duty counsel. The trial judge convicted him of failing or refusing to comply with a breath demand; the Crown had stayed the separate impaired-driving charge.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found a breach of the Charter protection against unreasonable search or seizure, excluded the evidence and entered an acquittal. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court.
Permission to knock had limits
Writing for the majority, Justice Mahmud Jamal applied the common-law principle that members of the public, including police officers on legitimate business, ordinarily have implied permission to approach a home and knock. That permission facilitates communication. It can be withdrawn by a clear expression of the occupant’s intention and does not authorize a search simply because police are investigating an offence.
The majority held that the officers could approach Singer’s truck and knock on its window to communicate with its occupant about the complaint. An investigative purpose did not, by itself, turn that approach into a search. Nor did the possibility that an ordinary conversation might reveal signs of impairment make the interaction unlawful.
Jamal emphasized that the principle does not permit random checks for criminal activity or the use of conversation as a pretext for a search. Police intentions still matter. But the trial judge’s findings supported a legitimate investigation here, with the truck visible from the road, no barrier to entry and no indication that permission to approach had been revoked.
The permission stopped at the truck door. Opening it intruded on Singer’s reasonable expectation of privacy inside the vehicle and gave the officers access to information, including the smell of alcohol, that they otherwise lacked. That was a search under section 8 of the Charter.
A breach did not automatically exclude the evidence
The majority declined to create a new police power for impaired-driving investigations. Existing law already permits a safety search where officers have reasonable grounds to believe a search is necessary to eliminate an imminent threat to public or police safety. The danger must arise from the particular circumstances; a general concern about impaired driving is insufficient.
Jamal found objective grounds for concern in the circumstances of a running truck and an unresponsive occupant. But the safety-search issue had not been argued at trial, and the necessary findings about the officers’ own safety concerns had not been made. The Crown therefore failed to justify the warrantless search, and opening the door breached section 8.
Whether to exclude the evidence required a separate assessment under section 24(2) of the Charter. The majority weighed the seriousness of the police conduct, its effect on Singer’s protected interests and society’s interest in deciding the case on its merits.
Jamal placed the conduct at the less serious end of the spectrum, pointing to the circumstances suggesting a safety risk and what he regarded as, at most, a reasonable misunderstanding of the law. He assessed the impact on Singer’s rights as no more than moderate. Against those considerations, the evidence was reliable and essential to the Crown’s case, and the public had a strong interest in prosecuting the serious breath-refusal offence. The majority concluded that admitting the evidence would not undermine the administration of justice.
Dissenters saw a more serious intrusion
Justices Michelle O’Bonsawin and Mary Moreau, joined by Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, would have found an unlawful search from the moment the officers entered the property. In their view, the officers were seeking sensory evidence of impairment to substantiate a charge, which exceeded the limited permission to approach for communication.
The joint dissent also rejected the suggestion that legal uncertainty or safety concerns reduced the seriousness of the breach. It stressed that Saskatchewan law at the time set limits on this kind of entry, that the officers had not articulated the necessary safety concerns, and that their conduct showed a careless disregard for Singer’s Charter rights.
Those judges considered the intrusion and subsequent detention significant. They also examined the impact on Singer as an Indigenous person in the broader context of the over-policing of Indigenous communities. Although they accepted that the evidence was reliable and important, they concluded that its admission would damage public confidence in the justice system.
Justice Sheilah Martin agreed with the joint dissent’s result and separately cautioned against courts creating new police powers that bypass established safeguards. She said constitutional limits must constrain such powers and that a failure to satisfy an existing power’s requirements cannot justify inventing one with lower standards.
The majority’s ruling left one issue for the Saskatchewan appeal court: Singer’s claim that his trial was unfair because the Crown’s sole witness was briefly in the courtroom during defence counsel’s opening remarks. The Supreme Court decided the search and evidence questions, leaving that distinct ground of appeal for determination.
On April 15, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dismissed the remaining ground and upheld Singer’s refusal conviction. The trial judge had made no formal witness-exclusion order. Defence counsel did not pursue the issue after the witness’s presence came to light, and the appeal court found nothing to suggest that hearing the submissions had changed her testimony. The court ordered Singer to surrender to serve the remainder of his sentence.
AI-generated illustration. The truck and driveway are illustrative.
Source: R. v. Singer, 2026 SCC 8.



