The Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial for Robert Joseph DeSutter on two sexual-exploitation charges, overturning acquittals after a dispute over excluded digital images and how courts should assess an adult’s relationship with a vulnerable young person.

In R. v. DeSutter, 2025 SCC 42, the Court divided 3–2 on December 5, 2025. Justices Sheilah Martin, Nicholas Kasirer and Michelle O’Bonsawin allowed the Crown’s appeal substantially for the reasons of Nova Scotia Court of Appeal Justice Anne Derrick, who had dissented below.

Justices Malcolm Rowe and Mahmud Jamal would have dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of Nova Scotia Chief Justice Michael Wood. Rowe delivered the Supreme Court’s brief oral judgment, but was not part of its majority.

The order requires a new trial on counts 3 and 14, both alleging sexual exploitation under section 153(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. It does not find DeSutter guilty. A publication ban protects information that could identify complainants or witnesses.

Why the excluded images mattered

DeSutter had been tried on several charges involving young people. The trial judge acquitted him of all charges except a common-assault charge. The appeal ultimately concerned only the two sexual-exploitation counts.

The Crown sought to introduce images found on a USB device seized from his residence. Many depicted the illusion of a woman being sawed in half, with subjects in various states of dress. The prosecution argued that the images helped establish a sexual purpose behind DeSutter’s use of a cardboard saw in contact with the complainants. The defence maintained that the conduct reflected an interest in magic and that the images would invite improper conclusions about his character.

The trial judge excluded the images. She considered images involving clothed women insufficiently relevant and found that the prejudicial effect of other images outweighed their probative value. Without sufficient proof of a sexual purpose, she acquitted on one exploitation count. On the other, she found that the Crown had not established an exploitative relationship.

Derrick’s reasons, substantially adopted by the Supreme Court majority, identified errors in both parts of the analysis.

Evidence of bad character is generally inadmissible because a court must decide whether the prosecution proved the charged offence, rather than whether the accused seems like a bad person. Such evidence can nevertheless be admitted when its value in proving a particular live issue outweighs the risk of improper use.

Here, the relevant issue was DeSutter’s intention in the conduct, rather than the identity of the person responsible. Derrick found that the trial judge had effectively demanded the degree of distinctive similarity associated with identification cases. That was too restrictive when assessing whether the images could illuminate a sexual purpose. The potential relevance of images depicting clothed women could not be rejected on the approach the judge used.

Prejudice requires a specific analysis

Derrick considered the more significant error to be the failure to explain how admitting the images would prejudice a proper determination of the charges.

Two risks required consideration: “moral prejudice,” where a decision-maker infers guilt from perceived bad character, and “reasoning prejudice,” where the evidence distracts from the issues actually being tried. Evidence is not improperly prejudicial simply because it supports an inference against the accused.

Although the trial judge had referred to those concepts, Derrick found that calling the images “extremely prejudicial” did not supply the necessary analysis. The judge also failed to consider whether any risk could be reduced in the circumstances of a judge-alone trial.

Derrick saw no basis in this record to conclude that the experienced trial judge would be distracted from the charges or drawn into prohibited reasoning. The presumption that judges know the law could not excuse an important gap in the analysis.

The errors mattered to the acquittals. Considering the images together with the other evidence could have changed the assessment of sexual purpose. On one count, the finding that sexual purpose had not been proved had prevented the judge from reaching the question of exploitation at all. Derrick also considered that the images could cast the broader relationships in a different light.

Exploitation depends on the whole relationship

The separate exploitation issue concerned the other complainant. Section 153 allows courts to consider the young person’s age, the age difference, the development of the relationship and the adult’s control or influence when determining whether a relationship is exploitative.

Derrick found that the trial judge had not adequately examined the cumulative significance of the young person’s vulnerability, lack of resources and reliance on benefits supplied by an older adult. The proper analysis required considering how the relationship operated as a whole, including how those benefits gave the adult access to the young person.

A young person’s initiation of contact or receipt of benefits does not, by itself, negate exploitation. A power imbalance may remain even where a vulnerable young person seeks what an adult can provide. Listing relevant factors without considering their combined effect was insufficient.

That error provided a further basis for a new trial on the affected count. The prosecution still had to establish a legal error that could have materially affected the acquittal; an appeal could not succeed merely because another judge preferred a different reading of the facts.

Two judges would have preserved the acquittals

The reasons adopted by Rowe and Jamal took a different view of appellate intervention. Wood considered the trial judge’s assessment of the images to be a reasonable exercise of discretion entitled to substantial deference. She had recognized their possible relevance but was not prepared to draw the inferences the Crown sought.

He also rejected the suggestion that a judge-alone trial removes the danger of prejudice. Experienced judges can still struggle with the effects of discreditable information. In his view, the record showed that the judge understood the governing principles despite her brief explanation.

Wood supplied an alternative ground: even assuming the exclusion was legally wrong, the Crown had not shown that admission might materially affect the acquittal. He read the trial judge’s reasons as showing she would not draw the necessary inference of sexual purpose from the images.

On exploitation, Wood found that the Crown was effectively asking the appeal court to reweigh evidence and draw different factual inferences. The trial judge had considered the relevant circumstances, and her conclusions were supported by the record. Failure to discuss every item of evidence was not itself a legal error.

The Supreme Court majority’s order displaced that result only for the two specified sexual-exploitation counts. The Crown had abandoned its appeal concerning another count because it had not challenged the trial judge’s finding about proof of the complainant’s age. The remaining charges were not reopened by this ruling.

The Supreme Court docket records the appeal as closed on February 6, 2026. No later retrial judgment was verified for this report.

Source: R. v. DeSutter, 2025 SCC 42, adopting reasons in R. v. DeSutter, 2025 NSCA 18.