The Supreme Court of Canada upheld an adult life sentence for a person convicted of murder committed as a youth in R. v. S.B., 2025 SCC 24. Although the majority found an error in the standard used to assess maturity, it concluded that the evidence met the stricter test and the error had not affected the sentence.

All nine judges agreed to dismiss the appeal on July 18, 2025. Seven applied the framework announced that day in the companion R. v. I.M., 2025 SCC 23. Justices Suzanne Côté and Malcolm Rowe agreed with the result but continued to disagree about the required standard of proof.

The decision preserved life imprisonment with a 10-year period of parole ineligibility. That describes the sentence upheld, not a finding about present custody or a guarantee of parole after 10 years.

An adult sentence survived a fresh sentencing analysis

S.B. was convicted of first-degree murder for a planned shooting committed while he was under 18. The youth court imposed an adult sentence. On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had failed to address the presumption that young people have diminished moral blameworthiness.

That omission required a fresh sentencing analysis. The appeal court admitted an enhanced pre-sentence report addressing S.B.’s background and the racial and cultural factors that had shaped his life. After considering the expanded record, it imposed the same adult sentence.

A historical distinction mattered. Proceedings against S.B. began before the 2012 amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act, so the earlier version of section 72 applied. But the Supreme Court had already recognized the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness as a constitutional principle in R. v. D.B. The older statutory wording did not permit the sentencing judge to ignore it.

Under the governing framework, the Crown must first overcome that presumption by proving adult-like developmental maturity beyond a reasonable doubt. It must then separately satisfy the court that a youth sentence would be insufficiently long to hold the offender accountable. The second inquiry involves an evaluative balancing of sentencing principles.

The error did not change the outcome

Justice Nicholas Kasirer, writing for the majority, concluded that the Court of Appeal had not applied the reasonable-doubt standard to rebutting the presumption itself. Recognizing that individual aggravating facts required that standard was not enough.

An error in principle does not automatically require a different sentence, however. It must have affected the result. Reading the reasons and record as a whole, the majority found that S.B.’s adult-like developmental maturity had been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The evidence showed a leadership role in planning and carrying out the murder, followed by deliberate directions to conceal it. The majority saw self-control and independence rather than submission to adult or older-peer pressure. Conduct in detention also supported its assessment of consistency in judgment and leadership. The point was what this evidence revealed about maturity at the time of the offence, rather than treating all misconduct in custody as proof of adult capacity.

S.B. argued that the appeal court had overstated his role. The majority rejected that submission because the original findings supported his leading role and responsibility for the fatal shooting. Youth sentences imposed on other participants did not dictate the same outcome for him: their roles, subsequent conduct and assessment records differed.

The Court also rejected the suggestion that considering planning necessarily makes an adult sentence appropriate for every first-degree murder. Planning must be examined for what it reveals about the particular young person’s judgment.

Seriousness and social context required careful treatment

The objective gravity of murder cannot establish developmental maturity. The Court of Appeal had referred to the offence’s seriousness, but the majority concluded that its reasoning remained focused on S.B.’s personal judgment and the circumstances revealing it. Even if those references were improper, they did not materially affect this sentence.

Kasirer cautioned against searching judgments for isolated references to seriousness without reading them in context. Expressing empathy for victims is not itself an error. What matters is whether the court used gravity as a substitute for assessing the young person.

S.B. also argued that the appeal court undervalued the enhanced pre-sentence report. The majority agreed that social context evidence can matter at both stages: it can illuminate developmental maturity and help assess moral responsibility and meaningful accountability.

But the report had not been ignored. The appeal court considered disadvantage, exposure to harmful influences and systemic anti-Black discrimination. It was entitled to find that this evidence did not overcome the evidence of S.B.’s independent judgment and leadership. Its assessment of the report’s limited weight on maturity was supported by the record.

At the separate accountability stage, the report likewise provided valuable context but expressly did not explain the dynamics that precipitated the offence. The majority found no error in the appeal court’s balancing of that evidence with the harm caused, rehabilitation, reintegration and protection of the public. Rebutting the maturity presumption alone would not have been enough; this second requirement still had to be satisfied.

Custody evidence was not punishment for later convictions

S.B. submitted that the appeal court had improperly relied on conduct after sentencing to justify the adult sentence. The majority identified a factual problem with that argument: the passages at issue referred to misconduct already recorded in the pre-sentence report and available at the original hearing.

The Court of Appeal had expressly rejected the Crown’s attempt to introduce later convictions as fresh evidence, so that S.B. would not be punished for that later conduct.

The majority also rejected a blanket rule excluding events after an offence. Such evidence can be relevant to rehabilitation, subject to the rules governing fresh evidence and the limits of appellate review. Here, the established custody record was relevant to rehabilitative potential, and the appeal court was conducting sentencing afresh. The possible harmful effects of detention did not prevent it from weighing that record in context.

Two judges agreed under a different test

Côté and Rowe applied their reasoning from I.M.: deciding whether the presumption is rebutted is an evaluative judgment requiring the Crown to persuade the court, rather than a factual conclusion governed by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

They nevertheless reached the same result. They considered S.B.’s difficult upbringing but found adult-like planning, foresight and sustained efforts to conceal the crime. On accountability, they emphasized his central role, the seriousness of the harm and limited evidence of rehabilitation. They agreed that the social context evidence and pre-sentence misconduct had been considered without reviewable error.

The companion rulings therefore produced different outcomes under the majority’s common framework: a youth sentence for I.M., and an adult sentence preserved for S.B. The latter decision depended on its individual record and the absence of an error that affected the sentence.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. S.B., 2025 SCC 24.