The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a Quebec judge’s decision to conduct a murder trial without a jury during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the Crown’s refusal to consent. It set aside an order for a new trial, but sent the case back to the Quebec Court of Appeal to address the Crown’s remaining challenges to the verdict.

In R. v. Varennes, 2025 SCC 22, all seven judges agreed on that result. They divided over why the trial judge could override the prosecutor: five relied on preventing a probable Charter breach, while two found an abuse of process in the exceptional public-health circumstances.

The July 11, 2025 decision did not finally resolve the Crown’s appeal from Pascal Varennes’s acquittal of second-degree murder. The Supreme Court also refused his request to stay further proceedings.

A jury trial during the pandemic

Varennes was charged with the second-degree murder of his spouse. Under the Criminal Code, murder is ordinarily tried in superior court before a judge and jury. Section 473(1) permits a judge-alone trial with the consent of both the accused and the Attorney General.

His trial was scheduled for September 2020. After pandemic restrictions suspended jury proceedings, Varennes agreed to waive a jury in an effort to avoid delay. He also faced lengthy travel between his detention facility and the courthouse, complicating consultations with his lawyers.

The Crown refused consent. It considered a jury appropriate for a domestic-violence murder case in a small community and said the trial would take substantially the same time either way. It remained willing to reconsider if circumstances changed.

The trial judge found the refusal unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances and ordered a trial without a jury. She later acquitted Varennes of murder, convicted him of manslaughter and imposed approximately nine years and three months’ imprisonment, followed by probation.

The Quebec Court of Appeal treated the Crown’s consent decision as prosecutorial discretion reviewable only for abuse of process. Finding that threshold unmet, it declared the judge-alone trial a nullity and ordered a new jury trial without addressing the Crown’s other grounds concerning the admission and treatment of evidence.

The Crown could challenge the trial format on appeal

Varennes argued that the Crown could not use an appeal against acquittal to challenge an earlier order about the mode of trial. In his view, the prosecution should have sought immediate leave to appeal that order to the Supreme Court.

The Court rejected that argument. Criminal proceedings generally cannot be interrupted by appeals from preliminary rulings, and precedent permits challenges to jurisdictional errors through an appeal after the verdict. Section 676(1)(a), which allows Crown appeals from acquittals on questions of law alone, was available for this challenge.

The prosecution therefore had a valid appeal route. Its argument that the judge lacked authority nevertheless failed on the merits.

Majority distinguishes two sources of judicial authority

Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, writing for five judges, distinguished the superior court’s inherent power to control its proceedings from its power to grant remedies under section 24(1) of the Charter.

Under the first route, decisions at the core of prosecutorial discretion — such as whether to bring, continue or stop a prosecution — are reviewable only for abuse of process. They directly affect the criminal jeopardy an accused faces and engage the Attorney General’s constitutional role.

The choice between a jury and a judge alone instead concerns how the prosecution proceeds and who finds the facts. The majority held that it falls outside that core and can be reviewed on a standard less demanding than abuse of process.

That does not give judges unrestricted power to substitute their preferences. Deference remains important, particularly because Parliament expressly gave the consent decision to the parties. The majority left the precise standard for reviewing this statutory decision under inherent jurisdiction undecided: the Charter supplied a sufficient basis to uphold the order.

There is no freestanding Charter right to a judge-alone trial. But a court may grant an appropriate remedy when insisting on a jury would probably violate another protected right.

Preventing an unreasonable-delay breach

The majority upheld the order as a remedy for a probable future violation of Varennes’s right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

A claimant must establish a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities. The same standard applies to past, continuing and anticipated violations: a future breach must be more likely than not, rather than virtually certain.

The majority acknowledged that this was not a conventional delay application. The parties had not systematically classified the periods of delay under the Jordan framework. Varennes had also waived his delay right for a period, extending the applicable deadline to February 2021.

Even so, the majority accepted the trial judge’s assessment of the extraordinary uncertainty in summer 2020. Jury selection required bringing large groups together, infections could interrupt proceedings, and the timing of future jury trials was unknown. Those findings could not fairly be reassessed with hindsight. Pandemic delay was not automatically deductible as an exceptional circumstance: the Crown still had to take reasonable available steps to address it.

A remedy then had to protect the right while respecting public interests and the separation of powers. The Crown’s preference for community participation through a jury was legitimate. But proceeding before a judge preserved a trial on the merits while reducing the risk that delay would ultimately require the prosecution to be stayed.

The majority distinguished preventing a probable future delay breach from remedying one that had already occurred. In the former situation, a remedy that expedites proceedings may be preferable to a stay.

Although the trial judge used the language of unfairness and unreasonableness rather than expressly completing the Charter-remedy analysis, her findings supported the same order under the proper framework. That omission had no material bearing on the murder acquittal.

Concurring judges found abuse of process

Justice Malcolm Rowe, joined by Justice Nicholas Kasirer, agreed with the outcome but rejected the majority’s reasoning.

They agreed that a future Charter breach must be established on a balance of probabilities. In their view, however, the record did not establish one: the necessary analysis of total delay, defence delay and exceptional circumstances was missing. Rowe also objected that the majority’s approach shifted the case away from the issues the parties had primarily argued, raising a concern about their opportunity to be heard.

He further maintained that a proven section 11(b) breach requires a stay, even when established before the scheduled trial ends. Preventive case-management measures remain possible, but he would not characterize them as Charter remedies before a violation is established.

On prosecutorial discretion, the concurring judges would retain the abuse-of-process standard. Parliament made Crown consent a condition of the judge’s jurisdiction, and choosing a jury implicates the nature of the prosecution, including community participation and distinctive procedural consequences. Rowe warned that reviving a core/non-core distinction would create uncertainty.

Nevertheless, he found that the high abuse-of-process threshold was met. Insisting on a jury amid the severe health risks and constraints of summer 2020 undermined the justice system’s integrity. A judge-alone trial was an available remedy less drastic than stopping the prosecution altogether.

Why the case was not ended

Varennes sought a stay based on the passage of time, completion of his manslaughter sentence, reintegration into the community and the Crown’s opportunity to learn his defence strategy from the first trial.

The Court found no abuse of process warranting that final remedy on the record. Learning the defence and correcting errors are ordinary consequences of a successful Crown appeal, not inherently abusive. Nor had Varennes demonstrated particular prejudice from delay sufficient to justify a stay.

He could renew the request with a fuller record. The decision whether to pursue the outstanding appeal grounds rested with the Crown, and the Court of Appeal was tasked with deciding them if pursued.

The Supreme Court docket records its appeal as closed on July 11, 2025. No later disposition of the remaining Quebec appeal grounds was verified for this report.

Source: R. v. Varennes, 2025 SCC 22.