The Supreme Court of Canada acquitted Tammy Marion Bouvette of criminal negligence causing death on June 6, 2025, replacing a judicial stay with a not-guilty verdict after undisclosed evidence undermined the fairness of her guilty plea.

All nine judges agreed on the outcome in R. v. Bouvette, 2025 SCC 18. They divided 5–4 on the legal basis for acquitting someone whose conviction resulted from a miscarriage of justice, but whose case could still support a reasonable conviction on the available record.

The majority relied on the Crown's request for an immediate acquittal and its undertaking to call no evidence if a new trial were ordered. Four concurring judges favoured a broader approach examining the miscarriage of justice, the remaining prosecution case and the hardship suffered by the accused.

A guilty plea without critical disclosure

Bouvette was babysitting 19-month-old Iyanna Teeple in Cranbrook, British Columbia, in May 2011 when the child became unconscious in a bathtub. Bouvette called for emergency assistance and attempted to resuscitate her. Iyanna later died in hospital.

Bouvette was charged with second-degree murder. In May 2013, she pleaded guilty to the lesser offence of criminal negligence causing death and received 12 months' imprisonment and probation.

Before that plea, authorities had received significant information questioning the work of forensic pathologist Dr. Evan Matshes, whose evidence had helped support the prosecution. An external panel of three forensic pathologists considered his conclusions in Iyanna's case unreasonable. A 140-page package about the review of his work was not disclosed to the defence.

There were competing medical opinions. The Supreme Court majority expressly cautioned that its account made no findings about the reliability or decisive effect of the disputed expert evidence and did not impugn the prosecutors' good faith. The established failure was the non-disclosure and its effect on Bouvette's ability to defend herself and make an informed plea.

A special prosecutor's independent review led to disclosure and an appeal. In 2023, the British Columbia Court of Appeal permitted Bouvette to withdraw her guilty plea and quashed her conviction. It found a reasonable possibility that she would not have pleaded guilty had full disclosure been made.

The appeal court nevertheless declined to acquit her because the record could support a reasonable conviction. Instead, it stayed the proceedings, finding that putting her through another trial would offend fundamental principles of justice. Bouvette appealed that remedy, with the Crown also seeking an acquittal.

Why an acquittal mattered after the case had been stayed

Justice Nicholas Kasirer, writing for five judges, distinguished correcting the original conviction from deciding what should happen next. Once a conviction is quashed, the court must consider whether to acquit, order a new trial or impose a judicial stay under the Criminal Code's appellate powers.

Both an acquittal and a judicial stay bring proceedings to a conclusive end and leave the accused presumptively innocent. But an acquittal records a conclusion of not guilty: the Crown has not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. A stay does not decide guilt.

That distinction can matter to the stigma left by an unresolved allegation. Courts must therefore consider acquittal before turning to other remedies. The majority also stressed that an acquittal is not a formal declaration of factual innocence and cannot necessarily erase every social consequence of a charge.

The record alone did not require acquittal

An appeal court must acquit when the admissible evidence, including new evidence received on appeal, cannot support a reasonable conviction. A weakened prosecution case is not enough if conviction remains reasonably possible.

Bouvette argued that the record met that test once Matshes' evidence was set aside. The majority disagreed. The Crown's decision not to call a witness did not itself make that witness's evidence legally inadmissible. Assessing the record required considering the admissible evidence together with the material challenging it, without turning the appeal court into a trial court choosing which evidence to believe.

Even without Matshes' opinion, the record included evidence that the child had suffered a visible injury in a fall, was later left alone in the bath for about a minute and became unconscious before dying. The majority concluded that a reasonable conviction could not be excluded on this particular record, without expressing a view on how likely it was. The concurring judges agreed that Bouvette could not succeed on this evidentiary ground.

A trial that could only end in acquittal

The Crown's undertaking provided a separate route. Unless contrary to the public interest, an appeal court must acquit when the Crown both seeks an immediate acquittal and says it would call no evidence at a new trial to secure that result.

Those conditions mattered. A statement that the Crown simply did not intend to proceed would not necessarily establish them: withdrawal of a charge or a prosecutorial stay would not produce the same final verdict.

Here, the Crown clarified that it would bring the matter before the trial court, call no evidence and invite an acquittal. Ordering that empty procedural exercise would waste resources and prolong Bouvette's distress. The Supreme Court could enter the inevitable result itself.

The majority retained the court's responsibility to protect the public interest; the prosecutor did not acquire the judicial power to acquit. But giving immediate effect to the inevitable acquittal was the just result in this case.

Broader remedial powers left unresolved

Both parties also urged the Court to recognize a broad framework for acquittals in the interests of justice, even where conviction remained reasonably possible. The majority declined to settle that question because the Crown's undertaking already resolved Bouvette's appeal.

Justice Kasirer warned that broad, unweighted factors could invite appeal courts to take over the trial court's role or weaken the meaning of an acquittal. Having served a sentence does not by itself require acquittal. He left other discretionary grounds for future cases rather than abolishing them or overruling the Ontario Court of Appeal's influential Truscott decision.

Justice Sheilah Martin, joined by Justices Andromache Karakatsanis, Michelle O'Bonsawin and Mary Moreau, considered clear guidance overdue. Their concurring reasons emphasized Parliament's broad grant of remedial discretion and cases bearing the hallmarks of wrongful convictions, including non-disclosure, questionable expert evidence and false guilty pleas.

Their proposed framework considered three matters: the nature and effects of the miscarriage, the prospects for a new trial and acquittal, and the overall fairness of the case. The merits would receive primary weight. Generally, the court would need to find acquittal more probable than not at a retrial applying the reasonable-doubt standard.

The concurrence allowed a limited exception where the miscarriage itself prevented that assessment: a weak Crown case, an unlikely retrial and strong fairness considerations could still justify acquittal. Hardship alone would not suffice. Nor would the Crown's concession bind the court; judges would retain an independent supervisory role.

Applied to Bouvette, the concurrence emphasized the undisclosed information, the disputed expert evidence and the pressures facing an Indigenous woman with cognitive difficulties. Justice Martin considered the remaining prosecution case weak and acquittal more probable than not. Bouvette had served her sentence, lost custody of her four children and experienced devastating personal consequences. The child's family also supported acquittal, the Crown told the Court.

The competing approaches produced the same final order: the judicial stay was set aside and Bouvette was acquitted, without another trial. The majority's narrower rule governs; the concurrence's broader framework did not command a majority.