The Supreme Court of Canada upheld an indecent-assault conviction in R. v. R.A., 2025 SCC 7, rejecting the argument that an adult had not committed an assault because the child complainant physically initiated sexual contact after his invitation.

The unanimous March 20, 2025 decision confirmed a British Columbia Court of Appeal ruling that replaced an acquittal with a conviction. Chief Justice Richard Wagner, delivering the Supreme Court’s reasons orally, said the adult’s intentional participation in the sexual contact satisfied the assault requirement. Which person moved to initiate the contact did not change that conclusion.

The charge arose under the former Criminal Code offence of indecent assault. But the court expressly connected its reasoning to the modern sexual-assault provision, section 271, explaining that an adult who intentionally precipitates sexual contact with a child satisfies the elements of sexual assault.

Why the acquittal could not stand

The underlying facts were undisputed. R.A. invited the child to touch him sexually, and contact followed. The trial judge accepted that the incident was indecent but acquitted because she concluded there had been no direct, intentional application of force by the accused, and no qualifying attempt or threat to apply force.

That interpretation treated the direction of the physical movement as decisive: the complainant had touched the accused, rather than the accused initiating the touching through his own movement.

The Supreme Court rejected the distinction. In these circumstances, the element of force could be satisfied even though the child physically initiated the touching. That reading reflected both the broad language of the assault provision and its purpose of protecting children’s bodily and sexual integrity.

The court also rejected the trial judge’s reliance on Fairclough v. Whipp, a 1951 English decision. That case’s reasoning had supported the view that inviting another person to touch the accused did not amount to an assault on that person. The Supreme Court said Fairclough was not authoritative in Canada. R.A.’s undisputed conduct constituted an assault because he intentionally had sexual contact with the child following his invitation.

Intentional participation remains essential

The Supreme Court substantially adopted paragraphs 17 to 43 of the British Columbia appeal judgment. Those reasons explain why the ruling is about intentional contact, rather than imposing liability whenever a child touches an adult.

Writing for the unanimous appeal court, Justice John Willcock rejected the suggestion that the Crown’s interpretation could make a sleeping adult criminally responsible for being touched. An adult who neither initiates nor intentionally participates in sexual contact is different. The application of force must be intentional; the hypothetical removed the very element of voluntary participation that mattered in R.A.’s case.

The appeal court also explained that “force” in assault law does not require violence beyond the touching itself. Canadian law’s protection of bodily integrity did not support a distinction based on whose body was moving when the intentional sexual contact occurred.

The British Columbia court had offered an additional, narrower reason for finding an assault: the particular contact fell within conduct recognized as assault even under the English authorities. The Supreme Court’s stated adoption focused instead on the broader Canadian-law reasoning in paragraphs 17 to 43. The Supreme Court thus resolved the appeal on the broader rule governing intentional sexual contact.

A conviction, not a new trial

Replacing the acquittal required more than identifying an error of law. The appeal court explained that all findings necessary for guilt had to have been made, expressly or implicitly, or be undisputed.

That condition was met. The trial judge had treated the other elements of the historical offence as established or not contested. The only disputed question was whether the admitted conduct amounted to an assault. Once that legal question was answered correctly, the undisputed facts supported guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeal court entered a conviction and returned the matter for sentencing.

The Supreme Court dismissed R.A.’s appeal and affirmed the conviction. Its reasons did not impose a sentence, and the subsequent closure of the Supreme Court file does not establish what sentence was later imposed or whether it has been served.

Source: R. v. R.A., 2025 SCC 7; R. v. R.A., 2024 BCCA 283.