
The Supreme Court of Canada restored Enrico Di Paola’s 15-month conditional sentence, ruling that facts behind an abandoned charge can be considered at sentencing when the statutory conditions and safeguards are met.
In R. v. Di Paola, the court allowed the Crown’s appeal on February 13, 2025, and released its reasons on October 17. The eight-judge majority rejected a categorical rule excluding facts simply because they had previously supported a separate charge that was no longer pending.
The court also emphasized fairness in plea negotiations. Prosecutors generally must disclose their intention to rely on those facts before a plea agreement is reached, and judges retain discretion to refuse their use where it would be unfair.
Justice Malcolm Rowe dissented on the outcome. He agreed there was no blanket prohibition, but concluded that the sentencing judge had not exercised sufficient caution in this case.
Gifts, contracts and a negotiated plea
Di Paola, a construction contractor, pleaded guilty to conferring an unauthorized advantage or benefit on a government official. The official, Alain Prud’homme, was principal of the École des métiers de la construction de Montréal.
The agreed facts included travel benefits and work on Prud’homme’s personal garage at below its actual value. The benefits totalled more than $32,000. The sentencing judge found they were conferred to obtain construction contracts worth approximately $200,000.
Di Paola had initially faced four counts, including a more serious charge alleging benefits given in return for cooperation or influence in government business. Under the plea agreement, the original indictment was replaced with one containing only the unauthorized-benefit count. That offence did not require proof that contracts were received in return.
The sentencing judge nevertheless considered the contract evidence as aggravating and imposed a 15-month conditional sentence. The Quebec Court of Appeal reduced it to six months, concluding that section 725(1)(c) did not permit consideration of facts that had already formed the basis of a separate charge.
The Supreme Court restored the original sentence. It was a conditional sentence, involving service in the community under conditions, rather than an order for 15 months in prison.
Previously charged facts are not automatically excluded
Section 725(1)(c) permits a sentencing court to consider facts forming part of the circumstances of the offence that could constitute the basis for a separate charge. Chief Justice Richard Wagner, writing for the majority, said the provision asks whether that separate charge remains possible at sentencing, not whether it has ever been laid before.
The facts must have a sufficiently close connection to the offence being sentenced. The provision is not a general licence to punish unrelated conduct. Nor does it permit reliance on facts underlying a charge that has become permanently unavailable: the majority explained that a permanent stay resulting from a plea agreement prevents use of those facts under this provision.
The court’s earlier decision in Larche had not decided the specific question raised here. The majority said it was completing that analysis, not reversing Larche’s general principles.
The majority considered the broader interpretation consistent with proportionate sentencing and workable plea bargaining. Relevant facts do not lose their significance merely because a charge was withdrawn. Allowing parties to replace a charge with aggravating facts can conserve trial resources while allowing the accused to avoid conviction on a more serious count.
But the provision is discretionary. Unlike neighbouring provisions dealing with certain other offences or outstanding charges, it does not require either party’s consent. That makes its safeguards particularly important.
Proof, notice and protection against another prosecution
Aggravating facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt if not admitted. The offender may challenge the Crown’s evidence and present evidence in response.
Facts used under section 725(1)(c) must also be recorded on the information or indictment. Section 725(2) then bars further proceedings for offences disclosed by those facts, unless the underlying conviction is set aside or quashed on appeal. This protects against being prosecuted again on facts already taken into account in determining punishment.
The Crown must give timely notice to the offender and the judge of the facts it intends to prove. In plea negotiations, that disclosure must come before the agreement. A failure to disclose increased jeopardy will generally justify refusing to apply the provision, although exceptional situations may arise, such as genuinely new facts emerging afterward.
The prosecutor must also preserve the offender’s ability to respond, including by disclosing intended witnesses. The majority stressed that the provision cannot be used to ambush someone who has pleaded guilty. Judges may refuse its application to prevent unfairness, surprise or undue prolongation of sentencing.
Why the majority found the process fair
Fresh evidence admitted at the Supreme Court included communications between counsel. The majority found that Di Paola’s lawyer had requested removal of the contract details from the agreed statement of facts while suggesting that the Crown raise them as aggravating factors at sentencing. The Crown confirmed it would do so, and defence counsel agreed.
The majority saw no ambiguity about that arrangement. Di Paola knew the proposed use of the contracts, could cross-examine the Crown’s witnesses and made sentencing submissions. The record also did not establish an agreement permanently staying the abandoned charge, so the statutory possibility of a separate charge remained.
The sentencing judge had not expressly cited section 725(1)(c), but the majority found his reasons sufficiently clear when read with the record. He identified the aggravating facts and applied proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The missing statutory reference was not an error affecting the sentence.
His failure to record the facts on the indictment was an error, but one the Supreme Court could correct. It ordered the Superior Court office to record that Di Paola conferred benefits in return for lucrative contracts and knew of, or was wilfully blind to, their improper nature. The judgment establishes that direction; it does not verify later administrative compliance.
Rowe found the plea’s protection insufficient
Rowe emphasized that sentencing on facts supporting another offence is an exception to the ordinary rule that punishment follows a conviction. In his view, fairness to the offender must guide that exceptional discretion, alongside efficiency.
He identified three useful considerations: whether the intended use of the facts was disclosed, whether those facts substantially increased sentencing exposure, and whether the reasons acknowledged the exceptional use of facts supporting a more serious offence. None was individually decisive.
Rowe distinguished agreement that the contracts existed from agreement to use them as consideration for the benefits. He read later communications as leaving their proposed use ambiguous. Their omission from the agreed facts, the defence’s objection, the lack of an express statutory explanation and the failure to amend the indictment reinforced his concern.
The majority rejected that reading of the correspondence and the suggestion of improper Crown conduct. Rowe would have preserved the reduced sentence; the majority found no error justifying appellate intervention and restored 15 months. The sources reviewed do not establish how much of the sentence Di Paola subsequently served or his present status.
Source: R. v. Di Paola, 2025 SCC 31.



