The Supreme Court of Canada upheld Dwayne Alexander Campbell’s drug convictions on December 6, 2024, ruling that police could respond to messages on a seized phone without a warrant in the urgent circumstances of an impending fentanyl transaction.

The 6–3 decision in R. v. Campbell, 2024 SCC 42, produced four opinions. Five judges accepted that Campbell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation but found the search justified. Justice Suzanne Côté reached the same result because she considered this limited undercover exchange outside constitutional privacy protection. Three dissenting judges would have excluded the evidence and acquitted him.

The ruling did not create a general exemption from warrants whenever police suspect fentanyl. The majority tied its conclusion to evidence of an impatient seller, an impending transaction and a dangerous drug likely to reach other buyers if officers delayed.

Messages on a seized phone

Guelph police arrested a suspected dealer in June 2017 and lawfully seized two phones. Four incoming messages from a contact called “Dew” appeared on one phone’s lock screen, discussing a price of $1,250 for “this half” and impatience about driving around with it.

Officers understood the messages as an offer to sell half an ounce of heroin, probably mixed with fentanyl. They relied on the low price, information about the arrested dealer and evidence that approximately 75 per cent of heroin seized in Guelph that year contained fentanyl.

An officer impersonated the arrested man and exchanged 35 messages with Campbell over approximately two hours and 15 minutes to arrange delivery. Police did not unlock that phone or search its other contents. They arrested Campbell when he arrived carrying 14.33 grams of heroin mixed with fentanyl.

Campbell challenged the evidence under section 8 of the Charter, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. The trial judge rejected the challenge to the conversation, convicted him of trafficking and possession for trafficking, and imposed a six-year sentence before credit. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the result.

A separate search of the phone seized from Campbell after his arrest was found unconstitutional at trial. That ruling was not challenged on appeal, although it mattered to the dissent’s assessment of police conduct.

Privacy survives the use of someone else’s phone

Justice Mahmud Jamal’s reasons, joined by Chief Justice Richard Wagner and Justices Nicholas Kasirer, Michelle O’Bonsawin and Malcolm Rowe, recognized Campbell’s privacy interest in the conversation generated by the police exchange.

The relevant subject was the electronic conversation, including information about identities and associations, rather than ownership of the physical phone. Borrowing a phone or sharing control could reduce privacy but did not necessarily eliminate it. Nor did the possibility that a recipient might disclose a conversation amount to accepting police intrusion.

Privacy had to be assessed without making protection depend on whether the actual messages were criminal or mundane. The question included what such communications could reveal about personal choices and relationships. Police appropriation of a real person’s identity to exploit an existing relationship was particularly intrusive.

The majority nevertheless emphasized that not every text exchange automatically attracts constitutional protection. The assessment remains dependent on the circumstances.

Why the majority found an emergency

A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable. Under section 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, police may search without a warrant when the grounds for obtaining one exist but exigent circumstances make obtaining it impracticable.

The majority applied the framework from R. v. Paterson: urgency must require immediate action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety. Convenience or a useful investigative opportunity is insufficient. Police needed reasonable and probable grounds for their belief in the emergency, not merely a suspicion.

Here, the trial judge’s findings supported a reasonable belief that the impatient seller would move on and sell elsewhere if police did not act, and that the drugs likely contained fentanyl. Officers did not have to identify a particular alternative buyer or know with certainty that the substance was fentanyl.

The majority found that those circumstances created a public-safety urgency, rather than simply a generalized concern about illegal drugs. Police had responded to an unfolding transaction; they had not manufactured the emergency. The trial judge found that a telewarrant would likely arrive too late, and Campbell did not dispute the impracticability of obtaining one.

The judges also addressed appellate review: factual findings attract deference, but whether those facts meet the legal standard for exigency is reviewed for correctness. Jamal found no reversible error; the dissent said the Court of Appeal had deferred to factual findings without properly applying the legal standard.

Jamal stressed that an anticipated sale the next day or week could present a different case. Both the impending transaction and the likely fentanyl content mattered.

Rowe agreed fully with Jamal but wrote separately to defend Paterson as the governing framework. He also cautioned against judging officers with hindsight: although the exchange ultimately lasted more than two hours, police could not know at its outset how much time they had.

Wiretap rules and a question left open

The majority also rejected Campbell’s argument that the exchange required authorization under the Criminal Code’s wiretap provisions. In its interpretation, those provisions address interception using intrusive surveillance technology. Police used the same phone through which the intended recipient would communicate; their deception did not itself constitute an interception under that regime.

That conclusion did not remove the separate Charter protection against unreasonable searches.

Nor could police justify the exchange simply as a search incident to the other man’s arrest. The new transaction involved a distinct potential offence, insufficiently connected to the reasons for that arrest.

The Court declined to decide a further argument raised only during oral submissions: whether the drug statute’s power to search a “place” could authorize this investigative technique at all, or whether a general warrant was required instead. Because that issue had not been properly raised and argued, the judgment left it unresolved.

Different views on privacy and exclusion

Côté considered the exchange a narrowly confined undercover investigation. Police had not unlocked the phone, examined earlier conversations or asked probing questions. Their messages concerned completing a transaction already apparent from the initial texts. She also weighed Campbell’s limited relationship with the recipient and shared control of the borrowed phone.

In her view, those circumstances did not establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. She further disagreed with the dissent’s proposed exclusion of evidence. At the time of the investigation, Ontario appellate law denied a privacy interest in messages on a co-accused’s phone, and police had considered the warrant question. Rowe joined her criticism of the dissent’s exclusion analysis, emphasizing that police had considered authorization and could not know the exchange would last two hours.

Justices Sheilah Martin and Mary Moreau, joined by Justice Andromache Karakatsanis, agreed that Campbell had a privacy interest but rejected the claimed emergency. The feared harm depended on subsequent sales and eventual consumption, rather than a sufficiently imminent, concrete threat. A general desire to keep dangerous drugs off the street could not justify bypassing judicial authorization.

They also criticized the absence of an attempt to obtain authorization as the operation continued, and the limited evidence about why obtaining it was impracticable. Difficulty securing a warrant could not itself establish an emergency. They disputed the majority’s restrictive wiretap analysis but left the precise authorizing provision undecided.

For the dissent, exclusion followed from balancing three considerations. The officers’ conduct, including the separate unlawful search of the phone in Campbell’s possession, was serious; commandeering the conversation substantially invaded his privacy. The evidence was reliable and essential to prosecuting serious offences, which favoured admission, but that public interest did not outweigh the first two factors.

The dissent would therefore have set aside the convictions and entered acquittals. The majority’s dismissal left the convictions standing; the Supreme Court docket records the appeal as closed on December 10, 2024.