
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld British Columbia’s authority to provide a class-action process for governments across Canada seeking recovery of opioid-related health-care costs, rejecting a pharmaceutical-industry challenge to the province’s legislation.
The 6–1 decision in Sanis Health Inc. v. British Columbia, 2024 SCC 40, released November 29, 2024, preserved section 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act. The majority found that it regulates the procedure of litigation in B.C. without taking over other governments’ substantive claims or legislative powers.
The ruling dismissed the appeal with costs. It did not decide whether the companies were responsible for opioid-related harm, award damages or itself certify the proposed class action.
Justice Andromache Karakatsanis wrote for six judges. Justice Suzanne Côté dissented, concluding that automatically including other governments unless they opt out improperly interferes with their control of litigation beyond B.C.’s borders.
A national claim and a territorial challenge
B.C. began its lawsuit in 2018 against 49 manufacturers, marketers and distributors of opioid products. It alleged that misleading marketing had contributed to the opioid epidemic and claimed negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation and breaches of the Competition Act. Those were allegations underlying the litigation, not findings made in this appeal.
The province sought to represent federal, provincial and territorial governments and agencies that had paid opioid-related health-care, pharmaceutical and treatment costs. B.C. subsequently enacted its recovery statute, creating a direct statutory claim and special evidentiary and procedural rules.
Section 11 addresses the already commenced proceeding. It authorizes B.C. to act for the described class and preserves other governments’ ability to opt out under the Class Proceedings Act, within the time and in the manner set by a certification order.
Sanis Health, Shoppers Drug Mart, Sandoz Canada and McKesson Canada challenged that section. They argued that it let B.C. control other governments’ civil rights, choose litigation strategy and bind future governments to the outcome. In their view, this exceeded the constitutional requirement that provincial laws operate within the province.
The B.C. Supreme Court and Court of Appeal rejected the challenge. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld that result.
Procedure, rather than a transfer of civil rights
The majority first examined the provision’s purpose and effects to identify its essential character. That distinction mattered because the Constitution gives provinces authority over the administration of justice within their territory, including civil procedure, as well as property and civil rights within the province.
The companies argued that section 11 created substantive powers governments otherwise lacked because the Crown was not a “person” eligible to participate under ordinary class-proceedings legislation.
The majority disagreed. When governments sue to enforce civil rights, the Crown generally acts with the legal capacity of a natural person. The relevant B.C. legislation did not remove that capacity to participate as a representative plaintiff or class member.
Section 11 therefore supplied a procedural bridge between B.C.’s existing lawsuit and the new recovery statute. It did not create new substantive claims for the other governments. Their claims remained governed by their own applicable laws.
Karakatsanis acknowledged that participating in a class action means surrendering some control over counsel, strategy and settlement. But litigation routinely has binding consequences, including for governments and their successors. Accepting another province’s procedural rules does not, by itself, violate the Constitution.
For the majority, properly informed participation through the opt-out mechanism was an exercise of autonomy. Governments could weigh the benefits of coordinated proceedings against the loss of individual control and choose whether to remain in the class.
That choice was reinforced by court supervision. Class members could seek permission to intervene, challenge inadequate representation, object to settlements and, in appropriate circumstances, seek a late opt-out. These were safeguards subject to judicial control, not a guarantee that a government could leave whenever it wished.
Why the connection to B.C. was sufficient
Classifying the provision as procedural did not end the constitutional analysis. It also needed a meaningful connection to B.C. and had to respect other governments’ legislative sovereignty.
The majority found that connection in a single proceeding before B.C.’s courts, involving common defendants, issues and claims. Section 11 did not independently expand the court’s jurisdiction. The court would still have to establish the required connection to the class and determine that B.C. was the proper forum.
Governments choosing to participate would accept B.C.’s procedural rules, while their substantive recovery rights remained subject to their own legislatures. The majority distinguished delegating the conduct of litigation from transferring a legislature’s constitutional law-making power.
A government cannot necessarily use legislation at home to escape legal consequences it has accepted in another province. That limitation follows from provincial territorial boundaries; it does not mean that participation has unconstitutionally surrendered legislative sovereignty.
The majority also emphasized cooperation. Nearly every province and territory had enacted similar recovery legislation, and governments supporting the proceeding could save the cost and duplication of separate lawsuits. That support warranted caution before declaring the arrangement unconstitutional, although the court retained responsibility for deciding constitutional validity.
Dissent: an opt-out default was not voluntary entry
Côté viewed the default rule differently. The legislation allowed B.C. to seek a class including other governments without first obtaining their agreement. Once certified, those governments would have to take affirmative steps, on terms set by a B.C. court, to preserve control of their own litigation.
She considered that a substantial effect on property and civil rights outside the province, rather than an incidental consequence of a procedural rule. It also affected the responsibilities of other governments’ attorneys general to conduct Crown litigation.
Côté rejected the majority’s reliance on ordinary Crown capacity to establish participation under the Class Proceedings Act. In her view, the presumption that legislation does not bind the Crown extended to other governments, and an opt-out scheme could not force them to waive that protection.
She also distinguished a court’s jurisdiction to hear a cross-border dispute from a legislature’s power to enact laws governing it. Common issues capable of supporting judicial jurisdiction did not necessarily establish the stronger connection required for provincial legislation. She would have found the territorial defect even if section 11 were classified as procedural.
Government support could not cure that problem, she said, and some support letters treated the proposal as an opt-in arrangement. She did not decide whether a differently designed opt-in regime would be valid.
Côté would have severed section 11(1)(b) and subsection 11(2), leaving the rest of the statute intact. She rejected saving those provisions as necessary to the broader scheme because B.C.’s own recovery claim could proceed without them. The majority’s finding of validity made that alternative doctrine unnecessary to decide.
Later proceedings remained separate
The constitutional ruling was one step in the litigation. In a July 6, 2026 statement, B.C.’s attorney general reported that the Court of Appeal had dismissed challenges to the class-action lawsuits and said trial was scheduled for early 2028. That later procedural progress was not a finding of opioid liability in the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision.
As of November 18, 2026, a later Supreme Court docket recorded a pending application by Janssen Inc. and Johnson & Johnson for leave to appeal orders made in 2026 in the same B.C. government proceeding. The application was filed on September 29; no decision on leave appeared on the docket. This was a separate application concerning later orders, not a reopening of the 2024 constitutional appeal. It did not establish liability, payment or a change to the trial schedule.
Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2024 SCC 40.



