Dow Chemical Canada must use judicial review in Federal Court to challenge the federal revenue minister’s refusal of a downward transfer-pricing adjustment, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in a divided decision defining the boundary between Canada’s two tax-litigation forums.

The 4–3 ruling in Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Canada held that the minister’s discretionary decision under subsection 247(10) of the Income Tax Act is separate from a tax assessment. It therefore cannot be challenged through the Tax Court’s ordinary assessment-appeal jurisdiction.

Justice Nicholas Kasirer wrote for the majority in the June 28, 2024 decision dismissing Dow’s appeal with costs. Justice Suzanne Côté, joined by Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Malcolm Rowe, would have allowed the challenge to proceed in Tax Court as part of the assessment appeal.

The Supreme Court decided the proper forum. It did not decide whether Dow deserved the adjustment or what its final tax liability should be.

A disputed reduction after transfer-pricing adjustments

The dispute involved transactions between Dow and a related Swiss company, including manufacturing services and a loan on which Dow incurred interest expenses. Transfer-pricing rules address transactions between Canadian taxpayers and related non-residents by substituting amounts that would have been agreed between parties dealing at arm’s length.

The minister increased Dow’s income for its 2006 taxation year under those rules. Dow also sought a downward adjustment relating to interest expenses. Under subsection 247(10), such an adjustment cannot be made unless the minister considers it appropriate in the circumstances.

The minister refused Dow’s request in 2013. Dow applied for judicial review in Federal Court and also pursued objections to its reassessments. It appealed a 2017 reassessment to Tax Court, where the parties asked a preliminary question about that court’s jurisdiction. The Federal Court application was stayed pending the jurisdictional determination.

The Tax Court held that the minister’s decision was an essential component of the assessment and could be reviewed in the assessment appeal. The Federal Court of Appeal disagreed. The Supreme Court majority upheld that conclusion.

A tax calculation and a discretionary decision are different

The majority distinguished determining the amount legally owing from deciding whether a discretionary reduction is appropriate. An assessment applies tax law to the relevant facts; the minister has no general discretion to choose a different tax bill. The Tax Court examines whether that resulting assessment is correct.

A decision under subsection 247(10) performs a different function. Parliament authorized the minister to consider policy matters, including fairness and possible double taxation or double non-taxation across jurisdictions. Taxpayers have no automatic entitlement to a downward adjustment.

Although the minister’s opinion may affect the tax calculation, the majority said that does not make the exercise of discretion part of the assessment. The existence and outcome of the opinion may matter to the calculation; the legal adequacy of the reasoning behind it is a separate administrative-law question.

That distinction has practical consequences. A refusal can occur after an assessment, and need not produce a new assessment. Even if a court overturns the refusal, the minister may reach the same conclusion after properly reconsidering it. It does not follow automatically that the amount assessed was wrong.

Both courts derive their powers from legislation. The Federal Courts Act gives Federal Court jurisdiction over judicial review of federal administrative decisions, subject to express statutory appeal routes elsewhere. Parliament had not expressly provided a Tax Court appeal from this decision. The majority rejected extending the assessment appeal by implication merely because the two decisions were closely connected.

Dow also relied on the former Exchequer Court’s review of ministerial discretion. The majority found that history insufficient: that court had broader jurisdiction and administrative-law remedies that the modern Tax Court lacks.

The forum determines the review and the remedy

The majority identified a further difficulty with Dow’s position. Assessment appeals in Tax Court involve a fresh examination through a trial process, with evidence and legal submissions. Judicial review of the minister’s discretionary decision instead presumptively applies the deferential reasonableness standard.

Treating the discretionary decision as part of an assessment while reviewing it under a different standard would unsettle the statutory scheme, the majority held. Courts could not supply that new jurisdiction and procedure themselves.

The available remedies mattered too. Federal Court can quash the refusal and require reconsideration, but cannot itself vacate or vary the assessment. Tax Court can vacate or vary an assessment, or send it back for reconsideration and reassessment, but the majority held that those powers do not authorize it to quash the separate discretionary refusal.

If Federal Court quashes the refusal, the minister must reconsider. A new opinion changing tax liability should then be reflected in a reassessment. Tax Court may ultimately be needed if the assessment fails to reflect that change. A successful judicial review does not itself guarantee a reduction.

Dow argued that a single forum would improve access to justice. The majority answered that jurisdiction could not be enlarged on that basis and that uncertainty over which discretionary decisions were included could create further litigation. Comprehensive reform of the divided system was for Parliament.

Dissent saw the decision as part of the assessment

Côté’s dissent took a narrower position than Dow’s broader invitation to bring all ministerial discretion affecting tax liability within Tax Court jurisdiction. She focused on subsection 247(10) decisions reflected in an assessment.

Reading the transfer-pricing provisions together, she concluded that when a downward adjustment is sought or established, the minister must form an opinion about whether it is appropriate. That is an entitlement to a decision, not an entitlement to receive the adjustment.

Because this decision determines income and the resulting tax payable, the dissent considered it inseparable from the correctness of the assessment. An improper exercise of discretion could therefore make that assessment incorrect. The existing statutory assessment appeal supplied jurisdiction; no new power of judicial review was required.

Côté also disagreed about remedies. In her view, Tax Court’s power to refer an assessment back for reconsideration and reassessment included requiring the minister to reconsider the adjustment decision. Tax Court could not substitute its own opinion, and the minister could still reach the same result through a proper exercise of discretion.

The dissent proposed deferential appellate review of the discretionary component, examining such matters as wrong principles or irrelevant considerations. Tax Court could consider new evidence when deciding whether the minister’s opinion remained a valid basis for the assessment. That differed from judicial review focused on the decision when made.

For the dissent, separating a challenge to an upward adjustment from a challenge to a refused downward adjustment risked forcing taxpayers into parallel proceedings about the same tax liability. The majority’s ruling nevertheless preserves that division: this discretionary refusal belongs in Federal Court, while assessment appeals remain with Tax Court.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada, Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Canada, 2024 SCC 23.