
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a sexual-assault conviction while rejecting a request for broader secrecy over the appeal, ruling that a targeted publication ban could protect the complainant without closing the proceedings to public scrutiny.
In R. v. T.W.W., 2024 SCC 19, decided May 24, 2024, seven judges dismissed the accused’s appeal over the exclusion of other sexual-activity evidence. Justices Suzanne Côté and Mary Moreau would have ordered a new trial because, in their view, developments during the trial required the judge to reconsider the initial evidentiary ruling.
All nine judges agreed on the disposition of the Crown’s separate request to restrict access. The Court prohibited publication of information about the nature of the complainant’s other sexual activity at issue and required redacted public factums, but found the broader requested restrictions unjustified.
The decision addressed both the safeguards governing sexual-history evidence and the responsibility of appellate courts to explain their work publicly while protecting complainants’ privacy.
Specific relevance required
The accused had sought permission before trial to introduce evidence under the Criminal Code’s section 276 regime. He said it was relevant to credibility and necessary context for his defence. The trial judge refused, and a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld that decision.
Writing for the Supreme Court majority, Justice Michelle O’Bonsawin emphasized that invoking context or credibility was not enough. Those issues arise in nearly every criminal trial. The applicant had to identify precisely how the proposed evidence addressed a particular issue without relying on prohibited assumptions.
The regime barred the “twin myths”: reasoning that a complainant was more likely to have consented to the activity charged, or was less worthy of belief, because of other sexual activity. Evidence offered for a permissible purpose still required sufficient relevance and probative value, without a danger of prejudice that substantially outweighed that value.
For credibility or context, the applicant had to explain why excluding the evidence would make the defence position untenable or utterly improbable. The Court did not impose a blanket exclusion: evidence could be necessary, for example, to address a material inconsistency or preserve the coherence of the defence narrative. But general assertions could not do that work.
Here, the majority found no permissible use established on the pre-trial record. The accused ultimately denied that the assault occurred, and the proposed evidence did not establish that denial. The majority also rejected the claimed inconsistency in the complainant’s account of the relationship: separation did not necessarily mean that every aspect of a relationship had ended.
Independently, even if the evidence had some relevance, the majority found no error in the trial judge’s weighing of its limited probative value against prejudice. The accused had not shown why the evidence was necessary to advance his theory. Its admission risked the prohibited reasoning and harm to the complainant’s privacy and dignity.
Both the majority and dissent rejected the suggestion that disclosure to police diminished the complainant’s protection. The majority also stressed that an identity publication ban did not reduce the protections owed under section 276.
Initial ruling and later reconsideration are different questions
The Court distinguished legal errors from discretionary evidentiary assessments on appeal. Under the majority’s approach, relevance and correct legal principles attracted no deference. A properly conducted balancing of probative value and prejudice did.
Côté and Moreau disagreed with that division. Although factual findings deserved deference, they considered the ultimate admissibility determination reviewable for correctness because Parliament had designated it a question of law.
All judges nevertheless agreed that the trial judge’s initial ruling was correct on the record then available. An appellate court could not use later testimony or closing submissions to retroactively find that ruling wrong.
The dispute was whether the judge should subsequently have reopened it.
The majority held that this issue was outside the appeal as of right. Such an appeal was limited to the question of law on which the Court of Appeal judge dissented. That dissent concerned the initial ruling, not a later failure to reconsider it. The accused had not sought leave to add the separate issue, and it was not meaningfully argued before the Supreme Court.
The majority also rejected reconsideration on its merits. It accepted that materially changed circumstances could require a judge to revisit a ruling, sometimes without a request where the evidence demanded it. But that power remained limited by the statutory process, including identifying the proposed use and respecting the complainant’s standing.
In this case, defence counsel had opportunities to seek reconsideration on the basis later advanced by the dissent. Counsel pursued different arguments and, after an adjournment, did not pursue admission of the earlier evidence. The majority declined to speculate about privileged strategic choices or substitute its own approach.
Côté and Moreau considered reconsideration part of the existing admissibility issue, not a new appeal ground. They favoured a less rigid reading of the dissent below and saw counsel’s omission as a lapse rather than an established tactical choice.
For them, the complainant’s trial testimony made the relationship’s separation relevant to the account of non-consent, creating a material change. They would have permitted narrowly confined cross-examination to counter that implication and test credibility on that point. This would not authorize an inference of consent from previous activity. They considered the evidence essential to full answer and defence, with a limiting instruction mitigating prejudice.
Targeted ban instead of broader closure
The Crown argued that the statutory publication protections governing the trial-level application extended to the Supreme Court appeal. Alternatively, it relied on the Court’s power to control its own proceedings.
The Court rejected the statutory argument. Reading the then-applicable section 278.95 in its text and context, it found a scheme directed to trial applications and decisions. Parliament had provided for appeals without expressly extending those protections to appellate proceedings.
That did not eliminate privacy protection. The Court had implied jurisdiction over its proceedings and records and could restrict openness where justified. Applying the Sherman Estate framework required a serious risk to an important public interest, necessity because reasonable alternatives would not prevent the risk, and benefits outweighing the restrictions’ negative effects.
The complainant’s privacy and dignity presented a serious public-interest concern. But the Crown had not established that sealing the requested materials and maintaining an in-camera hearing were necessary. A publication ban was a less restrictive alternative, and the appeal’s legal issues could be argued without extensive reliance on sensitive details.
Public reasons and hearings also allowed scrutiny of judicial decision-making and guidance to lower courts. The Court had initially heard the appeal privately and accepted materials under seal pending its decision; those interim precautions did not establish that permanent closure was justified.
Its final order prohibited publication, broadcast or transmission of information about the nature of the complainant’s sexual activity at issue other than the activity forming the charge. It directed the parties to file factums within 30 days redacting that information and anything identifying the complainant. The separate identity ban remained part of the protective measures.
The statutory discussion concerns the law applied in 2024. The current Criminal Code consolidation records the subsequent repeal of sections 278.95 and 278.97 under 2026 legislation. That later change should not be mistaken for permission to disregard the Court’s case-specific publication order.



