
The Supreme Court of Canada quashed Franck Yvan Tayo Tompouba’s sexual-assault conviction and ordered a new trial in French on May 3, 2024, after finding that a failure to explain his language rights triggered a presumption of prejudice the Crown had not overcome.
The 5–2 decision in R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16, established how appeal courts should deal with a missed language-rights notice raised for the first time after conviction, where no decision on those rights was made in the original proceedings.
Chief Justice Richard Wagner’s majority reasons rejected the view that the accused had to prove both the failure to give proper notice and an actual loss of his right to choose the trial’s official language. Once the notice breach was established, the burden shifted to the Crown to show that the underlying choice had nevertheless been respected.
The order was for a new trial, not an acquittal. The Supreme Court did not decide the allegation’s merits or report a later retrial outcome.
A bilingual accused tried in English
Tayo Tompouba, a bilingual Francophone, was convicted after an English-language trial in British Columbia. The parties agreed that the judicial official at his first appearance had not ensured he was advised of his right to apply for a French trial, contrary to section 530(3) of the Criminal Code.
He had not applied for a French trial or raised that failure before conviction. On appeal, he argued that the breach required fresh proceedings. He offered no new evidence establishing that he had been unaware of his language rights, maintaining that he did not need to do so.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal accepted that the missed notice was a legal error but dismissed the appeal because the evidence did not establish prejudice. It could not determine when he learned of the right, whether he would have chosen French, or whether English had been his informed choice.
For the Supreme Court majority, that uncertainty had been placed on the wrong party.
A duty to ensure an informed choice
The majority emphasized that language rights protect equal access to courts and the cultural identity of official-language minorities. They are distinct from the minimum requirements of a fair trial. An accused’s ability to understand English and defend a charge does not erase the right to choose French.
Section 530 provides an absolute right to a trial in the chosen official language when the application is timely and the accused can instruct counsel and follow proceedings in that language. Late applications engage judicial discretion, with a presumption favouring the request in the interests of justice. Mere administrative inconvenience is insufficient to defeat it.
To make that choice meaningful, section 530(3) requires the first-appearance judicial official to ensure the accused knows both the right and the deadline for exercising it. The majority described an active duty: a judge cannot assume the accused has been informed, and must take steps to ensure notice is given if any doubt remains.
That obligation applies even where the accused has a lawyer. Parliament extended it to represented accused persons in 2008, rejecting reliance on an assumption that counsel would always supply the necessary information.
Why the Crown bore the burden
The disagreement concerned the Criminal Code’s appeal framework. A legal error ordinarily carries a presumption of prejudice; other irregularities may require an appellant to prove a miscarriage of justice.
The majority classified this breach as a legal error because a judicial official failed to apply a mandatory rule connected to the proceedings leading to conviction. An improper omission could qualify, even if committed before trial by someone other than the eventual trial judge.
That did not make a new trial automatic. The Crown could invoke section 686(1)(b)(iv), a provision permitting certain procedural errors to be cured where no prejudice resulted, to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities.
The majority identified three possible routes: showing insufficient proficiency in the other official language; showing that the accused would have chosen the same trial language even after proper notice; or showing timely knowledge from another source and a free, informed choice. The Crown could rely on the existing record or seek permission to introduce new evidence.
A genuine violation of the underlying right to choose the trial language could not be cured merely because the trial was otherwise fair. The distinction was between a missed notice that proved harmless to the choice and an infringement of the choice itself.
The Court also rejected Tayo Tompouba’s argument that the Crown had forfeited reliance on a curative provision by expressly declining to invoke one below. Its no-prejudice submissions had implicitly raised the issue, and it expressly sought the provision’s application in the Supreme Court. He had an opportunity to respond, so procedural fairness did not prevent consideration.
Why the evidence fell short
French proficiency was undisputed. But speaking English with police and counsel did not establish that Tayo Tompouba would have preferred an English trial. A bilingual person may use the majority language because they believe it is required. He had also testified that he wanted a French-speaking lawyer but had been told finding one would be difficult.
The Crown relied on release documents he had signed containing language-rights notices. The majority found the circumstances insufficient to establish informed knowledge: one notice appeared below his signature in small English text, another on the reverse of the signed page, and the documents were signed while he was under arrest as a condition of release. His rights were not explained then.
Nor did having counsel establish that the missing advice had been supplied. Treating representation alone as sufficient would largely undo Parliament’s decision to impose the notice duty in represented cases.
The majority did not conclusively determine what Tayo Tompouba knew or would have chosen. It held that the evidence was inconclusive, and the Crown therefore failed to discharge its burden.
Dissent would have required evidence from the accused
Justices Andromache Karakatsanis and Sheilah Martin agreed on the importance of language rights but would have dismissed the appeal.
They distinguished the procedural right to notice from the substantive right to choose. The missed notice was not, in their view, an erroneous legal decision attributable to the trial judge. Determining compliance could also require new factual findings. They would therefore assess it under the miscarriage-of-justice ground, placing the burden on the appellant.
They proposed a limited evidentiary requirement: the accused should establish, for example by affidavit, that they did not know of the right and that a trial in the other language was a viable option. They need not swear they would actually have chosen it. Tayo Tompouba had supplied no such evidence.
The dissent also viewed the signed notices, counsel’s professional obligations and an earlier challenge concerning advice about French-speaking counsel as supporting an inference of knowledge. It warned that the majority’s approach could require the Crown to prove matters known only to a silent accused.
The majority considered its rebuttable presumption an appropriate safeguard against tactical appeals and stressed that systematic compliance with the notice duty would prevent the problem.
A separate argument alleged that the trial judge should have proactively ordered a French trial. The majority found it unnecessary to decide. The dissent rejected it, finding no circumstances requiring the judge to inquire into the choice of language. The majority’s order quashed the conviction and required a new trial in French.



