A police request for an Internet Protocol address is a search protected by the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled, extending privacy protection to an early step in an online investigation before police obtain a subscriber’s name or home address.

In R. v. Bykovets, 2024 SCC 6, a five-judge majority held that an IP address attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy because it can connect a person’s online activities and lead to intimate information about them. The Court set aside Andrei Bykovets’ conviction and ordered a new trial on March 1, 2024.

Justice Andromache Karakatsanis wrote for the majority. Justice Suzanne Côté, joined by Chief Justice Richard Wagner and Justices Malcolm Rowe and Michelle O’Bonsawin, would have dismissed the appeal. They considered the majority’s approach too detached from what the evidence showed police could learn from the addresses in this particular investigation.

The decision did not acquit Bykovets or finally determine the admissibility of the evidence. The appeal concerned whether the initial request engaged section 8, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure. The Crown conceded that, if Bykovets had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses, his section 8 rights had been violated.

Police obtained the addresses before seeking subscriber information

Calgary police investigated fraudulent online purchases involving virtual gift cards in 2017. They learned that Moneris, a third-party payment processor, handled a liquor store’s online sales and asked it for the IP addresses associated with the transactions.

Moneris voluntarily supplied two addresses. Police identified the Internet service provider and then obtained a production order requiring it to disclose the associated subscriber information. One address was registered to Bykovets and the other to his father.

Police subsequently obtained warrants to search the two residences. Bykovets was convicted of 14 offences related to the fraudulent purchases and possession of fraud-related material.

The trial judge rejected his challenge to the initial request, finding that the IP addresses alone did not disclose core personal information. A majority of Alberta’s Court of Appeal agreed. Its dissenting judge would have recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy and ordered a new trial.

Why an address can reveal more than a number

An external IP address enables information to move between an Internet connection and other destinations online. Internet service providers record which subscriber was assigned an address at a particular time. Many addresses are dynamic, meaning the provider can change them without notice.

The Supreme Court had already ruled in R. v. Spencer that police requests for subscriber information linking an IP address to a name and address engage section 8. Here, police obtained that later information through a court order. The dispute concerned the earlier acquisition of the IP addresses themselves.

For the majority, privacy could not be assessed by treating those addresses as isolated numbers or by accepting the police’s intended use as the limit of the inquiry. Courts must consider what information a search can reveal, including inferences drawn by combining it with other available information.

The expert evidence described another route to identifying a user: examining activity recorded by websites that track IP addresses. Information from social-media or email accounts could allow identity to be inferred without asking the Internet service provider for subscriber information.

Karakatsanis identified three related privacy risks. The activity associated with an address may itself reveal sensitive matters, including financial transactions or visits to medical or political forums. That activity can be correlated with other records tied to the same address. The resulting trail can ultimately identify the person behind otherwise anonymous activity.

The concern was therefore broader than disclosure of a name. An address could help assemble a detailed picture of someone’s interests, habits and personal choices before the safeguards recognized in Spencer were triggered.

Privacy does not disappear when companies hold the data

The majority rejected the view that a user’s limited control over an IP address defeated the privacy claim. Canadian law permits people to share information for a limited purpose while retaining protection against state access. Avoiding the Internet altogether was not a meaningful price to demand for privacy.

Likewise, the fact that police requested information from a company’s database rather than entering a home did little to resolve the issue. Digital records can expose far more than a physical intrusion would suggest.

Karakatsanis emphasized the role of companies that collect and combine vast amounts of user data. Although those private companies are not themselves governed by section 8, their cooperation can greatly expand what police learn. Judicial oversight places the disclosure decision within the Charter’s safeguards instead of leaving its scope to private organizations.

The majority acknowledged the importance of investigating online crime, particularly offences against children. It nevertheless considered prior judicial authorization a manageable additional step where an address is sufficiently connected to suspected crime, pointing to production-order mechanisms and remote access to judicial officers.

The holding does not prohibit police from obtaining IP addresses. It requires the state to justify an intrusion into the privacy interest they engage.

Four judges focused on the evidence in this investigation

Côté agreed that privacy must be assessed according to what people ought reasonably to expect, rather than simply what technology permits others to collect. She also accepted that courts must examine information and the inferences it supports. Her disagreement concerned how far that inquiry could extend on this record.

In her view, the addresses disclosed only the identity of the Internet service provider. They did not themselves reveal Bykovets’ identity, browsing history or other intimate information. Police acquired the identifying link only after obtaining the production order required by Spencer.

The dissent acknowledged that combining an address with records held by another website could identify someone. But that had not occurred here. Côté considered a police request for such identifying records subject to Spencer’s protections as well; she left spontaneous disclosures by companies for a case presenting those facts.

She also distinguished taking a computer, which gives police possession of private data, from obtaining an address that requires further information before a user can be identified. The user’s limited control over the address, and its retrieval from the processor’s database rather than his home, did not strengthen the privacy claim on these facts.

The dissent’s objection was also evidentiary and procedural. Côté warned against replacing the trial record with hypothetical scenarios, contestable facts accepted through judicial notice or material supplied by interveners. She also emphasized the limits on the Court’s criminal-appeal jurisdiction and the absence of a basis to overturn the trial judge’s factual findings. The majority, by contrast, considered broader social realities and the potential of aggregated data essential to a meaningful privacy analysis.

Côté warned that requiring another authorization in every case could slow investigations and strain police and judicial resources. She expressly left open that different facts could support a reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address.

The majority’s broader approach prevailed. The new trial was the ordered remedy; the Supreme Court did not decide Bykovets’ ultimate guilt or direct that all evidence obtained in the investigation be excluded.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada judgment.