
The Supreme Court of Canada restored Daniel Hodgson’s acquittal in a fatal chokehold case, ruling that an appeal court could not replace the trial judge’s assessment of his intent with a general proposition about the danger of chokeholds.
In R. v. Hodgson, 2024 SCC 25, the Court also upheld the trial judge’s analysis of self-defence. The judges unanimously restored the acquittal on February 15, 2024. Written reasons released July 12 explained why the Nunavut Court of Appeal’s order for a new trial could not stand.
Justices Sheilah Martin and Mary Moreau wrote the principal reasons for eight judges. Justice Malcolm Rowe agreed with the result in a separate concurrence.
A fatal intervention at a house party
Hodgson was sleeping in a bedroom at an Iqaluit house party when another guest asked him to help deal with Bradley Winsor, who had refused repeated requests to leave. Winsor had pushed another man against a wall. When Hodgson intervened, Winsor elbowed him in the head.
Hodgson put Winsor in a chokehold. Other guests shouted for him to stop, and another man pulled them apart. Winsor died despite attempts to revive him.
The trial judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hodgson caused the death. But she had a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill or intended bodily harm he knew was likely to cause death, and acquitted him of second-degree murder.
She found the requirements for manslaughter otherwise established, but the Crown had not disproved self-defence or defence of others. She considered the sudden confrontation, Hodgson’s injured dominant hand, the failure of less forceful efforts and the relatively short duration of the chokehold. Expert evidence raised the possibility that health and substance-related factors unknown to Hodgson contributed to the fatal outcome, which mattered to her assessment of proportionality.
The Nunavut Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. It faulted the trial judge’s treatment of the chokehold’s dangerousness and concluded that she had assessed self-defence through an improperly subjective lens.
Disagreement with facts is not enough
The Supreme Court said the Crown’s right to appeal an acquittal under section 676(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is limited to a question of law alone. That restriction protects against wrongful convictions and repeated exposure to prosecution after an acquittal. It does not give the Crown the same scope of appeal available to a convicted person.
Some mistakes in assessing evidence can qualify as legal errors. Examples include a factual finding unsupported by any evidence, a mistake about the legal effect of established facts, reliance on a wrong legal principle, or failure to consider all the evidence on guilt or innocence. The Court cautioned that a finding of reasonable doubt is not itself an unsupported factual finding for this purpose.
Even a legal error is insufficient by itself. The Crown must also show, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that the acquittal would not necessarily have been the same without it. That demanding standard does not require proving that a different verdict was inevitable.
Here, the appeal court had not precisely identified a legal error in the murder-intent analysis. The trial judge had stated the correct test. The disagreement concerned her factual conclusions about Hodgson’s state of mind and the weight of the evidence.
The Supreme Court warned that merely labelling a disagreement a legal error can improperly expand Crown appeals. An appeal court must identify the legal principle allegedly misunderstood and explain how the trial reasons reveal that misunderstanding.
Dangerous conduct does not automatically establish murder intent
The Court went further: even treating the alleged errors as legal questions, the trial judge had made no such error.
Murder requires proof of subjective intent: an intention to kill, or to cause bodily harm the accused knows is likely to cause death while being reckless about whether death results. Proving that a reasonable person would have recognized the danger does not establish that mental state. Nor is it enough simply to prove that the accused knew the act was dangerous.
Manslaughter uses a different standard. Its mental element can be established through objectively foreseeable bodily harm that is neither trivial nor transitory. The trial judge had understood that distinction and found the manslaughter requirements met before considering self-defence.
The Court did not declare chokeholds safe. It expressly recognized their potentially fatal consequences and said judges must remain attentive to the danger of the particular technique, force and duration. But earlier decisions did not create a legal rule requiring the same conclusion about every chokehold or every accused person’s intent.
An Alberta sentencing decision, Lemmon, concerned choking to overcome resistance to another offence. The Supreme Court’s earlier Cooper decision permitted an inference of knowledge that strangulation would likely cause death on its facts, but did not require it. Neither displaced a trial judge’s assessment of the evidence in Hodgson’s case.
The trial judge had accepted Hodgson’s account that he meant to restrain Winsor and had considered his experience, the surrounding events, the brief struggle and the other guests’ surprise at the outcome. Her reasonable doubt about murder intent rested on that evidence.
The Crown’s further reliance on the common-sense inference that sane and sober people intend the natural and probable consequences of their acts also failed. That inference is available, not mandatory. It cannot replace an assessment of subjective intent, and the judge did not have to expressly reject it after explaining the evidence that left her in reasonable doubt.
Self-defence required more than Hodgson’s own view
The Supreme Court separately rejected the finding that the trial judge had applied a wholly subjective self-defence test.
Section 34 requires a belief on reasonable grounds that force or a threat is being used, an act done for a defensive or protective purpose, and a response reasonable in the circumstances. Those elements use different inquiries. The first combines an actual belief with reasonable grounds; the second concerns the accused’s subjective purpose; the third assesses the overall reasonableness of the response using the relevant statutory factors.
The trial judge addressed each element. She considered the nature and imminence of the threat, available alternatives, Hodgson’s role, the participants’ physical capabilities, their lack of prior conflict and proportionality. She recognized that Winsor was not likely threatening someone’s life, but considered the full circumstances rather than treating that fact as decisive.
Referring to Hodgson personally did not turn the analysis into an exclusively subjective one. Her reasons repeatedly applied the objective question of whether his conduct was reasonable in the circumstances. Although the trial preceded the Supreme Court’s Khill decision clarifying self-defence, her analysis followed its principles.
Rowe agreed that self-defence applied. His separate reasons highlighted that reliance on sexual-assault myths can raise a question of law permitting a Crown appeal, illustrating a category of evidentiary error within the otherwise restricted appeal power. He did not propose a different outcome for Hodgson.



