
The Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission refused to reopen its decision upholding a Charlottetown permit for cottage foundations, finding that resident Jerry Woolfrey was largely seeking to reargue his appeal. The July 17, 2026 review decision in Jerry Woolfrey v. City of Charlottetown, Order LA26-12, 2026 PEIRAC 46, left the commission’s June ruling unchanged.
In Order LA26-08, 2026 PEIRAC 33, issued June 8, the commission had dismissed Woolfrey’s appeal of a building and development permit issued to Royalty Maples Properties Inc. Both decisions in docket LA24021 were made by chair Pamela J. Williams and commissioners Gordon MacFarlane and Murray MacPherson.
The permit covered foundations only, as one stage of a larger cottage and motel project. The property was already zoned Highway Commercial, or C-2, but adjoined and was accessed through a low-density residential neighbourhood. The case was not a rezoning application or blanket approval to complete the development.
Errors recognized, but not enough to invalidate the permit
The original appeal challenged both the city’s procedures and the planning merits. The commission’s framework asks whether the planning authority followed the law and procedural fairness, and whether its decision was supported by sound planning principles reflected in the official plan and zoning bylaw.
Charlottetown issued the foundation permit on Nov. 19, 2024, but did not post public notice until about Dec. 3, missing the Planning Act’s seven-day requirement. The commission accepted jurisdiction over Woolfrey’s appeal despite the apparent timing issue. It also accepted that late notice affected residents’ time to consider municipal reconsideration, but found the error did not justify overturning the permit: Woolfrey was able to bring his appeal and obtain review of the city’s decision. It reminded the city that timely notice was mandatory.
The permit was unsigned because the city’s online system had failed to attach a digital signature. Planning witnesses also could not confirm whether council had formally delegated authority under the bylaw. The commission found neither the uncertainty over delegation nor the missing signature sufficient to invalidate this decision in its circumstances. It also noted that the city’s registered professional planner had been consulted, rejecting a related challenge to the qualifications of the planner who processed the application.
Another error concerned driveway approval. Planning staff initially mistook an arborist’s approval concerning trees for Public Works approval of access. Public Works subsequently approved the access before a second-phase permit was issued. The commission accepted that later approval and declined to overturn the foundation permit on that ground.
Woolfrey also challenged the treatment of land-use buffering. The city’s planner said she had measured the spacing from the submitted plans before approving the permit, although the distance was not written on them. The commission accepted the city’s explanation as part of its finding that the process was generally compliant. It nevertheless recognized that the accumulated errors could contribute to residents’ dissatisfaction and distrust, and urged greater care in reviewing applications.
Existing zoning still required an objective planning assessment
Woolfrey and his planning expert argued that the development was incompatible with the surrounding neighbourhood. They emphasized separation of conflicting uses, protection of residential character and the hierarchy of roads. Residents described increased traffic and safety concerns on narrow streets without sidewalks.
The city and developer emphasized the existing C-2 zoning and the permit’s limited scope. No rezoning or variance was required, and the city said the application met the bylaw’s requirements for a permitted use.
The commission accepted that the application was “as-of-right,” but did not treat that label as eliminating every judgment required by the bylaw. Provisions concerning safe access, residents’ health and safety, and development compatibility retained a measure of discretion that had to be exercised objectively.
On this record, it found the city had adequately considered those provisions. Residents were well placed to describe their experiences, but their traffic evidence was anecdotal rather than empirical. The commission accepted the city’s planning evidence and Public Works approval, and found that the principles identified by Woolfrey’s expert were reflected in bylaw provisions the city had considered.
The Official Plan issue was similarly confined to this application. The commission accepted that staff did not have to separately weigh its policies and objectives against an as-of-right application meeting the bylaw. It reasoned that the bylaw implemented the plan and established land-use rights, and was not satisfied those rights should be displaced by a discretionary plan review, at least where council was not reviewing the application. It did not declare official plans irrelevant to planning decisions generally.
Unchanged foundations and a limited review power
The developer had changed from relocating existing cottages to constructing new ones. Woolfrey argued that a permit condition required revised plans. The commission acknowledged that the condition was unclear, but accepted the city’s evidence that the approved foundations had not changed. Moving or building the cottages required separate permits; the change did not trigger a revision of this foundation permit.
Woolfrey’s later review request alleged errors concerning staff appointments, late notice, the Official Plan, continuous buffering and the description of the permit as a foundation permit. He characterized appointment information as new evidence. The city opposed review; the developer made no submissions on that request.
Under section 12 of the commission’s governing statute, review is discretionary and used sparingly. The applicant must establish a preliminary case for correcting an error or addressing materially changed circumstances, including relevant evidence unavailable at the original hearing. The commission found that the appointment and notice issues had already been addressed, while the remaining points were further argument about evidence and issues previously considered. No error or material change justified reopening the decision.
The review process was not a substitute for a statutory appeal to the Court of Appeal on a question of law or jurisdiction. Nor did the original planning appeal automatically stop development. The June reasons explained that any work continuing during the appeal was at the developer’s risk and could not influence the commission’s decision. Later permits remained distinct from the foundation approval under review.



