
Canada’s nuclear regulator’s detailed reasons for approving expanded medical-isotope production infrastructure at Darlington emphasize a limit on the authorization: additional reactor units must remain within the approved safety case, and designated staff cannot authorize activities outside it.
In DEC 25-H107, detailed reasons dated April 10, 2026, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission explained its December 19, 2025 decision allowing Ontario Power Generation to install and operate target delivery systems on Units 1, 3 and 4. The April reasons did not replace or newly grant the earlier authorization.
The approval covers production of the radionuclides already authorized by Darlington’s licence: molybdenum-99, lutetium-177 and yttrium-90. It retains regulatory hold points and verification requirements. A proposal to produce another radioisotope would require a licence amendment and a public hearing.
Expanding an existing system, not changing the licence’s activities
Darlington, in Clarington, Ontario, has four CANDU reactors. A target delivery system was already installed on Unit 2. It moves capsules into the reactor for irradiation, retrieves them and transfers them into shielded containers for off-site processing.
OPG’s application supplied detailed support for a Unit 3 installation planned for a 2026 outage, while asking that the same approach support installations on Units 1 and 4. An earlier Commission decision had required OPG to obtain approval before extending the system to other units and demonstrate that the work could be carried out safely as a low-risk activity.
The Commission treated the application as a change to the licensing basis, the requirements and supporting safety documentation governing authorized work, rather than an amendment to the licence’s terms or permitted activities. The existing licence remained unchanged.
Following a hearing in writing, the Commission found OPG qualified and its safety and control programs adequate. CNSC staff supported the application, and the Society of United Professionals filed the hearing’s sole intervention in support. The Commission nevertheless stressed that it has no economic mandate and did not decide the application on the economic benefits of isotope production.
Safety checks remain conditions of expansion
The Commission accepted that the established Unit 2 safety case could support the additional systems. Its review covered management, operating performance, safety analysis, physical design, fitness for service and environmental protection. Staff considered the Unit 3 design changes to have negligible or positive safety effects and to reflect foreseeable differences between units or experience from Unit 2.
That conclusion did not dispense with unit-specific verification. OPG must provide safety and design documents for the additional installations and show that its engineering-change process has been followed. Updated operating procedures, radiation-protection assessments and fire-protection documentation remain part of the required regulatory work.
The reasons also address an outstanding contractor-oversight concern. Staff reported that a contractor had performed types of work for which it was not formally qualified, leading to an inspection finding elevated to medium significance. Staff said OPG was developing and implementing corrective action and expected the issues to be resolved before further installation work.
The Commission required OPG to satisfy staff concerning the outstanding warning-letter actions. It noted that staff could take further enforcement measures if necessary and would continue enhanced oversight of supply-chain and contractor management. The approval therefore was not a finding that all corrective work had already been completed.
Delegated authority has a defined boundary
The Commission extended the regulatory hold point previously established for Unit 2 to systems on the other reactors. A hold point is a step beyond which the operator cannot proceed without the required regulatory consent.
For future installations and operations on Units 1 and 4, the Commission delegated acceptance authority to the executive vice-president and chief operations officer, and the director general responsible for power-reactor regulation. It did not adopt staff’s proposal to include the Darlington regulatory program director in that delegation.
Those officials may verify conformity with the approved safety case and licensing basis. They may not approve work outside those boundaries. If an installation or operation falls outside them, OPG must return to the Commission for authorization.
Environmental and Indigenous-rights findings
The Commission found no impact assessment required under the Impact Assessment Act because the requested change did not involve a listed activity or a project on federal lands. It accepted OPG’s environmental-protection program, with continued staff oversight, and found the existing decommissioning plan and financial guarantee adequate for the Unit 3 system.
It also concluded that the licensing-basis change would not cause new adverse effects on potential or established Indigenous or treaty rights. The reasons considered the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in assessing consultation obligations and reviewed engagement by OPG and CNSC staff.
No Indigenous Nation or community filed an intervention in this hearing. The Commission found that potentially interested communities had been informed and given an opportunity to participate, while emphasizing that OPG’s ongoing Indigenous-engagement obligations extend to the target delivery systems as appropriate.
The detailed reasons explain the scope and safeguards of the authorization. They do not establish that every later installation, regulatory hold-point release or production milestone has occurred.



