
Burnaby met its duty to accommodate a bylaw enforcement coordinator’s disability despite a slow and sometimes reactive process, the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal has ruled.
In McRae-Chalus v. City of Burnaby (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 239, issued November 10, tribunal member Andrew Robb dismissed Candace McRae-Chalus’s complaint about accommodation between September 2019 and January 2021. The city established that accommodating her restrictions in her former position would have fundamentally changed the job, while it continued exploring other work.
The decision does not determine whether her later termination was discriminatory or retaliatory. Those allegations were proceeding in separate complaints.
A return to work with restrictions
McRae-Chalus went on disability leave in 2017 because a vocal cord condition made speaking painful. Her bylaw enforcement role required communication with property owners, contractors and city staff, along with occasional site inspections. Although much work was done in writing, verbal communication and some work outside the home remained part of the job.
A rehabilitation consultant proposed a gradual return in September 2019 involving work from home, no talking or physical interaction, and no more than 12 hours weekly. The city rejected that plan for the existing position but remained open to clerical work. It sought further information about the nature and permanence of her restrictions.
At a September 2020 return-to-work meeting, the city proposed another independent medical examination and offered a temporary clerk position at her former rate of pay. McRae-Chalus said her restrictions required working from home, making that offer unsuitable. She also objected to how city staff treated her at the meeting and to their apparent lack of familiarity with information she had provided to the benefit administrators.
The city subsequently obtained a job-demands analysis and investigated other duties in her department. In January 2021, her doctors reported that her condition had worsened and that a return to work in the foreseeable future was unlikely.
Disability established without expert medical evidence
The tribunal rejected the city’s argument that McRae-Chalus had not proved a disability. Although it did not admit her medical providers’ records for the truth of their contents, her testimony and her husband’s evidence established a persistent condition that substantially affected her ability to speak and work.
Her ability to speak on some occasions and continue some ordinary activities did not defeat that finding. The tribunal did not make a particular medical diagnosis. It assessed the functional effects she described.
It also found an adverse employment impact connected to the disability. Receiving benefits did not erase the lost experience, career development and other benefits of working. The city could not selectively rely on medical statements that she was unfit to work while disregarding their discussion of returning with accommodations.
That shifted the burden to the city to justify its job requirements. It had to show a rational connection to the work, good-faith adoption and reasonable necessity, including that accommodation could not be provided without undue hardship.
Reasonable accommodation, not a perfect process
The city satisfied that test. The tribunal accepted that speaking with the public and attending sites could not always be replaced by written exchanges. Splitting off only non-verbal tasks would undermine the coordinator’s responsibility for understanding each file. Other coordinators’ partial remote work during the pandemic did not show the entire position could be performed from home.
Rejecting the proposed arrangement was not the same as refusing all accommodation. The city considered alternative positions, sought clarification of changing medical information and continued investigating duties that might be suitable. It was reasonable to seek a further examination when the information left uncertainty about whether McRae-Chalus could work at the office without speaking.
Robb nevertheless criticized the city’s intermittent communications and lack of urgency before it learned that her benefits might end. Direct contact could have helped her feel more involved, and a proactive approach would have been better practice.
On the evidence, however, those shortcomings did not change the outcome. Even the consultant with access to the medical information had struggled to determine the restrictions’ permanence. The tribunal assessed the process as a whole and found reasonable efforts rather than a closed mind.
It also reviewed the full recording of the return-to-work meeting and found city staff’s conduct professional, rather than mocking or discriminatory. With reasonable inquiries already supporting undue hardship in the former role, the city was not required to trial the proposed arrangement before reaching that conclusion.
The complaint was dismissed under section 37(1) of the Human Rights Code. The ruling turns on the duties of this particular position, the information available during the process and the alternatives explored, rather than a general exemption from accommodating communication disabilities or remote work.



