Saskatchewan’s Court of Appeal has refused a new family-law trial sought on the ground that a judge should have let a parent’s lawyer withdraw on the first morning, finding that the identified problems were resolved and the proceedings remained fair.

In W.K. v. S.K., 2026 SKCA 119, Justice Jerome Tholl, writing for a unanimous panel, distinguished a lawyer’s unresolved ethical inability to continue from difficulties that had been volunteered to the judge and carefully addressed. Counsel confirmed that he was ready to proceed and never renewed his request, despite repeated invitations to do so.

The October 30 ruling dismissed W.K.’s appeal and ordered him to pay $2,000 in costs. The appeal concerned the withdrawal request alone, not alleged errors in the underlying parenting and child-support findings.

Two problems at the start of trial

The family case had already been delayed for years. A trial originally scheduled for June 2024 was adjourned after W.K. obtained Legal Aid representation. That adjournment was made peremptory against him, signalling that the rescheduled September trial was expected to proceed.

At its outset, his lawyer described difficulty obtaining proper instructions. He identified concerns about disclosing financial information and about dealing with parenting assessors’ reports and evidence. He also said documents had arrived shortly before trial, leaving little time to review them, and sought permission to withdraw.

The judge explored the two principal problems. W.K. confirmed that he agreed to disclosure of the financial records. The judge explained that the assessors were court witnesses whose evidence would be received regardless of whether he chose to have questions put to them. His decision about cross-examination did not itself prevent the evidence from being heard.

Counsel accepted that resolution. The judge dismissed the withdrawal application without prejudice to renewing it at any point during trial if ethical concerns arose. She then gave lawyer and client time to speak privately. After the break, counsel said they were ready to proceed.

Later, counsel confirmed that he had reviewed a further assessment report with W.K. and resolved the issue about questioning its author. The judge also gave them additional preparation time before W.K. testified. Counsel did not renew the withdrawal application, and W.K. did not discharge him.

Ethical withdrawal remained protected

The Court of Appeal explained that once a case is set for trial, Saskatchewan’s rules require counsel to obtain leave to withdraw. The requirement protects more than scheduling convenience: withdrawal may disrupt representation, prejudice parties, inconvenience witnesses and delay other cases. In parenting litigation, the child’s best interests also matter.

Tholl considered the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in R. v. Cunningham, a criminal case. Where timing is an issue, a court may ask why counsel seeks withdrawal, but must respect solicitor-client privilege. If continuing would violate counsel’s professional obligations, withdrawal must be permitted.

This case was different from a lawyer simply stating that ethical reasons required withdrawal without giving details. Counsel had volunteered the two difficulties before the trial judge made inquiries. She had not demanded disclosure of his instructions or client communications through improper questioning.

Once those concerns were disclosed, the judge could cautiously determine whether they actually required withdrawal, while respecting privilege and professional obligations. Both lawyer and client indicated willingness to continue after the issues were addressed. The judge twice emphasized that counsel should return to the issue if an ethical problem arose.

The court did not treat a peremptory adjournment as an absolute bar to another delay. But a further adjournment was extremely unlikely in these circumstances. Without a workable resolution, W.K. would probably have faced the trial representing himself on short notice.

Apparent privilege breach did not make the trial unfair

W.K. also argued that counsel had breached solicitor-client privilege and disparaged him before the trial judge. Tholl said counsel appeared to have crossed the line in describing discussions with his client, but that did not establish prejudice to the adjudication or a negative effect on trial fairness.

The central issue was financial disclosure that W.K. was already legally required, and repeatedly ordered, to provide. His failures were known to the other party and the court. What counsel said did not change those facts or reveal the disclosure problem for the first time.

The discussion about limiting questions to an assessor disclosed nothing sensitive that could have affected trial fairness. The trial decision itself did not refer to information counsel had provided during the opening exchange. W.K. identified no authority establishing that an apparent breach in these circumstances entitled him to a new trial.

Preparation complaints lacked supporting evidence

The court separately rejected arguments about counsel’s readiness. No request for additional preparation time had been refused. The judge adjourned early one afternoon to allow preparation and later offered another break that counsel declined. The trial finished before its full allocation of days had been used.

More broadly, W.K. relied on the transcript and trial decision without applying to introduce fresh evidence. There was no evidence explaining what additional preparation should have achieved: what testimony should have been elicited, what questions should have been asked, what documents should have been introduced or what other witnesses should have been called. No expert evidence assessing counsel’s performance was proposed.

The court also found it unreasonable to withhold relevant documents until the eve of trial, during trial or altogether, then complain that counsel was insufficiently familiar with them. W.K. had not identified how different handling of the documents could have changed the outcome.

Taken together, the record did not establish a miscarriage of justice or sufficient concerns about trial fairness to justify a new trial. The decision leaves the underlying judgment undisturbed on this procedural challenge; it does not re-evaluate the parenting evidence or establish any later family arrangements.

Source: W.K. v. S.K., 2026 SKCA 119.