The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has refused to anonymize a closed complaint file, finding that concerns about how prospective employers might react to an internet search did not justify restricting access to its public records.

In Taghavimehr v. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2026 CHRT 121, tribunal member Gary Stein dismissed a request to remove identifying information from publicly accessible records and address copies held by third-party websites. The October 23 ruling concerned confidentiality after the complaint had been withdrawn, rather than the merits of the original discrimination complaint.

A withdrawn complaint remained publicly searchable

Jamal Taghavimehr filed his complaint against Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada in 2018. The Canadian Human Rights Commission referred it to the tribunal in 2020. In May 2024, the tribunal closed the file at his request.

He later discovered that searching his name online produced a procedural decision issued before the withdrawal. He argued that potential employers could find that decision without the context that he had withdrawn the complaint and the file was closed.

Taghavimehr said he was advancing in his career and seeking greater professional responsibilities. Although he could not establish that an employer’s decision had been caused by the public information, he maintained that the risk of adverse professional consequences was foreseeable and substantial.

IRCC opposed the motion, arguing that there was insufficient supporting evidence and that the asserted privacy interest did not meet the legal threshold. It also pointed to an earlier tribunal letter explaining that official records were publicly accessible, subject to any confidentiality measures. Withdrawing the complaint, it argued, did not change the statutory test.

The evidence did not establish a real and substantial risk

Human rights proceedings and their official records are presumptively public. Section 52(1)(c) of the Canadian Human Rights Act permits confidentiality measures where disclosure presents a real and substantial risk of undue hardship, and the need for confidentiality outweighs the societal interest in public proceedings.

Stein applied that provision with guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada’s Sherman Estate decision, which sets a high threshold for departing from open justice to protect privacy. Evidence may establish actual or potential harm; the tribunal must nevertheless be persuaded that the risk is real and substantial.

The possibility that an employer would search Taghavimehr’s name, find the procedural decision and form an adverse impression remained speculative, Stein found. There was no evidence of that situation occurring. Obtaining additional records and drawing conclusions harmful to his employment prospects required a further chain of hypothetical inferences.

Stein acknowledged the practical difficulty of proving the risk Taghavimehr feared. But that difficulty did not remove the need for a persuasive evidentiary record. On the material presented, the required risk of hardship had not been established.

The alleged harm also fell short of undue hardship

The tribunal gave a separate reason for refusing the order: even if the hypothetical employment scenario occurred, Stein was not satisfied that it would amount to undue hardship within the statute.

The privacy exception protects highly sensitive information touching an individual’s core identity and dignity. Stein found that the name and information linking Taghavimehr to the proceeding had not been shown to meet that standard. The material he sought to protect did not disclose the kinds of intimate personal details identified in Sherman Estate.

The concern was that prospective employers might think negatively of someone who had pursued and later withdrawn a human rights complaint. Without more, Stein found that concern speculative and unexceptional. Treating it as sufficient would mean that a great many human rights complaints would cease to be conducted openly.

Stein acknowledged Taghavimehr’s wish to move beyond the closed complaint and his concerns about career advancement, but concluded that neither the evidence nor the nature of the information justified an exception. The confidentiality motion was dismissed.

Source: Taghavimehr v. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2026 CHRT 121.