Former Take Back Alberta CFO’s penalty halved after split election-finance appeal

A former Take Back Alberta chief financial officer has had his election-finance penalty cut in half after an Alberta judge overturned one false-report finding but upheld another for wilful blindness.

In Heidebrecht v Alberta (Election Commissioner), 2026 ABKB 735, decided October 21, 2026, Justice M.D. Slawinsky of the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta set aside the finding concerning Jonathan Heidebrecht’s first-quarter 2022 contribution report. The judge confirmed the second-quarter finding and reduced the single administrative penalty from $500 to $250.

The ruling was a mixed result, not a criminal conviction or complete exoneration. Each side must bear its own legal costs.

A changed burden on appeal

Heidebrecht became Take Back Alberta’s chief financial officer in February 2022. He said he resigned on June 30, but filed its second-quarter report on July 12. An Election Commissioner investigation led to a February 2025 decision finding that he knowingly filed false contribution reports for both quarters.

His appeal required the court to interpret a provision added to Alberta’s Election Finances and Contributions Disclosure Act in 2025. Section 51.03(6.1) places the burden on the Commissioner to establish both the contravention and the appropriateness of the administrative penalty. Slawinsky said the provision had not previously been judicially interpreted.

That wording makes a meaningful difference, the judge concluded. An ordinary appeal generally requires the person challenging a decision to demonstrate an error. Under this provision, the court must independently decide whether the Commissioner has proved the breach and justified the penalty, rather than simply reviewing the findings with ordinary appellate deference.

But it is not a fresh trial. The appeal remains confined to the evidence already before the Commissioner; the amendment does not authorize new evidence. The Commissioner’s reasons remain an important part of that record. The ruling concerns this specific statutory appeal process, not administrative appeals generally.

Knowing falsity requires more than carelessness

The Act prohibits knowingly making a false statement in a report or other document filed with the Chief Electoral Officer. Slawinsky held that this requires actual knowledge that a statement is false, or wilful blindness to that fact.

It is not enough that someone should have known better. Carelessness or negligence alone cannot establish the required state of mind. Conversely, the Commissioner does not also have to prove a separate intention to deceive: the requirement concerns awareness of falsity, not the filer’s purpose.

Wilful blindness means recognizing the need to investigate and deliberately avoiding that inquiry to remain ignorant. The court can infer that state of mind from circumstances, but the inference must be grounded in the evidence.

First-quarter explanation was not properly addressed

The first-quarter report disclosed no political advertising contributions, although $1,573.52 had been deposited in the political advertising account. Heidebrecht knew about those deposits. The disputed point was whether he knew his reporting treatment was wrong.

He explained that he was unfamiliar with the rules and uncertain whether the money would ultimately be used for political advertising. He said he contacted Elections Alberta and understood its guidance to mean the contributions could be reported in the second quarter if they were eventually used for that purpose.

The Commissioner treated his explanation as permission to alter the first-quarter report retroactively. Slawinsky found that this did not accurately reflect what Heidebrecht had said. Nothing in the record materially undermined the credibility or plausibility of his account.

The judge did not decide that Heidebrecht’s interpretation of the reporting requirements was correct. Rather, the Commissioner had not established that he knew the report was false. His account of seeking guidance also pointed away from deliberately avoiding an unwelcome answer.

Second-quarter breach concerned town-hall contributions

The second-quarter report disclosed approximately $15,350 in political advertising contributions, compared with approximately $23,762.15 deposited into that account. But the Commissioner accepted Heidebrecht’s explanation that some contributions had been refunded after donors learned their identities would have to be disclosed.

The surviving breach was therefore not simply the gap between those figures. It concerned unreported contributions connected with Take Back Alberta’s town-hall events, whether deposited in the political advertising account or its operating account.

The Act’s definition of political advertising includes organizing events with a significant purpose of promoting or opposing a registered party or its leader. The Commissioner found the town halls met that definition, based on their timing, political content and encouragement of party membership. Heidebrecht did not seriously challenge that classification; he maintained that he had viewed the events as educational and promoting civic participation.

Slawinsky found that the evidence, considered together, went beyond inexperience or poor judgment. Heidebrecht knew his employer was concerned about Take Back Alberta’s political associations, had attended a town hall involving negative discussion of political parties, and understood restrictions on supporting parties and candidates.

Yet he made few inquiries about the events or their fundraising, did not meaningfully review available information, and relied on others. He acknowledged that he could probably have obtained information about the events had he asked. He then certified the report after saying he had stepped away from the role, treating the filing as a favour or administrative task.

The judge found that this amounted to a deliberate choice to remain uninformed about facts directly relevant to the report’s truthfulness. That established wilful blindness and supported the second-quarter contravention.

Because the Commissioner had imposed one $500 penalty for two contraventions using the same penalty analysis, the court reduced it proportionately to $250. The decision resolves Heidebrecht’s appeal over these two reports; it does not adjudicate penalties involving other people or establish that every town hall is political advertising.