
Immigration decision-makers must account for Canada’s protection against returning refugees to persecution when interpreting the inadmissibility rules for senior officials of designated governments, the Federal Court of Appeal has ruled.
In Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Wahab, 2026 FCA 140, a unanimous panel dismissed the minister’s appeal on August 19 without costs. The decision preserves a fresh hearing for an Afghan military doctor whose inadmissibility finding had been set aside.
Justice René LeBlanc drew an important distinction: the principle of non-refoulement must inform how the legislation is interpreted at the admissibility stage. The judgment does not require a full assessment of an individual’s removal risks at that stage, nor does it decide that the doctor is admissible.
A military rank drove the original finding
Ghulam Haidar Wahab came to Canada in August 2021 through the Afghanistan Resettlement Program and later applied for permanent residence. He had spent his career as a doctor and orthopaedic specialist in the Afghan military, retiring in 1992 with the rank of colonel.
Part of that service occurred under regimes Canada subsequently designated for systematic or gross human-rights violations. Wahab did not challenge that designation. He testified that he had not been a Communist Party member, had taken no political stance and had performed duties corresponding to a lower rank. The Immigration Division found him candid and credible.
Nevertheless, in February 2023, the division found him inadmissible under paragraph 35(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and section 16 of its regulations. Those provisions address prescribed senior officials of governments associated with specified grave misconduct.
The division applied a test based on whether his position fell in the upper half of the military hierarchy. It treated the rank as creating an irrebuttable presumption that he could exert significant government influence or benefit from his position. It therefore saw no need for a broader contextual analysis. A deportation order followed.
International obligations constrain interpretation
The Federal Court set that decision aside in December 2024, relying on the later Mason and Weldemariam decisions. It sent the matter to a different Immigration Division panel to reconsider the legislation in light of non-refoulement.
The minister argued on appeal that those precedents concerned different inadmissibility provisions and that protection against return to persecution belonged at the removal stage, not the admissibility stage.
The appeal court disagreed. The Act expressly directs interpretation and application consistent with Canada’s international human-rights obligations. The minister identified no clear parliamentary intention to exclude the senior-official provisions from that interpretive requirement.
The court found no material textual, contextual or purposive distinction that would make non-refoulement relevant to the security provisions considered in Mason and Weldemariam but irrelevant here. These provisions form part of a common inadmissibility framework, and the consequences can put a person on a path to removal.
The Refugee Convention’s protection is not unlimited. The reasons discuss its exclusions and its narrowly defined exceptions for danger to national security or, following a serious criminal conviction, danger to the community. But being a prescribed senior official does not, by itself, establish exclusion from the Convention’s protection.
Later safeguards did not cure the interpretive omission
The court also considered the limited safeguards available after certain serious inadmissibility findings. Access to refugee proceedings, humanitarian relief and appeals is restricted, and the pre-removal risk assessment is narrower. Discretionary ministerial relief does not eliminate the possibility of removal inconsistent with the Convention.
That context mattered when interpreting the provisions. It did not turn the admissibility hearing into the later risk-assessment process. The minister’s argument conflated using non-refoulement to interpret the law with determining the actual risk faced by a particular person.
Earlier authorities on senior officials and the upper-half test did not resolve that distinction. They had not considered non-refoulement as an interpretive constraint. Earlier Charter cases about when risk or section 7 interests arise also did not displace the statutory-interpretation analysis.
Because the Immigration Division had not addressed that legal constraint, it failed to justify its interpretation in light of the potentially severe consequences. Its decision was unreasonable.
The upper-half test was not finally settled
The Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, an intervener, urged the court to clarify that adjudicators were not bound by the upper-half test. The panel declined to decide that broader issue.
How non-refoulement affects that test, the regulatory definition and Wahab’s circumstances was for the Immigration Division to consider first on reconsideration. The appeal court did not replace the administrative decision with its own answer.
It instead reformulated and answered the certified question narrowly: at the admissibility stage, the decision-maker must consider Article 33’s non-refoulement principle when interpreting paragraph 35(1)(b) and section 16. The judgment establishes that interpretive duty, not a blanket exemption for former officials or a confirmed outcome of the new hearing.



