
Quebec youth-court judges can order broad changes to prevent a child's rights from being violated again, even when those changes also protect other children. But the evidence must connect the remedy to the child before the court, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled.
The unanimous December 20, 2024 decision in Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43, also rejected the idea that a corrective order becomes invalid simply because its financial impact is substantial.
The Court partly allowed the rights commission's appeal, without costs. It issued no corrective order or recommendation because the young person had become an adult during the appeal and could no longer be subject to intervention under the Youth Protection Act.
Protecting the child before the court
The case arose from undisputed violations of a young person's rights during youth-protection intervention. The trial court identified failures involving counselling, support, medical care and recordkeeping, as well as abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures.
The director of youth protection challenged four remedies: mental-health training for staff, access to specialist support, a protocol governing interventions when a child spits, and safer isolation rooms. The dispute concerned the scope of the court's corrective powers, rather than whether the young person's rights had been violated.
The Superior Court narrowed the measures to the young person's situation. The Quebec Court of Appeal largely agreed and also redirected two orders from the health and social services institution, identified publicly as CISSS A, to its director of youth protection.
Writing for all nine judges, Chief Justice Richard Wagner interpreted the fourth paragraph of section 91 of the Youth Protection Act. It authorizes the Youth Division of the Court of Québec to order a situation corrected when a child's rights have been wronged.
That power serves three purposes: ending an ongoing violation, remedying its physical or psychological consequences, and preventing its recurrence for the child.
The Court rejected the commission's broader position that judges could make orders to protect children whose situations were not before them. The legislation organizes judicial intervention around individual children, while assigning responsibility for system-wide scrutiny and reform to other actors, including the minister, the commission and the national director of youth protection.
The commission's power to investigate problems affecting groups did not enlarge the court's jurisdiction. Even accepting the commission's interpretation would have offered little assistance here: this proceeding involved one child whose situation the commission had not investigated.
The Quebec Charter's protection of children and the Convention on the Rights of the Child supported generous corrective powers. The Charter provision applies when the state exercises parental authority. But the Convention did not require legislatures to authorize each tribunal to address the rights of multiple children in one case.
Three requirements for prevention
The Court identified at least three requirements for preventive orders. The child must face a risk of experiencing the violation again; the measure must be capable of helping prevent that recurrence; and its scope must relate to protecting that child's interests and rights.
The risk requirement will generally be satisfied while the child remains subject to intervention, although speculation unsupported by evidence is insufficient. Judges need not identify the single most effective remedy: several measures may reasonably help.
A broad order may target institutions or people shown by the evidence to pose a future risk. Alternatively, it may follow the child through the system, or combine both approaches. An order does not have to name the child expressly, and incidental benefits for other children do not make it invalid.
This allows a court to eliminate an institutional or systemic practice when the requirements are met. It does not authorize an unsupported blanket order covering every institution in a judicial district or across Quebec.
The Supreme Court separately rejected the Court of Appeal majority's treatment of budgetary impact as a jurisdictional limit. Section 91 contained no such criterion. Requiring parties to estimate costs, potentially through expert evidence, could complicate proceedings and create another barrier to justice for vulnerable children and families.
Appellate courts must ordinarily defer to a judge's choice among permissible remedies. Intervention requires a palpable and overriding error in assessing the evidence or a failure to exercise discretion judiciously. Errors interpreting the statute are reviewed for correctness.
What the four measures required
The training and specialist-support orders were too broad because the evidence did not justify extending them to all individualized treatment units. Narrowing them to workers and units responsible for the young person was appropriate. Another permissible approach would have combined protection in the existing unit with conditions governing future placements.
The protocol order also went too far by applying across CISSS A, which included services such as hospitals and long-term care centres. The evidence connected the risk to youth rehabilitation centres. Merely inserting the young person's name did not solve that mismatch.
The appropriate scope would have covered CISSS A's youth rehabilitation centres and other such centres later responsible for the young person. Alternatively, a transfer could have been conditional on a suitable protocol already being in place.
The isolation-room order required similar tailoring. The record did not establish that every room needed renovation to ensure that a safe room was always available. The appropriate requirement would have been access at all times to at least one room with injury-preventing wall material in the relevant units and future placements. The institution would then determine how many rooms needed adaptation to meet that requirement.
These were explanations of what the court should have ordered. The Supreme Court did not impose them after the young person reached adulthood.
Recommendations and the right to be heard
The ruling also confirmed that a youth-court judge may make an evidence-based, non-binding recommendation even when the requirements for a preventive order are not all met. That power should be used cautiously, but allows judges to identify a problem and encourage the responsible authorities to address it.
A separate procedural issue prevented restoring the two disputed orders against CISSS A itself. Quebec's Code of Civil Procedure requires that a person affected by a court measure be heard or duly called.
The commission argued that failing to formally bring the institution into the proceedings had caused no significant prejudice. The Supreme Court found the record insufficient to establish that proposition. It left open whether an absence of prejudice could cure a breach of the right to be heard.
The Court upheld directing the measures at the youth-protection director, while correcting the appeal court's reasoning: formal party status was not the decisive requirement. Being heard or duly called was. The youth court could have required the institution to attend and heard it before making an order affecting its rights.
Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2024 SCC 43.



