The Supreme Court of Canada upheld Ontario’s authority to decide a parenting dispute involving a child whose father sought his return to Oman, ruling that the child’s actual home mattered more than a requirement for shared parental plans about where to live.

In Dunmore v. Mehralian, 2025 SCC 20, eight judges rejected an approach that would make a settled common intention to reside somewhere essential to establishing habitual residence under Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform Act. Justice Suzanne Côté dissented.

The Court dismissed the appeal on December 9, 2024, and released its reasons on June 20, 2025, awarding costs to Raha Mehralian. The ruling preserved Ontario’s jurisdiction to make parenting orders. It did not itself decide the final parenting arrangements.

A family’s move became a jurisdiction dispute

Mehralian and Michael Paul Dunmore had lived in several countries during their marriage, generally moving for Dunmore’s work. They travelled from Oman to Ontario in March 2020 and remained longer than planned because of the pandemic. Their child was born in Ontario that December.

The family returned to Oman in January 2021, then moved back to Ontario in April after Dunmore’s employment in Oman ended and he found work in Toronto. They separated on May 30, 2021.

Dunmore began divorce and custody proceedings in Oman in June, one day before Mehralian started proceedings in Ontario’s Superior Court. The Omani courts eventually granted a divorce and awarded primary custody to Mehralian. Recognition of the divorce was dealt with separately from Ontario’s parenting jurisdiction.

Dunmore sought an order returning the child to Oman. He argued that the family had only been visiting Ontario and that both parents had never shared an intention to reside there. Mehralian maintained that Ontario was the child’s habitual residence.

The motion judge accepted Ontario’s jurisdiction, and the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

The statute fixes the relevant time

Justice Sheilah Martin, writing for the majority, emphasized that this was a case outside the Hague Convention’s child-abduction regime. Ontario’s statute expressly defines habitual residence; the Convention does not. The two frameworks cannot simply be treated as interchangeable.

Under section 22(1)(a), a child must be habitually resident in Ontario when the application begins. But the statutory definition looks back to where the child resided in whichever specified circumstance occurred most recently: with both parents; with one parent under an agreement, consent, acquiescence or court order; or with someone other than a parent permanently for a significant period.

A further safeguard prevents removal or withholding without consent from changing habitual residence unless there has been acquiescence or undue delay in starting proceedings. The majority said these provisions protect against changing jurisdiction through wrongful removal without requiring courts to redefine residence around shared parental intention.

Here, the relevant date was May 30, 2021, when the child last resided with both parents. The question was where the child was at home then, not simply where he was staying when litigation began.

Home is a factual question

The majority distinguished living somewhere from merely visiting. It directed courts to consider the child’s actual connections and the circumstances of moves, including family, social services, cultural and educational ties, and the duration and reasons for being in a place.

Physical presence alone is neither necessary nor sufficient. Residence need not be permanent, and a child can reside in more than one jurisdiction. For infants, caregivers’ connections—including their intentions—may carry greater weight because adults create the child’s home. Shared intention remains relevant, but does not control the analysis.

Martin said concentrating on parents’ subjective plans could invite manipulation and lengthy disputes over states of mind. Courts must also understand family dynamics, including how coercive behaviour can undermine freely expressed intentions. That contextual approach is not a licence to replace the jurisdiction test with an inquiry into where it would be best for the child to live.

The motion judge had found that the family moved to Ontario rather than merely visited. They bought one-way tickets, rented and furnished a Toronto apartment, and Dunmore obtained employment and a provincial health card. The child also had extended family in Ontario and had spent most of his short life there.

The majority found no legal error or factual error warranting appellate intervention. Martin added that even if the motion judge had applied the wrong law, the facts she found were sufficient to support Ontario residence at the relevant time.

Participating abroad did not eliminate Ontario’s jurisdiction

Dunmore also argued that Mehralian’s participation in the Omani proceedings defeated her claim to Ontario jurisdiction.

The majority rejected that argument. The question was statutory parenting jurisdiction, not whether an Omani judgment could be enforced in Ontario. Children should not lose statutory protections because of their parents’ litigation choices.

Participation in a foreign proceeding could matter under other provisions, including a request to decline jurisdiction in favour of a more appropriate forum. Dunmore had not made that request. The majority also left undecided the motion judge’s alternative finding of jurisdiction under section 22(1)(b), because habitual residence resolved the appeal.

Dissent would have reconsidered return to Oman

Côté read the statute’s references to consent and acquiescence as making shared parental intention central. She said that approach supplied predictability, discouraged unilateral changes of jurisdiction and respected the distinction between habitual residence and other statutory grounds for Ontario courts to act.

In her view, the majority had effectively imported the Hague Convention’s flexible approach despite Ontario’s express definition. Other provisions already allowed courts to address a child’s best interests, serious harm and whether return should be ordered.

Côté considered the motion judge’s rejection of a required settled intention a legal error permitting a fresh assessment. She viewed the Ontario stay as temporary, emphasizing Dunmore’s continuing search for work in the Middle East and acceptance of a Dubai position. She concluded that Oman was the last place of shared intended residence.

She also rejected the alternative jurisdiction ground on two independent bases. Proceedings were pending in Oman when Mehralian applied in Ontario; their later completion did not cure that problem. And, given her finding of Omani habitual residence and Mehralian’s participation in proceedings there, Côté found that the balance of convenience did not favour Ontario.

She would have sent the matter back to decide whether to return the child under section 40. Her proposed result was reconsideration of that discretionary question, not an automatic return order.

Warning against prolonged jurisdiction litigation

The majority criticized proceedings that took from June 2021 until March 2023 to reach a hearing, with more than 4,000 pages of material and over 20,000 recovered text messages. A contextual test, Martin said, must not become an excuse for costly, disproportionate litigation over children’s lives.

The SCC docket later recorded a costs assessment of $7,191.57 on October 20, 2025. That was a costs determination, not damages or proof of payment. The jurisdiction judgment does not establish the family’s current parenting arrangements.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2025 SCC 20.