The Supreme Court of Canada restored the dismissal of a contractor’s claim over unsuitable topsoil, holding that the buyer had accepted the risk of taking delivery without fresh testing and could not shift that loss back to its supplier.

The 6–1 decision in Earthco Soil Mixtures Inc. v. Pine Valley Enterprises Inc., 2024 SCC 20, set aside an Ontario Court of Appeal order requiring Earthco to pay $350,386.23. The dispute turned on whether two contractual clauses excluded a statutory condition that goods sold by description must match that description.

Writing for the majority on May 31, 2024, Justice Sheilah Martin held that the clauses worked in their commercial context. Parties did not need prescribed legal terminology to exclude the condition, but their agreement still had to expressly and unambiguously communicate the exclusion. Justice Suzanne Côté dissented, concluding that a disclaimer about quality did not remove the separate obligation to supply the soil described in the bargain.

A rushed delivery and a decision not to test

Pine Valley was working on a City of Toronto project to address basement flooding in North York. The work included replacing existing topsoil with material better suited to drainage. Delays exposed the contractor to liquidated damages of $500 per working day.

Earthco supplied laboratory reports based on soil samples about six weeks old. The parties discussed the need for updated testing because soil composition could change. Earthco warned Pine Valley against taking delivery before fresh results were available, but the contractor wanted the soil immediately.

The purchase order, originally priced at $66,168 for 3,678 cubic yards, included two clauses added for this transaction. One gave Pine Valley the right to test and approve the material at its own expense before shipment. The other said that, if Pine Valley waived that right, Earthco would not be responsible for the material’s quality after it left Earthco’s facility.

Pine Valley proceeded without the testing. After the soil was delivered and placed, water ponding appeared. Tests showed substantially more clay than the earlier results had indicated. The city eventually required the contractor to remove and replace the soil.

Pine Valley sought approximately $700,000 from Earthco. The trial judge found that the supplied soil did not match its contractual description, but dismissed the claim because the exclusion clauses protected Earthco. He assessed damages at $350,386.23 only in case liability was established. The Court of Appeal reversed him and awarded that amount.

The distinction matters: the Supreme Court did not find that the soil met the specifications. It held that the parties had allocated the risk of the compositional difference to Pine Valley.

What an express exclusion requires

Ontario’s Sale of Goods Act supplies implied protections for buyers. Section 14 addresses correspondence with description; section 15 separately concerns fitness for purpose and merchantable quality. Section 53 permits parties to exclude or vary obligations arising by implication of law, including through an express agreement.

Pine Valley argued that disclaiming responsibility for quality did not clearly exclude the different condition concerning the goods’ identity. Earthco answered that this approach elevated technical language above what the parties had actually agreed.

The majority held that the statute protects buyers while also allowing parties to arrange their own allocation of risk. Modern contract interpretation therefore applied: the court had to read the words used, the contract as a whole and the circumstances known to the parties when they made it, to determine their objective intention.

The agreement could not be invented from silence or presumed intentions. An express exclusion had to be set out in words, and context could not overwhelm those words or create a new bargain. But section 53 did not require parties to use terms such as “condition” or “identity” to achieve an effective exclusion.

The majority distinguished the rule governing which attributes count as a description of goods from the task of understanding the parties’ disclaimer. The legal distinction between identity and quality remained, but the word quality could carry an ordinary commercial meaning in a particular contract rather than a narrowly technical one.

Here, the parties used it to include the soil’s composition. Pine Valley was an experienced commercial purchaser, knew the reports were dated and had been warned about the need for testing. The trial judge had accepted evidence that it knowingly chose speed over testing to avoid further project delays. He rejected the suggestion that the waiver concerned only chloride testing.

For the majority, these were tailored clauses addressing the precise risk that materialized. Enforcing them gave effect to Pine Valley’s commercial decision.

Limits remain, and trial findings matter

The ruling did not make every exclusion clause enforceable. The court applied the framework from Tercon: first determine whether the clause covers the circumstances, then consider whether it was unconscionable when agreed and whether overriding public policy nevertheless requires refusing enforcement.

The majority also distinguished this commercial transaction from consumer legislation that can make specified protections mandatory. Its reasoning was not a blanket licence to contract out of every statutory protection.

A separate part of the appeal concerned how closely the Court of Appeal could revisit the trial judge’s interpretation. Contract interpretation generally combines fact and law and attracts deference, unless a distinct legal error is identified. These clauses were tailored to this buyer’s demand for immediate delivery, rather than simply presenting a standard-form interpretation question.

The majority held that the Court of Appeal had wrongly converted its objections to the trial judge’s reading into legal errors attracting correctness review. The trial judge had properly considered the circumstances and made no palpable and overriding error.

Earthco also argued that the transaction was not a sale by description at all. The majority declined to decide that alternative argument because the exclusion clauses resolved the appeal.

Dissent: quality and description were different promises

Justice Côté agreed that parties could contract out of implied conditions without using prescribed words. Her disagreement was about what this contract actually excluded and what the statute required an express agreement to address.

In her view, clear and direct language had to cover the particular statutory obligation being removed. General principles of contract interpretation could not override the Act’s distinction between receiving goods of the agreed description and receiving goods fit for their purpose.

The clauses referred to responsibility for quality, not responsibility for every defect. She concluded that the trial judge had allowed his understanding of the transaction’s purpose to expand the written disclaimer into an agreement the parties had not made. That was a legal error permitting appellate intervention.

The dissent also rejected Earthco’s challenge to the finding of a sale by description. The opportunity to inspect did not erase Pine Valley’s reliance on the soil description, and the trial judge could treat the specified composition as part of the goods’ identity.

On Justice Côté’s reading, the clauses still had a real function: if Earthco delivered soil with the agreed composition but it failed to drain properly, liability concerning fitness for purpose would be excluded. They did not, however, waive Pine Valley’s right to receive the described soil. She would have left the damages award in place.

The majority’s order restored the trial judgment dismissing Pine Valley’s action and awarded Earthco costs throughout.

Source: Supreme Court of Canada, 2024 SCC 20.