Coast Mountain Bus must release more employment-file information, but most redactions upheld

Coast Mountain Bus Company must disclose some additional information from a former employee’s employment records, but can continue withholding most of the passages disputed in an access-to-information inquiry.

The ruling draws a distinction between advice given to managers and information that merely shows advice was sought. It also separates details of other employees’ feelings from information showing only that they reacted to an interaction.

In Order F26-90, 2026 BCIPC 115, issued October 22, 2026, adjudicator Alexander Corley ordered the company to release specifically identified passages by December 4, 2026. The order does not require disclosure of the entire employment file.

The company had identified 1,237 pages responsive to the request. Most issues were resolved before the inquiry, leaving a small amount of information in emails, incident logs and handwritten notes to be assessed under British Columbia’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant, who is not named in the reasons, had an open grievance against the company at the time of the inquiry. The ruling concerns access to records, not the merits of that grievance or why the employment relationship ended.

Advice protection depends on what disclosure reveals

The company relied on section 13(1), which permits a public body to withhold information revealing advice or recommendations developed for it. It said the disputed material mainly recorded human resources advice to supervisors. The applicant argued that the company had withheld too much information about them, but did not address whether the particular passages would reveal advice.

Corley accepted that most of the material met the exemption. Notes of discussions between labour relations advisers and supervisors recorded recommendations about managing the applicant. Other notes captured advice from a human resources manager, while an email exchange contained advice about questions to ask the applicant.

The protection extended beyond statements expressly giving advice. Some surrounding information would let the applicant accurately infer what advice had been provided because they were familiar with the events under discussion. Those passages could also be withheld.

But the exemption did not cover everything in a consultation record. Some passages showed only that supervisors had sought advice or outlined a discussion without revealing what was recommended. Others recorded that an adviser had approved or disapproved of an unspecified action, without identifying the action itself.

Some supervisors’ accounts of their own conduct or understanding of company procedures could also be disclosed without revealing advice. The company could not use the exemption to withhold information it had already disclosed elsewhere in the records.

Corley reached a similar conclusion about information recording a duty manager’s settled decision to take a particular course. In that passage, the manager was communicating a decision, not advising someone else what to do.

The distinction did not make all facts in the records accessible. Although section 13(2)(a) excludes factual material from the advice exemption, Corley found that the factual statements within the protected passages would reveal the advice through accurate inferences. He found no applicable exception under section 13(2), and the records were not old enough for the separate rule excluding records at least 10 years old.

He also rejected the applicant’s challenge to the company’s exercise of discretion. Accepting its access manager’s evidence, he found no indication that the decision to withhold protected advice was invalid, made in bad faith or taken for an improper purpose.

Information about one worker can also be private to another

A separate part of the inquiry concerned section 22(1), which requires a public body to withhold personal information when disclosure would unreasonably invade someone else’s privacy. Unlike the advice exemption, this protection is mandatory.

That distinction affected the scope of the inquiry. Although the investigator’s report identified privacy redactions on only two pages, Corley also considered redactions on two other pages. The company had addressed them in its submissions, the applicant’s arguments applied equally to them, and the exemption was mandatory.

The company first had to establish that the withheld material was personal information. Once that was established, the applicant bore the burden of showing that disclosure would not unreasonably invade third-party privacy.

Corley found that the disputed information concerned identifiable third parties, principally their thoughts and feelings about interactions with the applicant. It also included an employee identification number. This was personal information, not business contact information.

Much of it was also about the applicant. That did not automatically entitle the applicant to receive it: the same information can concern more than one person, and their competing privacy interests still have to be assessed.

Section 22(3)(d) creates a presumption against disclosure of information relating to another person’s employment history. Corley applied it to the details of employees’ feelings about workplace interactions and to the employee identification number.

However, some passages revealed only that employees had reacted to the applicant’s behaviour, without describing the substance or nature of their reactions. Those passages did not reveal their subjective feelings and did not attract the employment-history presumption. After considering the circumstances, Corley found that disclosing that information would not unreasonably invade their privacy.

An open grievance did not establish the necessary connection

For the remaining personal information, the applicant did not overcome the presumption against disclosure. Corley found no applicable exception under section 22(4), and no evidence or argument showing that release would serve public scrutiny of the company’s activities.

He also considered whether disclosure was relevant to a fair determination of the applicant’s rights under section 22(2)(c). He accepted that a grievance was open, but the applicant had supplied no evidence or argument about its substance. Without that information, he could not assess whether the disputed personal information would bear on the grievance’s outcome. His conclusion turned on that evidentiary gap, not a rule that grievances cannot support access.

The fact that some information was also about the applicant weighed in favour of disclosure, but only weakly in this case because it was intertwined with other employees’ personal information. It did not outweigh the privacy protection for the substantive emotional information and employee identification number.

The operative order preserves the company’s authority or obligation to withhold the disputed material except for passages Corley marked in green in a separate copy sent to the company. Only those highlighted portions must be disclosed. The company must also send the OIPC registrar of inquiries a copy of its covering letter and the information provided to the applicant. The reasons do not establish that disclosure has occurred.