Pearson College discriminated by relying on teacher’s political Facebook posts in dismissal

The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal found that Lester B. Pearson College UWC discriminated against former teacher Nazım Açar by relying partly on his protected political Facebook posts when dismissing him. In Açar v. Lester B. Pearson College UWC (No. 2), 2026 BCHRT 222, issued Oct. 21, 2026, Vice Chair Devyn Cousineau ordered $94,322.35 in wage-loss compensation and $20,000 for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect, plus interest and compensation for the tax consequences of receiving wages as a lump sum.

The ruling drew a distinction between Açar’s off-duty public commentary about Israeli state action and his conduct towards students. The posts engaged the Human Rights Code’s protection of political belief; the classroom conduct at issue did not. The college had legitimate objectives and acted in good faith, but failed to show that relying on the protected posts to terminate employment was reasonably necessary or that accommodation would cause undue hardship.

Student complaint led to dismissal

Açar worked at the international residential college as a mathematics teacher and houseparent from 2010 until January 2020. The dispute began with a September 2019 conversation about an Israeli student’s anticipated military service and scholarship prospects. Açar and the student disagreed about the exact words he used concerning killing or shooting Palestinians. Cousineau found both accounts plausible and did not choose between them.

The student complained under the college’s Respectful Community Policy and asked to leave Açar’s class. The initial investigation resulted in a five-day unpaid suspension and a requirement for training on teacher-student boundaries. Broader concerns raised by another faculty member prompted an external investigation, which also examined Açar’s classroom conduct and public Facebook posts.

The external investigator found some allegations unfounded but identified policy breaches involving the student interaction, classroom discussions and social media. The report did not find that Açar held discriminatory beliefs about Israeli students. It recommended a further three-day suspension, an apology, training and changes to his Facebook page, and concluded that he could safely return to teaching. The college accepted the findings but considered the recommended discipline too lenient. It dismissed him without cause on Jan. 29, 2020.

Political belief did not protect every expression

The tribunal explained that the Code can protect public expression as a means of political participation, but does not protect every action connected to a political belief. Its protection is not interchangeable with the Charter’s freedom of expression, nor does it exempt employees from reasonable workplace expectations.

The disputed comment occurred during a teacher-student conversation between classes, rather than participation in public political life. The same conclusion applied to the college’s perception that Açar had singled out Israeli and Palestinian students while discussing oppression in mathematics class. Consequences for those particular interactions did not engage political-belief protection. The tribunal did not need to resolve the precise wording of the first comment to reach that conclusion.

The Israel-related Facebook posts were different. Açar published them outside work as an engaged citizen, inviting public discussion about the actions of a state and their effects on Palestinians. Some shared news reports or calls to action. Cousineau found this was political participation protected by the Code, not merely workplace conduct with a political connection.

The college had several reasons for dismissing Açar, including conduct outside the Code’s protection and concerns about managing him. Political belief nevertheless needed to be only one factor, not the sole or main reason. The decision-maker acknowledged that the Israel-related posts played a significant role, shifting the burden to the college to justify its reliance on them.

Bias allegation failed; accommodation defence also failed

Açar alleged that the external investigation was affected by pro-Israel bias. Cousineau rejected that claim. Personal views or experience were not enough to prove an inability to investigate impartially. Açar had notice of the allegations and substantial opportunities to respond; several allegations were rejected, and the investigator recommended continued employment rather than dismissal. Criticisms of the investigation did not establish adverse treatment connected to protected political belief.

The college’s justification for dismissal was assessed under the three-part bona fide occupational requirement test: a purpose rationally connected to the job, adoption in good faith, and reasonable necessity, including accommodation to undue hardship. The college met the first two parts. Protecting an inclusive educational and residential environment and its reputation were legitimate concerns, particularly given teachers’ positions of trust and the college’s international student body.

The tribunal considered a report about the broader suppression of pro-Palestinian speech as social context, but did not find that the college had deliberately engaged in that suppression or conflated criticism of Israel with antisemitism. The finding of discrimination did not depend on bad faith.

The defence failed on reasonable necessity and accommodation. At the time, the college had no standard governing the political content of teachers’ social media. It had not discussed the posts with Açar, worked with him to identify acceptable boundaries, or asked him to make the page private and remove offending posts as the investigator recommended. There was no evidence he would refuse those steps or another reasonable solution.

Cousineau accepted that off-duty commentary could engage the college’s interests and that online statements could reasonably be interpreted differently from what their author intended. But criticism of Israel was not, by itself, equivalent to discriminatory statements against Israeli or Jewish people. The college had to consider how to meet its objectives without unnecessarily impairing protected political participation. General impressions that Açar was difficult to manage could not establish that accommodation was futile, particularly when the investigator and his direct supervisor supported his return.

Late changes to the defence were refused

Two procedural decisions attached to the reasons explain why the college could not expand its pleaded reasons for dismissal during the hearing. On March 4, Cousineau found that Açar had not received notice that the college intended to rely on older incidents outside the external investigation. Those events had previously featured in allegations dismissed as untimely after the college argued they were unrelated to the investigation and termination.

The tribunal held that document disclosure did not require a self-represented complainant to infer an unpleaded defence. It adjusted and adjourned the hearing, allowed the college to apply to amend its response, and provided for Açar to answer any new issues if the amendment was accepted. The March ruling was an opportunity to address the notice problem, not acceptance of the new defence.

On April 20, the tribunal denied the amendment. Its lateness, inadequate explanation, inconsistency with the college’s earlier position and unfairness weighed against it. Accepting the new reasons could require revisiting the earlier dismissal of Açar’s allegations, substantially expanding and delaying the case. The existing issues could be decided without the amendment: other reasons for dismissal would not, by themselves, justify relying partly on protected political belief.

Wage losses were substantially reduced

Açar sought five years of wage-related compensation, calculated by him at $905,428 including benefits and tax implications. The tribunal assessed four periods rather than awarding that claim in full:

• First 11 months after dismissal: Severance had already compensated those wages. A further award would duplicate recovery.
• November 2020 to May 2022: No wage loss was awarded because Açar had not reasonably mitigated his losses. He applied for two jobs while focusing on completing a master’s degree and seeking reinstatement.
• June 2022 to April 2024: Wage loss remained connected to the discrimination, but 10 applications over 22 months were insufficient mitigation. The tribunal reduced the claim for this period by 50%, producing the $94,322.35 award.
• Beyond April 2024: Açar obtained alternative employment. The tribunal found the connection between later wage loss and the discriminatory dismissal too tenuous and declined further compensation.

The $20,000 dignity award was compensatory, not punitive. Cousineau considered the seriousness of losing long-held employment partly because of political belief, its importance to Açar’s identity and dignity, and the added humiliation of a mass college communication defending the dismissal. This was not a separate defamation award.

Reinstatement refused; financial and cease-and-desist orders made

The tribunal found that Açar’s return would not create a discriminatory educational environment, but nevertheless concluded that reinstatement was not viable. It accepted that the college’s opposition was not discriminatory or retaliatory and reflected an employment relationship broken for other reasons, including Açar’s continued refusal to accept that the student comment was inappropriate and the parties’ continuing conflict.

Cousineau expressly cautioned that employer opposition is not always decisive. An objection rooted in discrimination or retaliation may support reinstatement despite the employer’s wishes. The refusal here depended on the particular relationship and evidence, not a general employer veto.

The final order declared a breach of section 13 and directed the college to cease the contraventions and refrain from the same or similar conduct. In addition to the two quantified awards, the college must pay an amount verified from Açar’s tax records to compensate for the tax consequences of lump-sum wages. The order directs pre-judgment interest on the wage-loss award and post-judgment interest on all amounts, both until paid in full at Court Order Interest Act rates. It does not establish that payment has occurred.