Grand Forks flood proposed class action remains dismissed as too late

The British Columbia Court of Appeal has upheld the dismissal of a proposed class action over the 2018 Grand Forks-area flooding because the claim was filed too late. An earlier proposed class action did not stop the limitation clock merely by being filed: no application to certify that earlier proceeding was ever made.

In Flynn v. British Columbia, 2026 BCCA 414, released October 21, 2026, Justice Iyer, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, dismissed Gregory and Deborah Flynn’s appeal. The decision leaves their claim struck without permission to amend it.

The ruling resolves a time-limit issue, not responsibility for the flood. It does not establish that timber harvesting or watershed management caused the losses, nor does it decide that the defendants were free of negligence.

A proposed class action that never reached certification

Flooding in the Kettle River basin near Grand Forks caused extensive damage to homes and businesses in May 2018. A proposed class action filed in July 2020, referred to in the reasons as the Massey Action, alleged that the Province of British Columbia and six forestry defendants caused residents’ losses through timber-harvesting and watershed-management activities.

The Flynns knew that action had been started and were members of its proposed class. But no certification application was made, and the action was dismissed by consent in April 2023. Certification is the court process for determining whether a lawsuit can proceed on behalf of a class.

The Flynns learned of the dismissal in May 2023. They began their own proposed class action advancing substantially the same claim on April 11, 2024, and filed an application for certification in May 2025.

The defendants applied to strike the new claim as time-barred. None had filed a response to the claim, and the certification hearing had not occurred when they brought those applications. The Supreme Court of British Columbia granted the applications in September 2025, striking the pleading without leave to amend.

Knowing about the first action mattered

British Columbia’s Limitation Act generally requires a civil claim to be started within two years after it is discovered. Discovery requires knowledge, or knowledge a person reasonably ought to have, of the loss, its connection to an act or omission, the responsible person, and the appropriateness of using a court proceeding to seek a remedy.

The dispute focused on that final requirement. The Flynns argued that it would not have been appropriate for them to bring a separate lawsuit while they were members of the proposed class in the Massey Action. They also argued that the statutory assessment could take account of a claimant’s individual circumstances.

The appeal court did not decide whether the relevant provision contains a subjective element. It did not need to: the Flynns themselves pleaded that they knew about the Massey Action in July 2020. Even if subjective knowledge mattered, that knowledge had been conceded.

Learning in 2023 that the earlier action had been dismissed did not create a new discovery date for the underlying claim. The reasons distinguished discovering a claim from suspending a limitation period that has already begun to run. The appeal court accepted that the new action was late, including after allowance for the pandemic-related suspension of limitation periods.

Filing alone did not provide suspension

The Class Proceedings Act contains specific provisions addressing limitation periods. Section 39 concerns proceedings that are certified as class actions. Section 38.1 addresses defined circumstances involving an application for certification and an order rejecting certification or excluding a claim or person.

The decisive problem was that the Massey Action never had a certification application. Merely commencing that proposed class action was insufficient to suspend the applicable limitation period. The Flynns could not achieve a different result by treating participation in the proposed class as a reason the underlying claim had not yet been discovered.

Iyer reasoned that the legislature had specifically addressed limitation periods in the class-proceedings legislation. Interpreting the discovery rule as the Flynns proposed would undermine those choices.

The ruling should not be reduced to a blanket statement that every suspension starts only on the date a certification application is filed. The statutory text reproduced in the reasons provides for suspension from commencement of a proceeding when the specified conditions are met. Those conditions were not engaged through a certification application in the Massey Action. The court’s conclusion was that filing that action alone did not protect these claims.

The court acknowledged the hardship to the Flynns and the people they sought to represent. It nevertheless treated that result as a consequence of the legislature’s limitation-period policy, which promotes timely claims, reliable evidence and fairness to defendants facing older disputes.

The time-limit issue could be decided before certification

The Flynns also challenged when and how the limitation issue was decided. They argued that such issues in class proceedings should wait until after the common issues had been determined or, exceptionally, until certification.

The appeal court rejected an absolute sequencing rule. Earlier appellate authority established that certification does not presumptively have to be the first application heard. Judges decide the order of applications in the context of each case, considering matters such as delay, cost, the relationship between issues and whether an earlier motion could dispose of the proceeding or narrow what remains.

Here, the limitation problem was plain and obvious from the pleading, and there was no unresolved issue of discoverability or postponement requiring it to be left for later. A motion to strike under Rule 9-5(1)(a) is decided on the pleadings, without evidence. The court found no error in resolving this claim on that basis before responses or a certification hearing.

That does not mean every limitation defence can be decided at an early pleading stage. The result depended on the admitted chronology and the absence of a material discovery issue in this case. With the appeal dismissed, the Flynns’ proposed action remains struck on limitation grounds, without a trial of the flood-causation allegations.