
A divided Prince Edward Island rental appeal panel relieved a property owner of liability for money paid to an intermediary, while ordering the intermediary to reimburse two prospective tenants. In UOPLUS Inc. v. Kaur and Bhaskar, 2026 PEIRAC 63, the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission allowed the owner’s appeal on September 29, 2026.
The result turned on the evidence of agency and subletting, not on a finding that the tenants had suffered no loss. Akshay Bhaskar was ordered to pay each tenant $1,346.37. UOPLUS Inc., the apartment’s owner, was no longer jointly responsible under the revised order.
The two commissioners disagreed. Vice-chair Kerri Carpenter’s reasons prevailed because she chaired the hearing panel and the governing statute gives the presiding commissioner’s decision effect when the panel divides equally. Commissioner Gordon MacFarlane would have kept both the owner and Bhaskar liable.
Tenants paid but never moved in
The tenants signed a proposed fixed-term agreement with Bhaskar’s company, ACC-AK Corporation, and paid rent and a security deposit. They were then told the apartment was unavailable and never moved in. Carpenter accepted that the two claimants acted in good faith and had not received refunds.
The tenants initially sought relief against Bhaskar alone. The Rental Office later added UOPLUS as a party and ordered the owner and Bhaskar to pay $1,340.54 to each claimant. UOPLUS appealed, arguing that Bhaskar was its tenant arranging a sublet rather than someone authorized to rent apartments or collect money on its behalf.
The owner and its property manager provided sworn evidence and testified that they had not authorized Bhaskar to act as an agent for this transaction. They said they did not know about the claimants’ agreement and had not received their money. The property manager’s written authority did not permit appointing another person to act for the owner.
Bhaskar did not attend the appeal hearing, but the record included his unsworn written submissions. He said he acted as a facilitator or agent under the property manager’s instructions and had passed money onward. Carpenter found those submissions insufficiently specific to these tenants and this apartment, without supporting transfer records or an opportunity to question him.
One tenant was disconnected from the appeal call before giving evidence or submissions. The commission subsequently offered a written-submission opportunity; she responded that she had already provided the relevant material and maintained her position. The reasons accepted the tenants’ account of payment and non-repayment.
Subletting did not establish an agency relationship
Carpenter treated authority from the owner or its authorized representative as essential to the agency question. She found no sufficient communication or conduct showing that Bhaskar had actual or apparent authority to enter this agreement for UOPLUS. The claimants had not dealt with the owner or property manager, and their agreement did not identify either.
Instead, she found that Bhaskar rented the apartment for subletting. Although an executed owner–Bhaskar agreement for this particular unit was absent from the record, she accepted the overall evidence that the owner approved a sublet. Bhaskar had access to the apartment, did not occupy it himself, entered an agreement with the claimants and collected their money.
Those functions brought Bhaskar within the Residential Tenancy Act’s definition of landlord: a non-occupying person entitled to possession who exercises a landlord’s rights. Carpenter therefore held him, rather than UOPLUS, responsible for repayment.
Carpenter expressly distinguished earlier commission orders involving UOPLUS and Bhaskar, explaining that each appeal turns on its own evidence. She gave greater weight to the sworn and affirmed evidence that could be tested at the hearing than to Bhaskar’s untested submissions covering multiple properties. The decision does not erase those earlier orders or create a general exemption for property owners who use intermediaries.
Dissent would place the risk on the owner
MacFarlane reached the opposite conclusion. In his four-paragraph dissent, referring to earlier orders, he said Bhaskar acted on the owner’s behalf and that both satisfied the statutory definition of landlord. He emphasized that prospective tenants should not bear the risk of undisclosed limits on the authority of people given access to rental premises and permitted to deal with them as though authorized to rent.
Carpenter acknowledged the Act’s purpose of reducing power imbalances, but said it did not justify making one party responsible for another’s wrongdoing without a statutory basis. The split therefore concerned who must repay the tenants, not whether the tenants were entitled to relief.
The operative award to each tenant consists of $430 in rent, a $450 deposit, a further $450 for the statutory doubling of that deposit, and $16.37 in interest. Bhaskar was ordered to pay by October 13, 2026. The tenants had not appealed the Rental Office’s rejection of moving and alternative-accommodation costs, so those claims were not reconsidered.
No later reported decision or proof of payment was located in the limited official-source check for this report. The order establishes repayment liability; it does not establish that the money has been recovered or decide criminal fraud allegations.



