DLF Law Practice Incorporated and Donn Fraser must pay $12,000 plus HST in costs after unsuccessfully seeking to remove opposing counsel from Nova Scotia litigation.
The award in DLF Law Practice Incorporated v. McDonald, 2026 NSSC 299, a Supreme Court of Nova Scotia costs decision dated September 28, 2026, follows an earlier ruling dismissing their motion to disqualify Gavin Giles and his firm, McInnes Cooper.
The $12,000 includes disbursements but is before HST. It is payable immediately and regardless of the eventual outcome of the underlying litigation. It is a costs award for the counsel-removal motion, not damages or a decision on the lawsuits’ merits.
Work on the affidavit mattered
Justice Scott Norton had dismissed the removal motion in reasons dated August 31, 2026, reported as 2026 NSSC 284. When the parties did not agree on costs, the court received written submissions.
The judge described the motion’s legal issues as not complex, although its outcome was important to the parties. The hearing took half a day. But objections to Fraser’s supporting affidavit required additional work before the hearing, and the defendants were substantially successful in those objections.
Nova Scotia’s civil procedure rules ordinarily apply a tariff to motion costs, while allowing a judge to depart from it and award a lump sum where necessary to do justice between the parties.
The applicable tariff suggested between $750 and $1,000. Norton found that range inadequate in these circumstances.
A contribution, not a finding about the full bill
The defendants said their legal expenses responding to the motion totalled $29,000 plus HST, including about $6,000 addressing affidavit objections. The judge expressly noted that the expense claim was not supported by evidence. A footnote records that the defendants offered to provide an affidavit if the court requested one.
The award therefore should not be read as a judicial finding establishing the defendants’ entire claimed bill. The court selected $12,000 plus HST as a substantial contribution to reasonable expenses, taking account of success both on the motion and in excluding substantial portions of the affidavit.
In their costs letter, the plaintiffs alleged bias and asked the judge to recuse himself. Norton stated that no recusal motion was before him. This decision was not a determination of a new recusal application.
The narrow result is that the unsuccessful counsel-removal motion attracted a lump-sum costs award above the ordinary tariff. The underlying claims were not adjudicated in these reasons.
