The developer of a Galway commercial property has lost its appeal over St. John’s rejection of a traffic study, leaving intact the city’s request for better technical support for a proposed traffic-light arrangement or an alternative traffic-control proposal.

In Shoppes at Galway Limited Partnership v. St. John’s (City), 2026 NLSC 111, Justice Philip Osborne of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador dismissed the developer’s statutory appeal on September 8, 2026.

The distinction at the centre of the ruling is important: the city rejected the traffic impact report, not the development application itself. That application had neither been approved nor refused in the decision under appeal. Nor had the city ordered the developer to build a roundabout.

A revised proposal near Costco

The dispute arose from a proposal to develop two parcels at 85 Danny Drive near Costco, close to the intersection of Danny Drive and Access Road B.

Shoppes initially applied in 2020. That May, the city advised that its review had produced no further comments, but three conditions still had to be met before final approval. The project did not proceed at that time.

The developer asked about an extension in April 2022. After the city asked what date it had in mind, the next response came in February 2023. Shoppes then explained that building locations had changed and a drive-through had been added, and asked whether it could amend the earlier application.

The city allowed the same file number to be used but treated the revised proposal as a new development application. Its list of 38 matters to address included a traffic study to determine suitable control at the nearby intersection.

A March 2024 report from Harbourside Transportation Consultants agreed that the intersection needed a higher form of traffic control. It recommended different left-turn arrangements for opposing traffic: one direction would turn left only on a flashing arrow, while the other would be allowed to turn both on a flashing arrow and when otherwise safe.

The report identified six intersections in Ontario and British Columbia using that arrangement. Shoppes also supplied an engineer’s peer review supporting the recommendations.

Examples did not answer the city’s technical request

The city wanted technical references from the Transportation Association of Canada, or an acceptable alternative, supporting the proposed combination of signal phases. It maintained that the peer review’s references addressed protected left turns where sightlines were an issue, rather than the particular combination proposed.

The city also expressed concern that vehicles waiting to turn onto Access Road B could create queues reaching nearby intersections. Those were municipal concerns in the record, not a judicial finding that the proposed lights would be unsafe.

In April 2024, city staff rejected the report for insufficient vehicle-access information. They said the development could not be reviewed until acceptable technical support was provided or an alternative form of traffic control was proposed.

The St. John’s Local Appeal Board upheld that decision. It found that the development regulations authorized the city to request traffic information needed to assess an application and that no misuse of its discretion had been established.

An appeal about legal errors, not a fresh traffic assessment

Shoppes appealed the board’s decision under the development regulations and the Urban and Rural Planning Act, 2000. It did not bring a judicial-review application.

That choice limited the court’s task to questions of law or jurisdiction, which the judge reviewed for correctness. The court could not simply reconsider how the board had weighed the evidence. A factual finding could raise a legal error in limited circumstances, such as being based entirely on no evidence or an irrational inference, but disagreement with the finding was not enough.

The available remedy was also narrower than the developer requested. Even if an error had been established, the court could not substitute its own approval or direct issuance of a permit. It could set aside the board’s decision and return the matter to the board with its opinion on the legal or jurisdictional error.

On the earlier application, Shoppes argued that it was reviving an approved project rather than making a new proposal. But its lawyer acknowledged that final approval had never been issued in 2020. The rule governing how long final approvals last therefore did not apply.

The board also had evidence of the elapsed time, altered building footprint and added drive-through. Whether those changes justified treating the proposal as new was a factual or mixed factual-and-legal question. The judge found no legal error allowing him to reweigh that evidence.

Staff could ask for more information

The court rejected the argument that only city council could make the decision at issue. City staff had not refused the development application; they had found a supporting report inadequate.

The judge described development review as an iterative process in which staff identify deficiencies and seek further information. The legislation could not sensibly require council to assess every piece of information submitted along the way.

He also upheld the city’s use of standard terms of reference for transportation assessments. Read broadly and in light of their purpose, the regulations authorized the city to specify the information necessary to evaluate an application.

Shoppes said it had not received those terms, but the record included its own report’s statement that the study had been prepared in accordance with them.

No roundabout requirement, and no automatic acceptance of an engineer’s seal

The developer argued that the demand for further technical references effectively forced it to build a roundabout. The city’s letter had identified a roundabout as an example of an alternative to consider if the proposed signal arrangement could not be supported.

The board had nevertheless found that the actual decision requested more information, rather than mandated construction of a roundabout. Shoppes had not identified a distinct legal error in that conclusion.

Consequently, the court did not decide whether the city could require a roundabout in a future decision, or whether the design manual’s provisions about T-shaped intersections would prohibit one.

The judge also rejected the proposition that a report’s professional engineer’s stamp and seal prevented the city from questioning it or seeking further support. The Ontario case on which Shoppes relied concerned municipal immunity for a policy decision to rely on engineers’ work. It did not establish a rule requiring automatic acceptance of every sealed proposal.

The board’s assessment that examples of other intersections did not supply the requested technical references was not open to reconsideration on this limited appeal. The judgment did not find that the consultants were negligent.

Regulation challenge left undecided

Shoppes also sought to challenge the information-gathering regulation as impermissibly vague. The judge declined to consider that new argument for the first time on appeal, rather than deciding its merits.

The board had not had an opportunity to address the issue, and the record was insufficiently developed for a fair determination. Among the missing material were the kinds of comparative application records or evidence of arbitrary practices that could support such a challenge.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs awarded to the city on a Column III basis. The reasons do not specify a dollar amount.

The result preserves the rejection of this traffic report and the request for adequate supporting information. It is not a final refusal of the development, a ruling that a roundabout must be built, or unrestricted permission for municipalities to reject professional reports arbitrarily.