
A Quebec appeal judge has kept orders restraining defamatory publications and requiring their removal in force while a defamation appeal proceeds, but suspended a requirement that the defendants publish parts of the trial judgment with a Haitian Creole translation.
In Colem Morvan c. Phele, 2026 QCCA 1180, Justice Christian Immer distinguished restrictions that could be reversed if the defendants won their appeal from compelled publication that would defeat the purpose of appellate review once carried out. The September 4 ruling did not decide the merits of the appeal or overturn the trial findings.
John Colem Morvan and Bravo à la jeunesse inc., known as BAJ, had sought permission to appeal and suspension of the injunctions. Immer ruled that permission was unnecessary because the judgment included injunctive relief: an appeal lay as of right. He acknowledged the filed notice of appeal and granted only part of the requested suspension.
A political dispute became a defamation action
The underlying June 26 judgment concerned exchanges between Morvan and Windy Phele, who both commented publicly on Haitian politics. The dispute developed against debate over a proposed constitutional referendum in Haiti.
Superior Court Justice Sylvain Lussier found that Morvan’s publications accused Phele of diverting public resources to finance a home for his mother. The judge found the accusations defamatory and concluded that the conduct went beyond protected political disagreement.
The trial reasons distinguished injury to reputation from the separate requirement to establish fault. Phele retained the burden of proving his claim. Lussier found that Morvan had made no effort to verify the accusations, produced no valid supporting evidence, and persisted without concern for the harm, even after hostile comments and threats appeared. Phele, meanwhile, provided evidence of legitimate income and transfers.
The judge treated the repeated publications, their substantial audience, their continuing availability and their effects on Phele and his family as important. Phele’s continued professional activities and the absence of an apparent income decline did not eliminate his entitlement to compensation for moral injury.
The trial award totalled $30,000 in moral damages against Morvan, with BAJ jointly liable for $15,000 of that amount. The judge separately awarded $15,000 in punitive damages against Morvan and $1,000 against BAJ. The joint obligation formed part of the $30,000 award, not an additional sum.
The punitive awards reflected findings of an intentional attack on dignity and reputation, the preventive purpose of such damages and the defendants’ financial circumstances. The two defendants’ punitive obligations were assessed separately.
What the defendants challenged
On appeal, the defendants proposed to argue that the trial judge had reversed the burden of proof by requiring them to establish the source of the money used for the house. They also argued that he had failed to give proper weight to political commentary and that fault had not been established.
Alternatively, they challenged the compensatory award as excessive, disputed the basis and amount of punitive damages, and contested the requirement to publish the judgment. Those were proposed grounds of appeal, not errors established by Immer’s ruling.
The appeal suspended execution of the monetary judgment, but the injunctions remained enforceable unless separately suspended. Under article 514 of Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure, filing the appeal did not itself stop those orders.
The judge considered whether the judgment showed an apparent weakness, the harm to the applicants and the balance of inconvenience. A refusal that risked making the appeal useless could justify suspension even without an apparent weakness in the judgment.
Removal and restraint orders continued
Immer found no apparent weakness in the judgment on the record before him. That meant the inconvenience to the appellants from enforcement needed to weigh correspondingly more heavily to justify a suspension.
The trial judgment demonstrated harm to Phele from the publications. The appellants’ inconvenience from the prohibition and removal orders weighed substantially less: if they succeeded on appeal, the publications could be restored to the accounts.
The partial suspension therefore left in place the order against defamatory statements about Phele concerning criminality or corruption and the order to remove the identified publications. It did not create an unrestricted prohibition on political criticism or suspend every part of the injunction.
Compelled publication was different
The lower court had declined to compel an apology, expressing concern about sincerity and freedom of expression. It instead ordered publication of the judgment’s conclusions and four specified paragraphs, together with a certified Haitian Creole translation. Lussier considered that approach appropriate because the audience included people in Haiti and the diaspora who might not understand French.
Immer found that enforcing this particular requirement before the appeal was decided would render the eventual appellate ruling ineffective. Unlike removing material that could later be restored, the compelled publication could not be undone in the same way.
The operative order suspended only paragraph 134 of the trial judgment, which imposed that publication obligation. The suspension lasts until the appeal is decided or the appellants discontinue it. Costs on the application were left to follow the outcome of the appeal.
The decision establishes what was suspended pending appeal. It does not establish whether the defendants subsequently complied with the remaining orders, whether any damages were paid or how the merits appeal was ultimately resolved.



