The Federal Court of Appeal has ordered accounting firm Zeifmans LLP to answer a Canada Revenue Agency information demand, while rejecting the government's proposed primary-purpose exception to judicial authorization for demands aimed at unnamed taxpayers.

In Canada (National Revenue) v. Zeifmans LLP, 2026 FCA 147, Justice Monica Biringer, writing for a unanimous panel, held that the purpose of a demand determines whether advance court approval is necessary. If one purpose is to investigate the tax compliance of unnamed persons, authorization is required. It is not enough for the government to say its main purpose concerns named taxpayers.

The Minister nevertheless succeeded because the evidence showed that this particular demand was issued to advance the audits of three named individuals. The possibility that the records might later assist audits of connected entities did not establish another investigative purpose. Justices Wyman Webb and Donald Rennie concurred in the September 2 decision.

A demand that survived one challenge and stalled on enforcement

The dispute began with a January 30, 2019 requirement issued to Zeifmans, which represented Marc and Diana Vaturi before the CRA. It sought records concerning the Vaturis, Nader Ghermezian and entities connected to them for 2012 through 2017. The requested material included correspondence, accounting records, bank statements, tax-planning documents and loan records. Zeifmans itself was not being audited.

The firm challenged the requirement by judicial review, arguing that it needed advance judicial authorization, was too vague and had improperly been addressed to a partnership. The Federal Court rejected that challenge, and the Court of Appeal upheld the result in 2022.

Zeifmans still did not produce the material. When the Minister sought an enforcement order, however, the firm succeeded. In 2023 FC 1000, Justice Christine Pallotta concluded that the record contained materially different evidence, including evidence that unnamed connected entities were already under audit. She declined to issue a compliance order.

The new appeal reversed that result. It concerned the power to compel information, not a determination of the individuals' tax liability.

One investigative purpose is enough to require authorization

Section 231.2 of the Income Tax Act gives the Minister broad information-gathering powers, with a judicial-authorization requirement for demands relating to unnamed persons. Read together, subsections (2) and (3) focus on whether the information is sought to verify those persons' compliance with the Act.

The Minister argued that authorization should be unnecessary whenever investigating named taxpayers is the primary purpose, even if checking unnamed persons' compliance is a secondary purpose. Biringer rejected that distinction. The existing authorities did not establish such a test, and ranking purposes as primary or secondary would confuse the analysis.

The controlling question is whose tax compliance the Minister intends to investigate through the demand. An unnamed entity's existing audit may be relevant evidence, but it does not automatically answer that question. Information about an entity may instead be needed to understand the affairs of a named taxpayer.

This is a meaningful limit on the government's win: the court enforced the requirement on its evidence, without accepting a general exemption for demands mainly directed at named people.

Why the evidence changed the outcome

The appeal court found clear, outcome-determining errors in the Federal Court's assessment of the CRA evidence. The responsible official repeatedly said the requirement's purpose was to verify the named individuals' compliance. The accompanying information sheet and his explanation of the records' relevance supported that position.

Among the audit questions were whether transfers from offshore companies were loans that had to be included in income, whether repayments could support deductions, and whether the named individuals had met worldwide-income and foreign-reporting obligations. Records about the connected entities could help establish the relationships and transactions necessary to answer those questions.

The official had acknowledged that the material might eventually be used in other audits. Biringer treated that possibility as speculative. On this record, it did not establish that investigating the unnamed entities was a purpose for which the demand had been issued.

The court also rejected the inference that asking for a similarly broad range of records about named and unnamed persons necessarily meant both groups were investigative targets. The Minister need not explain in advance the precise use of every document, provided the material may be relevant to administering or enforcing the Act.

Vagueness, partnerships and the limits of another challenge

Zeifmans' remaining objections did not prevent enforcement. Read alongside the information sheet, the requirement identified the connected entities with enough precision to allow meaningful compliance. The court noted that the firm could have sought clarification if it genuinely could not understand the request, and there was no indication that it had done so.

Addressing the requirement to the partnership also did not invalidate it. Subsection 244(20) deems notice properly sent to a partnership to have been provided to its members. The court left questions about particular partners' liability in any future enforcement proceeding for that proceeding.

Biringer separately concluded that re-litigating the prior-authorization issue was an abuse of process in these circumstances. The firm had already unsuccessfully challenged the requirement, and the new evidence, properly understood, did not undermine the earlier determination.

That conclusion does not make every compliance proceeding a closed door to objections. The court recognized that judicial review and enforcement proceedings differ in their purposes, evidentiary rules and burdens of proof. Whether a second challenge is abusive requires a case-specific assessment of fairness, finality and efficient use of court resources. It did not decide whether re-litigating the vagueness and partnership issues was itself an abuse of process.

The judgment also preserves the safeguards in section 231.7. A compliance order requires proof of a valid obligation and non-compliance, and cannot compel material protected by solicitor-client privilege. No privilege claim was advanced here. The court found no basis to exercise its remaining discretion against issuing the order.

Compliance ordered; Federal Court costs still at issue

The court ordered Zeifmans to comply and awarded the Minister the agreed $5,000 in appeal costs. It set aside the Federal Court's award of costs to Zeifmans, but could not set aside the separate order fixing those costs at $19,053.60 because that order had not been appealed. It requested submissions on the amounts that should be refundable or payable and its authority to order them.

The public appeal docket, checked October 7, records the Minister's costs submissions and bill of costs filed September 23. The scheduling order gave Zeifmans two weeks after service and filing to respond, followed by a week for the Minister's reply. No later costs determination appeared in the docket at the time of the check.

For recipients of CRA demands, the decision puts attention on the evidence of the demand's purpose and the significance of any genuinely new evidence after an earlier challenge. Broad requests can be enforceable, but the statutory protection for unnamed-person investigations remains in place.