Manitoba teacher-certificate cancellation quashed for unfair process and inadequate reasons

Manitoba’s education minister must reconsider the cancellation of a teacher’s certificate after a court found the decision-making process unfair and the reasons inadequate to justify ending his teaching career.

In Hrabluk v. Manitoba (Education and Early Childhood Learning), 2026 MBKB 115, delivered August 26, 2026, Justice Neville of the Court of King’s Bench of Manitoba quashed the cancellation of Robert Hrabluk’s teaching certificate and returned the matter to the minister.

Hrabluk did not succeed on his separate argument that the minister lacked authority to replace an earlier, mistakenly issued one-year suspension. The court neither reinstated that suspension nor selected a new penalty. It did not exonerate the conduct at issue or order his return to a classroom.

Two letters imposed very different consequences

The certification proceedings arose from inappropriate private social-media communication with a student. Following an investigation, Hrabluk’s employer imposed a five-day unpaid suspension and corrective measures, including training and supervision. The minister separately reviewed his certification, and he voluntarily surrendered his certificate pending that process.

A Certificate Review Committee recommended cancellation after hearings. Its findings included failures to respect professional boundaries and maintain confidence in the education system. It also took a different view from the employer on Hrabluk’s remorse and insight.

Hrabluk’s lawyers challenged the recommendation in a detailed submission. They argued that the committee had not sufficiently explained its conclusions, assessed future risk or justified rejecting a lesser sanction. They pointed to his prior record, additional training, the employer’s assessment and other evidence relevant to rehabilitation.

On June 2, 2025, the minister sent a signed decision imposing a one-year suspension. Approximately half an hour later, her office asked counsel to disregard it because it had been sent in error. A new letter the following day cancelled the certificate.

The two letters contained much of the same reasoning but imposed sharply different consequences.

Minister could correct an error in expressing her decision

Hrabluk relied on functus officio, the principle that a decision-maker generally cannot revisit a final decision once the task has been completed. He emphasized that the suspension letter appeared final: it was signed, dated, set out reasons and said the matter was concluded.

The minister maintained that she had intended cancellation throughout. Staff had drafted the suspension letter in anticipation that she would accept their recommendation. She said that, after she decided otherwise, the wrong document remained among papers awaiting her signature.

Neville accepted that account. The minister’s evidence, together with the rapid notification of the error, supported a finding that cancellation was her actual intention rather than a subsequent change of mind.

A recognized exception permits correction of a decision that fails to express the decision-maker’s manifest intention. The minister therefore retained authority to issue the cancellation decision.

Authority to correct did not make the process fair

The judge nevertheless found serious problems with how the reasons were prepared, reviewed and issued.

The minister had given staff only general direction about her rationale and had not reviewed an interim draft. She acknowledged that her review of the first letter may have been confined to the addressee and signature page, and could not specifically recall reading the cancellation letter.

Neville did not prohibit reliance on staff to draft reasons. The concern was whether, in these particular circumstances, the minister had adequately considered and adopted the reasons as her own. Given the consequences for a professional career and the statutory obligation to provide written reasons, the process lacked procedural fairness.

Reasons had to confront the evidence and lesser sanctions

The court separately reviewed whether the cancellation was reasonable. That inquiry concerned the justification actually given, not whether the judge would have chosen the same outcome.

The minister had characterized the conduct as grooming and treated its seriousness as outweighing other considerations. She argued that she had addressed risk and mitigation, was not bound by the employer’s conclusions or other authorities, and could give the evidence different weight.

Neville found the explanation insufficient. Because that characterization was central to the cancellation, the minister needed to engage with the evidentiary record and Hrabluk’s submissions rather than state a conclusion with a brief credibility assessment. The court’s ruling concerned the adequacy of that justification; it was not a finding that grooming had or had not occurred.

The reasons also did not adequately explain why further training, supervision or a lesser penalty would fail to address future risk. Evidence about previous training, subsequent learning and rehabilitative prospects required a reasoned response. Merely noting the submission did not show why it was rejected.

The case was decided under the former statutory certification regime. As the judgment explains, amendments effective January 6, 2025 introduced a new professional conduct and competence system; the ruling does not describe that new process.

Neville left the new decision to the minister, requiring an individualized and properly justified reconsideration. Costs remain for agreement or further submissions.