
Two Campbell River homeowners have lost their attempt to appeal an approval allowing wetlands to be filled and replaced elsewhere on a proposed housing-development site, after British Columbia’s Environmental Appeal Board found they had not established the legal right to bring the appeal.
In DeVito, Round, & Save Simms Creek Society v. Water Manager, 2026 BCEAB 33, decided August 18, 2026, panel chair James Carwana ruled that Doreen DeVito and Barbara Round had not provided sufficient preliminary evidence that the approved work was likely to physically affect their properties. He also rejected DeVito’s claim to standing as a riparian owner.
The ruling dismissed the appeal at the standing stage. It did not decide the merits of the homeowners’ environmental objections or grant all approvals needed for the proposed housing development. The approval itself required compliance with its conditions and necessary municipal permits.
Five seasonal wetlands and two proposed replacements
The disputed July 2025 approval concerned a property near Simms Creek where Westurban Developments was pursuing a multifamily residential project. It authorized filling five shallow, seasonal wetland areas and creating two replacement wetlands on the same property. The ministry had reviewed technical material, including hydrological and geotechnical assessments.
The homeowners argued that relocating the wetlands could change water flows or the water table, increasing risks such as erosion, instability and slope failure on their land. They also challenged the application’s compliance with ministry policies and riparian-protection requirements. Save Simms Creek Society withdrew its own appeal, which the board separately dismissed as required by statute.
DeVito’s property was separated from the development site and Simms Creek by municipal parkland. Round’s property bordered part of the development site, but did not border the wetlands themselves. The planned replacement wetlands would be farther from Round’s land.
A preliminary threshold still required evidence
The Water Sustainability Act provides different routes to appeal. A landowner can qualify where an order is, or is likely to be, physically affecting their land. A riparian owner can qualify where they consider their rights will be prejudiced, but must first objectively establish the necessary relationship between their land and the relevant body of water.
The homeowners argued for a liberal approach at this preliminary stage, emphasizing that they did not have to prove their full case. The board agreed that definitive proof, or proof on a balance of probabilities, was unnecessary. Nevertheless, the landowner route required enough evidence to support a reasonable preliminary conclusion of likely physical effects, beyond assertions that harm might occur.
Carwana also distinguished physical effects on land from concerns about its economic value or other intangible consequences. Those concerns could not by themselves establish standing under the landowner provision. Nor could the board grant standing simply because an applicant had a genuine or public-interest concern: its authority was limited by the statute.
Why the two properties did not meet the test
For DeVito, the board found that her property did not adjoin the wetlands covered by the approval. It also rejected her argument that her land was riparian to Simms Creek. Land-title evidence and a parcel map showed municipal parkland between her property and the creek, rather than a boundary adjoining the water.
Her alternative argument depended on a chain of effects: wetland relocation would alter the development site’s hydrology, then affect Simms Creek, then harm her property. The board found the evidence insufficient to support that chain, particularly given measures designed to maintain post-development flows at pre-development conditions. It characterized the asserted effects as remote and speculative.
Round argued that some wetlands were only about 24 feet from her property and that filling them could destabilize a nearby steep slope. She questioned the original wetland mapping and said the more distant replacement wetlands would not compensate for effects on her land. She also argued that access to justice should not require her to obtain expert evidence merely to establish standing.
The board accepted that a small portion of the wetlands was near Round’s boundary, but found insufficient evidence that the existing wetlands affected her property or that the approved changes were likely to do so. Seasonal water levels already varied substantially, including dry summer conditions, without evidence establishing the alleged effects on her land.
Carwana also relied on the proposed hydrological design, ministry site checks confirming wetland boundaries, and municipal requirements governing land alteration and slope stability. Necessary permits had to be in place before the work began. He would not infer that those requirements would be breached, or that the property’s location in a hazardous-conditions permit area itself demonstrated likely harm from this particular approval.
No entitlement to application notice established
The homeowners also argued that they should have received statutory notice of the application. The board found that the relevant notice criteria mirrored the standing criteria at issue and, given its findings about their property interests and likely physical effects, found no error in the absence of notice.
The decision illustrates the limits of an environmental appeal based on proximity and concern alone. It does not require homeowners to prove the merits before an appeal can begin, but it does require a supported connection between the challenged work and the statutory rights relied on. The board dismissed this appeal without determining that the broader development was harmless or ready to proceed.



