
The Federal Court of Appeal has upheld a jurisdictional barrier to a damages motion by restored Kehewin Band members, despite earlier declarations recognizing their membership and the long history of the dispute.
In Dumais Estate v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2026 FCA 133, Chief Justice Yves de Montigny, writing for a unanimous panel, dismissed the appeal without costs on July 28. The result rested on the limits of the Federal Court’s statutory authority, not a determination that the damages claims lacked merit.
The appellants had sought compensation from the Kehewin Band and Band Council for the denial of membership benefits. Neither of the two jurisdictional provisions they invoked authorized the Federal Court to decide that claim on the record before it.
Membership declarations preceded the damages dispute
The litigation arose from Bill C-31, the 1985 amendments addressing historical discrimination in the Indian Act against women who lost status and band membership after marrying men without status, and their descendants.
The appellants were restored members or represented their estates. Kehewin resisted recognizing the restored membership. In 2000, the appellants sued both Kehewin and Canada for declarations and damages, alleging denied benefits, discrimination and breaches of fiduciary duty.
Kehewin’s defence was struck in 2009. In 2012, the Federal Court declared the appellants entitled to membership and ordered their names restored to the relevant membership lists, including those used for voting and benefits.
The next phase was a 2016 default-judgment motion seeking damages. After hearing that motion, the judge raised jurisdiction and invited further submissions. In 2020, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the provisions relied upon and dismissed the motion without deciding its merits. The claim against Canada had been held in abeyance pending that motion.
Concurrent obligations are not necessarily conflicting claims
The appeal focused first on subsection 17(4) of the Federal Courts Act, which concerns disputes involving an actual or potential Crown obligation and conflicting claims.
The panel explained that the provision is not confined to a conventional interpleader proceeding, in which a neutral holder asks a court to determine who should receive property. But there must still be conflicting claims concerning the Crown’s obligation.
Here, alleging that both Canada and Kehewin owed duties to the appellants was not enough. Those were concurrent claims, not evidence that Canada’s performance of one duty would prevent performance of another. A disagreement over who controlled membership did not itself establish competing claims against Canada.
The evidence also showed that Kehewin had not applied for or administered supplemental funding for reinstated members. The Crown therefore did not face the competing claims to those funds that might have arisen had the band received money the appellants said belonged to them.
Earlier cases allowing similar pleadings to survive motions to strike offered limited assistance. At that preliminary stage, a court asks whether lack of jurisdiction is plain and obvious. The present dispute required an actual jurisdictional determination on the evidentiary record.
Funding oversight did not establish Crown agency
The appellants alternatively relied on paragraph 17(5)(b), addressing relief against Crown officers, servants or agents. They argued that Kehewin acted as Canada’s agent when delivering membership services and benefits.
The panel rejected the argument without holding that a band council could never be a Crown agent. What was missing was the necessary Crown control over the relevant functions. General accountability, funding-management and potential co-management measures did not establish the required authority to direct how Kehewin prepared membership lists or distributed benefits.
The court also rejected a procedural-fairness challenge to Kehewin’s participation in the jurisdiction hearing after its defence had been struck. The appellants had opportunities to object. Receiving submissions on jurisdiction did not restore or amend the struck defence; the court had to satisfy itself that it could lawfully hear the claim.
Amendments could not cure the absence of conflicting claims, while alleging a different agency relationship would substantially change the cause of action. The appeal therefore failed on jurisdiction alone.
The appellants have since sought Supreme Court leave. The public docket for file 42534 records a September 25 application and subsequent filings, including a November 9 reply listed as incomplete. No leave decision appeared in the docket checked for this report.



