
Glenn Donald Hunter and Kyle William Watters must surrender more than $1.6 million in commissions and face lengthy capital-market restrictions after the Alberta Securities Commission rejected staff’s proposal to impose identical penalties for their unregistered foreign-exchange business.
In Re Hunter, 2026 ABASC 94, decided July 6, 2026, the panel ordered a $125,000 administrative penalty and 16-year market-access bans for Hunter, compared with a $150,000 penalty and 20-year bans for Watters. Each owes an additional $15,055.81 in costs. Their companies, HW & Associates Inc. and HW TradeFX LLC, received permanent market-access bans.
The individual restrictions last until the later of the stated period and payment of the administrative penalty or its discharge through legal process. Limited trading is permitted in specified registered accounts for the men, their spouses or dependent children, through a registrant first given the decision and statement of admissions. A separate exception permits director or officer roles in issuers wholly owned by the individual or specified family members that neither issue nor propose to issue securities to the public.
Different roles, not identical sanctions
The decision followed the panel’s October 2025 finding that all four respondents had acted as dealers without registration, contrary to section 75(1)(a) of Alberta’s Securities Act. The sanctions reasons recount that they raised approximately $20 million from about 200 investors in Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan between February 2021 and February 2023. About $1.8 million was returned to some investors; most of the rest was lost through unsuccessful trading.
Fraud was not alleged in this proceeding. The panel nevertheless found the unregistered dealing serious: it removed regulatory protections intended to ensure that people dealing with investors are qualified and suitable. Most of the money was raised after regulators had flagged registration concerns.
Commission staff sought $300,000 administrative penalties and 20-year restrictions for both men, arguing that they were equal partners. Hunter emphasized his smaller role, financial difficulties and lack of lasting financial gain. Watters relied principally on evidence of limited means and inability to work, arguing that sanctions had to be proportionate to his individual circumstances.
The panel rejected equal treatment based merely on the partnership label. Watters dominated the actual trading and directly raised $14 million of the approximately $20 million. Hunter remained responsible for participating in the business, but had less primary responsibility for raising most of the money and did not conduct the trades. The panel considered him a lower future risk.
It also accepted Hunter’s remorse and credited his efforts to arrange repayment of some investor funds. Those repayments came from investment money, not a finding that he personally funded restitution. The panel did not accept many of his efforts to minimize his involvement, including his claimed effective steps to stop the trading. Watters had not shown comparable remorse or initiated repayments.
Financial hardship mattered—but not to disgorgement
The commission’s sanctions powers are protective and preventive. The panel had to consider specific and general deterrence while ensuring the combined orders were reasonable and proportionate. Seriousness, personal circumstances, benefits obtained and mitigating considerations all informed that assessment.
The panel accepted evidence of financial difficulty for both men, stronger in Watters’ case. It reduced the administrative penalties that otherwise would have been appropriate, while choosing market-access bans at the upper ends of the ranges it considered. That combination was intended to protect investors without imposing administrative penalties that were crushing or unfit.
Disgorgement required a different analysis. Staff first had to establish the amounts obtained through breaches of securities law; the respondents then had to show why disgorgement of those amounts would be unreasonable. The focus was on money obtained, not merely money still held or spent personally.
Hunter received $600,000 in commissions in his trading account, while Watters received $1,013,137.81. Most of Hunter’s money and part of Watters’ money were subsequently lost through trading. That did not erase the benefit they had obtained or justify letting unsuccessful trading defeat disgorgement. Their financial circumstances did not reduce those orders.
The resulting payments are owed to the commission. The decision does not award investor compensation or establish that any ordered amount has been collected.
Costs followed a separate rationale
Staff sought $30,611.62 in costs jointly and severally against all four respondents. The panel deducted $500 because their advance consent to extending an interim order saved work. It rejected staff’s argument that cooperation already considered when setting sanctions could not also matter to costs: the two orders serve different purposes.
The remaining $30,111.62 was divided equally between Hunter and Watters, rather than imposed jointly and severally. Their positions were comparable but not identical; they were not represented by the same counsel, and neither was simply the other’s proxy. No costs were ordered against the defunct companies.
The final orders also require the men to resign issuer directorships and officer positions immediately. Along with trading restrictions, the bans cover advising, investor relations, specified management roles and acting as registrants, investment fund managers or promoters. The panel concluded the companies should never again handle investor funds and ended the proceeding, replacing the interim restrictions with its final orders.


