Lifemark ordered to pay more than $1 million after discriminatory handling of physiotherapist’s leave and resignation

Alberta’s human rights tribunal ordered Lifemark Health Corp. to pay physiotherapist David Volpi $1,005,338.14 plus prejudgment interest after finding that it discriminated in delaying disability-related leave and accepting his resignation without making appropriate inquiries.

The June 17, 2026 remedy decision, Volpi v Lifemark Health Corp., 2026 AHRC 71, awarded $965,338.14 for lost wages and $40,000 for injury to dignity. Tribunal member Dana L. Christianson also ordered Lifemark to ensure its Village Square location had an accommodation policy communicated to supervisory employees.

The award followed a separate February 18, 2026 liability decision, 2026 AHRC 26. That decision upheld only part of Volpi’s complaint: allegations of harassment, improper diversion of patients and a toxic work environment were not established.

The monetary award was substantially below the $4,575,200 in past and future income losses Volpi claimed, in addition to his request for $60,000 in dignity damages. It was also considerably above Lifemark’s proposed wage-loss compensation, which would have stopped after approximately nine months.

Leave was delayed, not refused outright

Volpi worked for about 16 years at the Village Square Sport Physiotherapy clinic in Calgary. Although the parties described him as an independent contractor, Lifemark accepted that it was his employer for the purposes of the Alberta Human Rights Act. The tribunal did not decide his status for every other employment-law purpose.

His complaint, filed in 2017, was initially dismissed at the commission’s screening stage. As the tribunal’s reasons recount, the Alberta Court of Appeal ultimately directed a full hearing in December 2024. The tribunal then separated liability from remedy.

The evidence showed that the company was addressing legitimate scheduling and workplace issues in 2015 and 2016. Those changes were stressful for Volpi, but the tribunal did not find that the changes themselves amounted to discrimination.

A different conclusion followed from his requests for time away from work. After a week off in July 2016, Volpi sought a longer break for his mental health. The tribunal found that his supervisor pushed him to wait until October 1 because of other scheduled absences. The request was not rejected outright, but the delayed start did not meet his need for earlier leave.

The employer already had information about Volpi’s disability and a history of accommodating it through time off. The tribunal rejected an approach focused solely on what the current supervisor personally knew. The legal obligation rested on Lifemark, which needed appropriate systems for collecting and passing relevant accommodation information to those who required it.

Even without that existing knowledge, the tribunal found enough objective signs to require further inquiry, including repeated requests for leave and an offer to provide a medical note. The employer did not ask for the information needed to assess accommodation.

Accepting the resignation required more than asking him to reconsider

On September 30, 2016, the day before the longer leave was to begin, Volpi submitted a hastily prepared resignation. The supervisor was surprised: Volpi had a long and successful relationship with the clinic and had patients booked for after his planned leave.

The tribunal found that the employer should have paused to inquire into whether disability contributed to the decision. Asking immediately whether anything could change his mind was not enough in these circumstances. Later communications and requests to return presented further opportunities to investigate, which the employer did not take.

The finding concerned discrimination under human rights legislation, not a separate civil ruling on whether the resignation was legally valid. Medical and expert evidence established the connection between disability, the delayed leave and the resignation. The employer had not shown that accommodation would cause undue hardship.

The tribunal emphasized a fact-specific duty to inquire. Its reasons did not turn every expression of workplace stress, or every resignation by a person with a disability, into discrimination.

Why the wage-loss award continued after new work began

Lifemark conceded $267,397.26 for the initial period without work, ending around July 1, 2017. It resisted compensation after Volpi began working at Strive Physiotherapy, arguing in part that he had not proved a permanent medical restriction preventing him from earning as much as before.

Christianson rejected that starting point. The loss being compensated was the discriminatory end of his employment. The question was what he would have earned had that employment continued, with appropriate deductions—not whether he had also proved a permanent inability to work at a particular level.

An actuarial expert provided calculations using income records. Lifemark argued that the earnings information was hearsay because the underlying records were not separately entered into evidence.

The tribunal declined to discard it. The legislation permits flexible evidentiary procedures; Volpi also gave direct evidence about his earnings, supported by other evidence. Lifemark had access to the records used by the expert, could cross-examine both witnesses, did not object when the report was admitted and called no competing actuarial evidence. The tribunal found the income figures reliable.

That did not mean accepting every assumption in the claim.

Reduced earnings assumptions and a shorter loss period

Volpi had earned substantial income partly through operating two patient schedules at once. The company had introduced restrictions on overlapping appointments for insurance-company patients. Christianson found that, even without discrimination, those legitimate changes would likely have reduced his earnings.

She therefore reduced the assumed post-resignation income from Lifemark by 25 per cent.

The tribunal also rejected the assumption that Volpi would have remained with the company until age 69. Although his long service, referral network and value to the clinic supported a substantial period of continued employment, the evidence also included workplace disagreements and interest in other business opportunities. The award covered losses through the end of 2025, rather than the much longer period claimed.

His actual earnings from Strive were deducted. The tribunal found no failure to mitigate: Volpi had worked diligently to obtain new work and succeeded. The 25 per cent adjustment was therefore a reduction in hypothetical Lifemark earnings, not a penalty for failing to look for work.

The additional wage-loss award was $697,940.88. Combined with the initial $267,397.26, the ordered total was $965,338.14.

Dignity damages, interest and an accommodation policy

For injury to dignity, Christianson assessed both the seriousness of the discrimination and its particular effects on Volpi. The repeated failures to inquire, loss of long-term employment and lasting damage to his confidence and professional identity supported the $40,000 award.

The tribunal ordered statutory prejudgment interest from October 1, 2016 to June 17, 2026. It rejected Lifemark’s argument that the lengthy procedural history should shorten that period: neither the parties nor the commission was responsible for the delay, and withholding interest would leave Volpi without compensation for time he lacked funds he otherwise would have had.

The non-monetary order was limited to Village Square. Lifemark was required to ensure that an accommodation policy addressed its disability-related obligations, established a process for assessing and implementing accommodation needs and supports, and was communicated to all supervisory employees there.