Saskatchewan board dismisses member’s union-discipline claim

The Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board has dismissed a SaskPower employee’s separate challenge to internal union charges, finding that the duty of fair representation did not cover the disciplinary process and that his internal-affairs claims were premature.

The June 16 decision in IBEW, 2067 v Popoff, 2026 SKLRB 33 preserves Colin Popoff’s right to seek review under section 6-58 of The Saskatchewan Employment Act if a union trial or discipline occurs later.

It dismisses Popoff’s employee-union application, file 012-26—not SaskPower’s separate unfair labour practice complaint, file 243-25, alleging reprisals connected to his arbitration testimony. Nor is it a finding that the union’s conduct was, or was not, retaliatory.

Claims concerned charges following testimony

Popoff alleged that International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 2067 brought retaliatory and discriminatory internal charges after he testified for SaskPower in an arbitration. He argued that the union’s failure to communicate with or represent him breached its obligations, and that his employment-related testimony brought the dispute within the duty of fair representation.

The union sought summary dismissal, arguing that representational duties did not extend to internal affairs and that no disciplinary penalty had been imposed. SaskPower took no position on that application.

Chairperson Kyle McCreary applied a summary-dismissal test that assumes pleaded facts are true or provable. The issue was whether those allegations could support an arguable legal claim, not whether they had been proved through an assessment of evidence or credibility.

Representational duties and internal affairs are different

The board held that section 6-59 governs a union’s representational role concerning rights under a collective agreement or Part VI of the Act. It does not require the union to represent a member in an internal disciplinary matter.

The connection between the charges and an arbitration under Part VI did not change the nature of the internal process. The board therefore dismissed the fair-representation claim.

Section 6-58 provides a different route for certain internal union disputes. Its natural-justice protection concerns procedural fairness, rather than review of a disciplinary decision’s substantive merits.

Popoff complained that he had not received notice before charges were brought. The board held that natural justice required notice of the charges and a reasonable opportunity to answer them, not advance notice that charges might be laid. His pleading disclosed notice of the charges and an opportunity to respond at a future trial. On that record, a challenge to the trial process was premature.

The claim under subsection 6-58(2) was also premature. Filing charges or threatening discipline was not one of the actions that triggered that provision. Popoff had not pleaded that the union had already imposed discipline or taken another prescribed action.

The dismissal expressly leaves him able to seek review of a future trial or discipline under section 6-58, including an allegation that a subsequently imposed penalty is discriminatory.

Earlier interim order involved SaskPower’s complaint

In the separate SaskPower v IBEW, 2026 SKLRB 2, a board majority granted interim relief in January 2026, directing the union to postpone the trial until SaskPower’s unfair labour practice complaint was completed or withdrawn.

That ruling applied a low arguable-case threshold and a balance-of-convenience test. The majority found an arguable claim under section 6-6 concerning participation in proceedings under Part VI of the Act. Whether the union’s conduct actually amounted to prohibited intimidation, threats or coercion was left for the merits.

The majority weighed the potential chilling effect on testimony and participation in proceedings against interference with the union’s internal democracy. It accepted that both involved risks of irreparable harm, but found that the harm of proceeding with the trial outweighed the harm of delay. It also rejected the suggestion that subpoena powers would resolve concerns about self-censorship or reluctance to assert rights.

Board member Hugh Wagner dissented from granting interim relief. The published reasons record his dissent without setting out his reasoning.

The June reasons described the trial as stayed pending the employer’s complaint. They did not decide that complaint’s merits, and the dismissal of Popoff’s application does not establish the present status of the January interim order.