N.B. appeal court upholds release barring former school employee’s lawsuit against union

A former educational assistant cannot proceed with her lawsuit against CUPE Local 2745 because she voluntarily signed an agreement releasing the union from claims about its representation, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal has ruled.

In Black v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, CUPE Local 2745, 2026 NBCA 55, decided May 28, 2026, the court upheld summary judgment dismissing Terrilee Jill Black’s action and ordered her to pay $2,500 in appeal costs.

The ruling did not decide whether the Anglophone East School District had constructively dismissed Black or resolve the merits of her employment dispute. It concerned whether her release barred the separate claim against the union and whether that question required a trial.

A negotiated resignation

Black had worked as an educational assistant for more than 20 years and belonged to CUPE, her bargaining agent. After the district raised the possibility of termination at a May 4, 2021 meeting, she indicated that she preferred to resign.

The union discussed two options with her: challenging a termination through the grievance process or negotiating a resignation. The motion judge found that those alternatives were fully discussed on several occasions over the following two weeks and that Black repeatedly confirmed she wanted to resign.

CUPE negotiated an agreement that allowed her to keep her retirement allowance and pension benefits. Black signed it on May 18, 2021. The agreement also released CUPE and its local from actions alleging a failure of their duty of fair representation and said it could be relied on to bar such proceedings.

Black later sued, alleging that the union had breached that duty and that she had been coerced into signing. She also challenged her capacity to enter the agreement. A Court of King’s Bench judge dismissed the lawsuit on January 10, 2025, finding the release clear, understood and voluntarily signed.

The evidence supported the release

Justice Quigg, writing for the unanimous appeal panel, found no basis to overturn those conclusions. Black had discussed her benefits, reviewed the document with union representatives and actively participated in settling its wording. She had time and an opportunity to reconsider.

The court distinguished warnings about the possible consequences of not resigning from extra obligations imposed by the agreement. On the record, the information CUPE gave Black about potential termination, benefits and repayment of administrative leave described her employment circumstances.

The court also emphasized the evidence needed to invalidate a release. Although Black asserted coercion and incapacity, no medical evidence was filed to establish that she lacked capacity to understand and sign documents at the relevant time. In cross-examination on the motion, she confirmed understanding and voluntarily executing the agreement.

That was an evidentiary conclusion about this agreement, not a general finding that a person raising an incapacity concern can never challenge a settlement.

The panel also rejected unconscionability, a doctrine requiring both unequal bargaining power and a resulting improvident bargain. In this case, Black had been represented in negotiations by her bargaining agent, participated in the negotiations and requested particular wording. The court found no inequality of bargaining power on those facts.

No trial was required

Under New Brunswick’s summary-judgment rules, a judge may decide a case without a trial when there is no genuine issue requiring one. The court must be able to determine the matter fairly and justly, including making the necessary factual findings and applying the law.

The appeal court said the motion judge had applied the correct framework. The moving party must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that no genuine issue requires trial. Judges also have powers to weigh evidence, assess credibility and draw reasonable inferences unless the interests of justice require a trial.

A party resisting summary judgment must present admissible evidence, rather than promise to produce it later. Here, the material facts supporting enforceability were established and the record did not disclose evidence requiring a trial. The appeal court owed deference to that assessment and found no legal error or obvious, outcome-changing factual error.

Fairness objections also failed

Black alleged bias and complained about her representation and the refusal of an adjournment. The panel found no evidentiary basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias, no procedural irregularity and no indication that proceeding with the motion had prevented her from participating, filing evidence or testifying.

The court declined to admit the fresh evidence she offered in support of her complaints about counsel because it did not satisfy the governing admission test. It also found no exceptional circumstances supporting an ineffective-assistance claim in this civil appeal.

Constructive dismissal was not properly before the court: it had not been pleaded in the original claim or raised in the notice of appeal, and any such claim would be against the district rather than CUPE.

The result leaves the dismissal of Black’s union lawsuit intact. Its practical lesson is the importance of a release’s scope and the evidence supporting a challenge to its validity, not a blanket rule insulating unions from representation claims.