British Columbia’s Forest Appeals Commission has upheld more than $2.35 million in wildfire-control and resource-loss recovery against a boater, rejecting his challenges to responsibility for the fire and to the province’s statutory valuation of damaged forest resources.
In Damgaard v. Government of British Columbia, 2026 BCFAC 3, decided May 22, 2026, panel chair Daphne Stancil dismissed Duffy Damgaard’s appeal. She found that he had not displaced the determination that he started a prohibited garbage fire on East Redondo Island in August 2018, leading to a wildfire.
The disputed recovery amounted to $2,355,772.95: $386,868.79 in fire-control costs, $305,804.16 for Crown timber and $1,663,100 for other forest land resources. A separate $2,500 administrative penalty was not appealed. The original order, confirmed by the commission, totalled $2,358,272.95. This was an administrative appeal, not a criminal conviction, and the reasons do not establish that the amounts have been paid.
Evidence of responsibility
The fire began near a beach where Damgaard’s boat was anchored. A prohibition on category 2 open fires was in effect. An origin-and-cause specialist concluded that burning garbage ignited nearby dry vegetation and spread into the forest. Damgaard did not dispute the specialist’s report, which was included in the parties’ agreed evidentiary record.
The contested question was who lit the fire. Witnesses placed Damgaard and a passenger near the origin area and described trips between their boat and shore. Damgaard denied starting it, argued that the case against him was circumstantial, and maintained that the passenger was equally likely to have been responsible.
He also offered innocent explanations for his conduct after the fire started. He said he had tried to extinguish it, reported it to the Coast Guard and left because a wooden boat near a growing wildfire was in danger. His counsel argued that moving to another anchorage and departing without running lights did not establish wrongdoing.
Stancil accepted that moving the boat and travelling to a different anchorage were reasonable in the circumstances. She did not treat departure itself as proof that he caused the fire. But she drew adverse inferences from other conduct, including leaving without running lights, vague responses when questioned, inconsistent explanations for a later change in travel plans and reluctance to engage with investigators.
The distinction between civil and criminal proof was central. The parties agreed that the applicable standard was a balance of probabilities, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the commission’s practice manual, Stancil held that the determination under appeal placed the burden on Damgaard to establish that he had not started the fire.
Circumstantial evidence had to be assessed in the context of the whole record, using reasonable rather than merely possible inferences. Damgaard did not testify or call witnesses at the appeal. Stancil drew an adverse inference that testimony under oath would have been detrimental to his denial, and found that he had not substantiated the alternative explanation involving the passenger.
The passenger was not a party and was not subject to the determination or recovery order. Stancil expressly declined to decide that the passenger also caused the fire. Her conclusion concerned Damgaard’s responsibility on the evidence and within the scope of his appeal, not a finding against everyone who had been aboard.
Helicopter costs counted as fire control
The Wildfire Act permits recovery of prescribed government fire-control costs resulting directly or indirectly from a contravention, as well as prescribed values for damaged Crown resources. Damgaard argued that the legislation left room to reduce the amounts and that some helicopter spending was excessive given what he described as limited suppression work.
The commission treated two requirements as necessary to include an expense: it had to be incurred for fire control and fall within a category listed in the regulation. Fire control includes actions to contain, extinguish or limit a fire’s spread. Transporting crews and equipment can form part of that work, particularly in an area with limited access.
Activity logs recorded helicopter reconnaissance and the movement of crews and equipment. Stancil found that the $214,033.84 attributed to helicopter fuel and flights was connected to controlling this wildfire and fell within the prescribed category. She did not purport to decide whether the province had chosen the best firefighting strategy; reviewing those operational choices was not part of her determination.
The commission confirmed the full $386,868.79 fire-control component. The reasons distinguish determining recoverable costs under the statutory scheme from a broader critique of how effectively a fire was fought.
Protected timber still had a statutory value
Damgaard argued that charging for both Crown timber and other forest land resources amounted to double counting. He also challenged the use of stumpage to value trees in an ecological reserve, where timber-harvesting rights could not be granted. In his submission, valuing unsaleable trees as though they could be harvested created a legal fiction.
Stancil rejected that interpretation. The Wildfire Act applies to Crown land and Crown timber in an ecological reserve. It incorporates the Forest Act’s method for calculating timber value, not the separate legal machinery for granting harvesting tenure. The fact that the trees could not be sold did not remove them from the wildfire-recovery scheme or invalidate that valuation method.
The commission also found that timber and other forest land resources were separate categories. The latter addressed ecosystem features and values beyond the trees themselves, including plants, soil, water and other intrinsic values. Recovery for damage to both categories in the same area therefore did not amount to charging twice for the same resource.
For other forest land resources in a protected area, the regulation prescribed $5,000 per damaged hectare. Damgaard argued that the uniform rate was arbitrary and produced a staggering amount. Stancil held that once the relevant area was determined, the regulation required that rate; it did not authorize a different valuation because the land lacked ordinary commercial value. The confirmed $1,663,100 component included the protected-area assessment and a smaller assessment outside the reserve.
No reduction based on ability to pay
Damgaard urged the commission to interpret the word “may” in the recovery provisions as permitting partial recovery, taking account of context and ability to pay. He argued that an all-or-nothing approach was impractical where accidental damage could expose an individual to millions of dollars in liability.
Following earlier commission reasoning, Stancil held that the scheme did not authorize reducing the calculated amount within a recovery category. She described the available options as ordering the full amount or none, and found that prescribed circumstances restricting recovery did not apply to Damgaard. She also rejected ability to pay as a basis for reducing this order.
The reasons distinguish recovery from the unchallenged administrative penalty. Factors such as the gravity of the contravention, deliberate conduct and cooperation concern penalty-setting; they did not provide a general power to discount the fire-control and resource-loss calculations in this appeal.
The appeal was dismissed and the order confirmed. The decision’s significance lies both in its treatment of circumstantial evidence in an administrative appeal and in its distinction between commercial harvesting rights and the statutory value of protected forest resources lost to wildfire.
