
A doctor who intervened in an appeal from the dismissal of a professional-conduct complaint failed to obtain an order requiring the complainant to provide security for his appeal costs.
In Mansfield v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2026 NLCA 17, decided May 14, 2026, Justice Daniel M. Boone of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador dismissed Shane Seal’s application. Seal was ordered to pay Rhonda Mansfield’s costs of the application, taxed under Column III.
The ruling did not decide Mansfield’s appeal from the dismissal of her complaint or finally overturn the costs award made against her below. It resolved the preliminary request for security.
Evidence did not establish inability to pay
Mansfield’s complaint had been dismissed by the college’s Complaints Authorization Committee. She appealed to the Supreme Court, where Seal was allowed to intervene over her objection. That court dismissed her appeal and awarded Seal costs. The college did not seek costs.
Mansfield appealed both the dismissal and the costs award. Seal then sought security on the basis that she might not be able to pay his costs if her appeal failed.
The appeal court applied Rule 43(1) of its 2025 civil rules, which requires special circumstances before security for costs can be ordered. Because its wording matched the predecessor rule, the court retained the established approach: security will usually be ordered where the respondent clearly demonstrates an inability to pay, unless the appellant shows the appeal has reasonably apparent merit.
Seal relied on Mansfield’s non-payment of the earlier costs award and the absence of a registered real-estate interest in the province. Neither established inability to pay. Mansfield had sought a stay of the costs order or permission to pay the money into court pending appeal, and had indicated she would pay if the award was upheld. The court also found that not owning registered real estate was insufficient proof of inadequate assets.
Intervenor costs raised arguable issues
The court further noted that Seal would not necessarily receive appeal costs even if Mansfield lost. The usual rule is that intervenors neither receive nor pay costs, although the nature and extent of their participation can justify a different result.
On a preliminary assessment, Mansfield’s costs appeal also had apparent merit. The court identified arguable failures to consider whether Seal’s intervention would contribute usefully, delay or prejudice the proceeding, or require limits. His interest in the case did not alone answer those questions.
There were also arguable questions about awarding costs merely because the intervenor was successful, without considering the usual intervenor rule and the potential chilling effect of costs awards against people who invoke professional discipline processes.
Those observations were not a final decision on the appeal. For this application, however, Seal had not established the financial premise for security, and the costs challenge met the preliminary merits threshold. Having initiated and lost the application, he was ordered to pay its costs.



